



# ***Daily Report***

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## **Sub-Saharan Africa**

FBIS-AFR-90-075  
Wednesday  
18 April 1990

# Daily Report

## Sub-Saharan Africa

FBIS-AFR-90-075

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18 April 1990

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**\* Embattled Leaders Adopt Populist Policies**

34000526A Lagos THE AFRICAN GUARDIAN in  
English 19 Mar 90 pp 8-9

[Article by Emenike Okorie: "Africa: On the Brink: Embattled African Leaders Adopt Populist Strategies"]

[Text] Felix Houphouet-Boigny, Cote d'Ivoire's [Ivory Coast] embattled president is, obviously, a man of little words. Faced with the option of trying to restrain leaders of the anti-government demonstrations with passionate appeals for understanding, and chasing the protesters off the streets with tear gas and armoured tanks, he chose the latter. Last Monday, the president swarmed the major streets, road intersections and bridges in Abidjan, the capital city, with squads of gun-totting soldiers and paramilitary troops equipped with anti-riot gear.

Later, at a press conference Tuesday (his first in five years), President Houphouet-Boigny sought to justify his hardline posture. First, he dismissed the demands by the students for his resignation, and the transformation of Cote d'Ivoire into a multi-party democracy. Thumping the table for emphasis, the 84-year-old president (some swear he is at least, 90), announced his readiness to use force (even if that meant injustice) to keep order. "Faced with injustice and disorder," he told the crowd of journalists in Abidjan, "I shall not hesitate to choose injustice."

For Houphouet-Boigny and the other half-dozen African leaders in Gabon, Benin, Niger and elsewhere, threatened by mass demonstrations and strikes, survival has become the key word. To try to retain their endangered positions, they have been forced to adopt varying survival strategies—some harsh and noncompromising, others somewhat conciliatory.

While the Ivorian leader has maintained a hardline posture, heaping the blame of the almost one-month-long unrest on western firms—which he said were trying to destabilise the country by driving down the prices of cocoa and coffee, the main export—the authorities in Gabon, for instance, are doing something else. President Omar Bongo, whose 23-year-rule has been threatened by wide-spread street protests and crippling labour unrests, is reaching out to the students and workers through a number of people-oriented policies.

Among other things, the president has formed a new cabinet and promised to introduce full-scale indigenisation of national enterprises, to ensure quicker replacement of foreigners with Gabonese nationalist in key positions. Other populist measures being introduced by Bongo include involvement of workers in the national commission for the distribution of housing, cancellation of examination fees for students, and personal intervention to ensure more effective distribution of drugs to government dispensaries. These were some of the demands by the Gabonese students, teachers and other workers whose six-week-long riots and strikes shut down

the nation's international airport in Libreville, capital city. They disrupted telephone, telex and other essential services.

In Niger, General Ali Saibou, the president, has also embarked on reform of sorts, in a bid to puncture the political tension generated by the recent mass protests and violent clashes between students and police in Niamey. Last week, he announced yet another cabinet reshuffle—the second in just three months. Observers believe the new changes, which re-established the post of prime minister (abolished in the first cabinet reshuffle last December) was necessitated by criticisms that General Saibou had, in the December exercise, alienated the Serghai-Zerma tribe which accounts for about 10 percent of Niger's seven million people.

Further deep-reaching political reforms were announced in Niger's south-western neighbour, Benin Republic, last week. The newly constituted council of ministers adopted a draft directive granting general pardon to all political prisoners, including those implicated in the abortive coups of 1981 and 1988. This was in keeping with the earlier resolution by the national conference of major political forces (February 19-28) which, among other things, called for immediate release of all political detainees.

It was also this 500-member National Conference, set up to broker the country's march to democratic rule, which dethroned former President Mathieu Kerekou and made him head of a commission of three former Beninois presidents charged with monitoring the transitional government of Prime Minister Nicephore Dieudonmo Soglo.

As desperate efforts to forestall further political unrest continue in Cote d'Ivoire, Niger, Gabon and Benin, some of their neighbouring governments, faced with similar possibilities, are moving to protect themselves. Here and there, new security measures are being adopted alongside a hodgepodge of hurriedly-arranged reformist packages.

In Zaire, for instance, perhaps out of the fear of a possible backlash, President Mobutu Sese Seko has surprisingly reversed his last month's decision to drastically cut back on social programmes. Now, to reduce a projected trade deficit of \$65 million, he has announced the reduction by half, salaries of ministers and other top-ranking government officials. At the same time, President Mobutu has not only promised to upgrade social services—health, education, rural development and so on—but to increase the housing and transport allowances of teachers, doctors and other professionals.

In Nigeria, Ghana, Togo, Liberia and other countries sandwiched between the affected nations, there is the fear that the growing wave of people's power protests in the continent might spill over. In war-ravaged Ethiopia, the government of Mengistu Haile Mariam is stepping down some of its Marxist tendencies, partly in response to the sweeping changes in Eastern Europe and, some

also say, in reaction to the on-going development in Africa. Last week, Kenyan President, Daniel arap-Moi was also reported to be making desperate moves to placate students demanding his resignation over the mysterious death of former minister, Robert Ouko.

#### **Benin Minister Opens News Agency Seminar**

*AB1704213290 Dakar PANA in English 1636 GMT  
17 Apr 90*

[Text] Cotonou, 17 April (PANA)—Benin's minister of information and communication Mr. Tchitchi Tousseint, on Tuesday in Cotonou confirmed the country has opted for multiparty democracy.

Opening of the seminar on management of news agencies organised by UNESCO, the minister said that the transition government had chosen this option, adding that the new constitution would be based on it. The transition government was a culmination of the national all-party conference which brought together the political forces within and outside the country to examine the calls for democracy.

The government is still led by President Mathieu Kerekou but a new prime minister and many senior government officials were chosen to run the administration.

Speaking earlier at the seminar, the coordinator of the Cotonou-based West African News Agency Development (WANAD) programme, Babacar Fall, urged African governments to support news agencies by conferring them with specific statutes conforming with their functions.

In spite of the economic situation, marked by the economic adjustment programmes, he said, the African environment remains favourable to the news agency development in view of the progress and growth of freedom.

Now in its third phase, the WANAD programme, established in 1984, is to have a satellite reception network. A news agencies' computerisation network and an information outfit costing four million U.S. dollars.

The initial eight million U.S. dollar financing for the three phases of the WANAD programme came from West Germany.

WANAD, a UNESCO project, will now cover the 16 countries in [word indistinct] Africa as Liberia, Senegal, Cape Verde and Mali have now joined the programme, which also includes the Central African countries, except Congo.

Some 15 directors of news agencies are participating in the four-day seminar.

## Chad

### Libyan 'Disinformation' on Battles Denounced

AB1704165990 Ndjamená Domestic Service in French  
1900 GMT 14 Apr 90

[Text] The Libyan regime, a few days after its devastating defeat in the entire east of Chad, is in a complete delirium. Indeed, the Libyan media in their editions of today, Saturday, 14 April, continue to say that the forces of the Islamic Legion are still controlling the Chadian localities and Bahai and Tine.

This piece of information, which is as fulsome as it is false, can hardly cover up the disarray of the Libyan Government as it once again watches its dreams of destabilization and annexation of our country being shattered. After the considerable human and material losses that the Chadian National Armed Forces inflicted on its Islamic Legion at Tine and Bahai, the Libyan regime obviously does not know where to turn following the very substantial human and material means it that deployed in this action.

In the face of this fresh failure, Al-Qadhdhafi is trying once again to abuse Libyan and international public opinion by indulging in deception and disinformation, the only field in which they excel, but even then, very awkwardly. As is known already, Libyan media operations are based on the principles of deception. They have become versed in the art of building up Al-Qadhdhafi's unfulfilled dreams.

## Sao Tome & Principe

### \* Development Projects With EEC Described

90EF0267A Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS  
in Portuguese 2 Feb 90 p 51

[Article by Sao Tome correspondent Maximino Carlos:  
"Sao Tome and Principe Maintains Silence"]

[Text] Sao Tome and Principe—whose economy is characterized by a relatively undeveloped agricultural sector centered around the growing of cacao, the export of which represents on the average more than 80 percent of all receipts in foreign exchange—signed the Lome Convention in 1977, after which date its cooperation with the European Economic Community developed within the framework of that agreement. In 1979 the country signed Lome II, in December 1984 Lome III, and on 15 December 1989 Lome IV, which has not yet gone into effect.

While waiting for the convention to go into effect, the Sao Tome Government is maintaining silence. The amount involved is still not known, nor how it is to be utilized. The Sao Tome representatives will have to negotiate with the EEC delegation present in Sao Tome

concerning the National Indicative Program, in order to carry out a detailed evaluation of the EEC intervention that has taken place over the past 11 years, and establish other areas for intervention.

It is known, however, that under the Lome IV Convention—the duration of which is 10 years (1990-2000)—there are possibilities in the area of social infrastructures, especially with respect to roads, health, and education.

The budget established in the previous convention—Lome III (1984-89)—for the National Indicative Program within the framework of the EDF [European Development Fund] was 6 million ECU's [European Currency Units], including 4 million for agriculture, the Sao Tome Government's top priority area. This sum was utilized in the project for rehabilitation of the palm plantations and includes the production of high-yield seeds and the popularization of agricultural methods adapted to local conditions. Specifically, it is the Project for the Development of Edible Oil Crops, which has two stages. The first stage consisted of the planting of selected palm trees and the second—the current stage—consists of the construction of a factory for industrial utilization with the capacity for processing 3 tons of clusters per hour. This means that the country will be self-sufficient in edible oils.

The factory will be constructed by the firm Ramalho Rosa, Ltd., and should be completed as early as this year provided the building materials arrive according to the schedule established in the agreement.

These actions have gradually taken on the greatest significance for the country's foreign trade. Of all the merchandise shipped to Europe cacao is the most important item, but cacao exports have recorded a sharp decline since 1979 as a consequence of the substantial decline in the prices for the product on world markets and also because of a decline in the quantities produced.

The principal items imported from the EEC are food products, manufactured articles, machinery, and transportation equipment.

Also in this connection, in consideration of the isolated location of the islands, a ship, the Pague, was acquired. It will provide regular service to the African continent in an attempt to respond adequately to the requirements for the transport of passengers and freight.

This acquisition was financed in part by the National Indicative Program and in part by the Regional Program for Trade Among the Countries of the Gulf of Guinea (Sao Tome and Principe, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, and Cameroon).

A joint study conducted by Portuguese technicians in the employ of the EEC and by Sao Tome technicians reports that the ship is not adapted to the existing trade structure

of the region, in that it was built for the transport of cargo of small tonnage, for on its voyages to Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, and Cameroon the discovery was made that some cargo came in containers, which the ship had not been built to accommodate. To cope with this situation the EEC financed a project for rebuilding the Pague to adapt its internal structures. The ship is currently in Portugal for this purpose.

Fishing is another priority area of the Sao Tome Government. In this connection, and with the objective of creating the conditions for greater utilization of the country's fishing resources, the Indicative Program provided for steps to be taken to rehabilitate the existing port infrastructure, specifically, partial restoration of the refrigerated facilities, construction of an icemaking plant, and personnel training.

In 1983 an agreement went into effect regulating the conditions under which the fishing boats of the EEC member states could fish in the territorial waters of Sao Tome and Principe. Six boats are currently fishing under the terms of this agreement. In return, the EEC is committed to paying an annual compensation: The right to fish is subject to the payment of a license fee of \$15,000.

With this money the EEC pays Sao Tome and Principe's contribution to the Regional Fishery Commission and also pays for the country's participation in the international conferences that deal with fishing.

In the area of health, provision has been made for the rehabilitation this year of Santo Antonio do Principe Hospital. The project is funded at 980,000 ECU's, with the participation of the AMI (International Medical Aid)—a Portuguese nongovernmental organization currently operating in Sao Tome—and several embassies, in particular the Canadian Embassy.

#### **Improve Health**

This project has been turned over to the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Cooperation, and Ministry of Social Development and the Environment so that they may formulate plans for getting it under way. The project calls for expansion of the hospital facilities and the acquisition of modern equipment and medicines.

Also in the area of health, the EEC is funding a project to fight AIDS and also provided \$50,000 in emergency aid during the cholera epidemic.

Outside the framework of the Convention, the EEC has a joint program with Sao Tome and Principe for the import sector involving 1 billion 400 thousand ECU's, of

which 1 million is earmarked for the acquisition of a generator group and 8,000 electricity meters.

A Belgian company has undertaken the job of installing the generator group, while the National Clock Factory (National Regulators, Inc.) will install the meters. At the present time the Sao Tome Government is awaiting a definitive response from these two firms. The installation of these two items, however, is contingent on the restructuring of the EMAE [Electricity and Water Company], which is being carried out in conjunction with a French company.

Approximately 400,000 ECU's are being used to purchase food, especially sugar, milk, and edible oil; caustic soda; and soap.

In addition to the Import Sector Program there is the Food Aid Program, under which Sao Tome and Principe has received significant quantities of cereal grains and "butteroil," which are sold to the public at low prices.

Also noteworthy within the framework of EEC cooperation is the project to bring water to the city of Trindade e Sao Joao dos Angolares, but the project is currently facing a series of problems. The fact is that since the provisional dedication of the project—at a ceremony presided over by President Pinto da Costa during the commemoration of the 10th anniversary of cooperation between the EEC and Sao Tome and Principe—the supply of water to the population has been inadequate. Four Portuguese companies participated in the project, one of which was Hidroprojecto, which planned and supervised it, but the reevaluation of the project is currently encountering many difficulties because the subcontracting firm, SOMEK [not further expanded], and Hidroprojecto are awaiting possible negotiations with the Sao Tome Government.

The basic objectives of the government are the establishment of a more just and equitable society, the development of a secure food supply, and the improvement of the material and cultural living standards of the population.

The efforts being made by the national authorities to achieve these objectives include employing the nation's productive forces in the task of national reconstruction, utilizing the creative initiative of all active participants in the economy, giving the workers responsible roles to play, and consolidating Sao Tome's relations with the neighboring countries and with the rest of the world.

Sao Tome and Principe is a member of the Economic Community of Central African States (CEEAC), whose sixth summit was held very recently in Kigali, Rwanda, and was attended by President Pinto da Costa.

In 1982 the international community granted Sao Tome and Principe "least developed country" status (LDC).

**Zaire**

**Security Forces Mount 'Sweeps' in Kinshasa**

*AB1704151490 Paris AFP in English 1424 GMT  
17 Apr 90*

[Text] Brazzaville, April 17 (AFP)—Security forces mounted widespread sweeps through the Zairean capital Kinshasa at the weekend, and held several militants of the clandestine Union for Democracy and Social

Progress, a traveller said here Tuesday. He said party leader Etienne Tshisekedi was believed to be under house arrest after calling for a march to protest against the power of President Mobutu Sese Seko last Saturday. The march failed to take place.

The source said the security presence had been boosted throughout Kinshasa, and the sweeps were made by the special Presidential Guard, the para-military Civil Guard, and an anti-terrorist corps.



## Ethiopia

### ANC's Mandela Stops Over En Route to Harare

EA1704182790 Addis Ababa Domestic Service  
in Amharic 0930 GMT 17 Apr 90

[Text] The African National Congress (ANC) vice president, Comrade Nelson Mandela, made a short stopover in Addis Ababa this afternoon before he left for Harare, Zimbabwe. During his stopover at Bole International Airport, Comrade Mandela made a press statement.

In his statement, the South African freedom fighter said that Ethiopia is a pioneer and in the forefront of the African freedom struggle by giving training and making a material and moral contribution to African freedom fighters in general, and to southern Africans in particular. Comrade Mandela added that he himself had received his first training in Ethiopia about 30 years ago.

Comrade Mandela and his wife Winnie Mandela made the stopover in Addis Ababa after attending a concert in London held in his honor, which attracted more than 700,000 spectators.

Comrade Mandela has left Addis Ababa for Harare to celebrate the 10th anniversary of Zimbabwe's independence. Comrade Mandela and his wife were welcomed and seen off by Comrade Berhanu Bayeh, Workers' Party of Ethiopia Central Committee Politburo member and vice president of the State Council.

### Comments on Vlok, Natal Disorders

AB1704204490 Paris AFP in English 1134 GMT  
17 Apr 90

[By Veronica Forwood]

[Text] Addis Ababa, April 17 (AFP)—South African police have been shooting at peaceful demonstrators in the country's troubled areas, African National Congress (ANC) Deputy President Nelson Mandela said on a stopover here Tuesday.

Mr. Mandela, who was on his way from attending a pop concert at Wembley Stadium in his honour, told journalists that government measures announced to control police violence in South Africa were being "sabotaged" by Law and Order Minister Adriaan Vlok.

He said the minister was "uncooperative and has no sympathy with black aspirations", while the government was "inconsistent".

Pretoria had recently sent the "so-called 32nd Battalion" of mercenaries from Angola into troubled areas and they were "sent into those areas to kill".

He also charged that police sided with the conservative Inkatha movement in clashes in Natal Province with the pro-ANC United Democratic Front (UDF) and trade union supporters.

"The government has seized on this situation for the purpose of eliminating those forces they regard as a threat to the principle of the white minority", he said.

He would raise these issues and the fact that political activists were still being detained by the authorities in a meeting with the government scheduled for May 2.

Mr. Mandela, who was en route for celebrations in Harare of the 10th anniversary of Zimbabwe's independence, described the Wembley concert as "very warming".

Winnie Mandela described it as "fantastic". "It was so moving, we had no idea the world identified with us to this degree". Mr. Mandela who was released from jail in South Africa on February 11, met Ethiopian President Mengistu Haile Mariam during a brief visit here on March 8.

The ANC leader praised Ethiopia for having trained some of the first ANC fighters and added that Addis Ababa was continuing to provide such [word indistinct].

Mr. Mandela, who declined to meet British Premier Margaret Thatcher during his visit to London to mark his disapproval with her call for the lifting of international sanctions against Pretoria, said he did not know when he would return to England to meet her.

He said the ANC National Executive in Lusaka was busy drawing up a programme of visits to foreign countries. "When that is finished, I will know exactly when I will visit England", he said.

Replying to a question about Hungary's forging of diplomatic ties with South Africa, Mr. Mandela said he felt that Eastern European countries taking such steps would send a "wrong signal" to the world that countries should relax pressure against South Africa.

### Umtata Radio Reports

MB1704163090 Umtata Capital Radio in English  
1500 GMT 17 Apr 90

[Text] Nelson Mandela has renewed his attack on Law and Order Minister Adriaan Vlok. Speaking in the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa, Mandela accused Vlok of sabotaging government's efforts to end factional violence.

Mandela also said Pretoria should first confer with black leaders before taking steps to end the violence. He said unilateral action would not get the support of the masses if the measures taken did not have the support of credible black leaders.

Mandela was in Ethiopia en route to Zimbabwe's independence celebration. He had left the concert in his honor at London's Wembley Stadium. He described the experience as so moving I had no idea what to say.

### Deputy Prime Minister on Negotiations With Rebels

AB1704224790 London BBC World Service in English  
0730 GMT 17 Apr 90

[Interview with Ashagre Yigletu, deputy prime minister, by Elizabeth Ohene in Addis Ababa; date of interview not given; from the "Network Africa" program]

[Text] We now receive the man who has been given what some people feel an impossible job—to negotiate peace between his government and rebel forces. After 30 years of fighting, peace seems as far away now as it has ever been in Ethiopia. Two attempts at peace talks between Eritrean rebels of the EPLF [Eritrean People's Liberation Front] and the Ethiopian Government side in Atlanta, USA, and in Nairobi have produced nothing, and last month's talks in Rome between Ethiopian Government representatives and the TPLF, the Tigray People's Liberation Front, did not produce anything either. But the man who has got the job of injecting new momentum into the Ethiopian Government's peace efforts is Deputy Prime Minister Ashagre Yigletu. In Addis Ababa, the capital, Elizabeth Ohene asked him if the government's approach to the two movements varied:

[Begin recording] [Ashagre] In general, the peace talks have been identical. But what is very important is that these two opposition groups want... [changes thought] The EPLF has created the TPLF and, at present, the TPLF is serving the EPLF as a mercenary of the EPLF. In fact, we have noted that they are conducting the peace talks in coordination, because on several of the procedural issues their stands, their positions have been identical; and also, their position or their wish in finalizing or not finalizing the peace talks have also been identical.

[Ohene] Some of the groups have said their problem is not with the state of Ethiopia; it is with this government. Now, is this government willing, in the interests of the unity of Ethiopia, say, to relinquish its power, in the hope that there might be peace?

[Ashagre] I think this view is, perhaps, meant to disrupt, you know, the understanding of the international community. The Government of Ethiopia [words indistinct] because Ethiopia has a government which is democratic, which has been democratically elected by the people, you know.

[Ohene] Is this a matter that you will be willing, say, to put to a referendum in the two regions?

[Ashagre] Well, this issue of referendum is (?uncalled for). No opposition group that emerges from a given region freely decides on the destiny of the entire population of Ethiopia. In fact, this is simply an aside issue that is raised, you know, by the opposition groups.

[Ohene] [words indistinct] you yourself, are you optimistic about your country?

[Ashagre] Really, I do not, anyway, have to be [word indistinct] by these movements, you know. What is really worrying us is that this war that has been going on, you know, for the past nearly three decades has only brought immense human and material loss to this country. Our economic development, our social development is being obstructed. So what we hope is that the opposition groups, perhaps later on, will come to their senses and really change their position, and really come to the peace talks and try to really resolve the problem by peaceful means. [end recording]

### Rebels: Another Ethiopian Pilot Defects to YAR

EA1804104290 (Clandestine) Voice of the Broad  
Masses of Eritrea in Tigrinya 0400 GMT 18 Apr 90

[Excerpt] The pilot of an Ethiopian fighter aircraft, landed in North Yemen [Yemen Arab Republic, YAR] yesterday, with a MiG-23 and sought political asylum there. The name of the Ethiopian pilot who sought asylum in North Yemen yesterday, 17 April, was Captain Esuyihun Ashine. He revealed that the fighter aircraft which he was flying had carried cluster bombs supplied to Ethiopia by Israel. He added that he dropped the bombs in the Red Sea.

It should be recalled that an Ethiopian pilot flew another Dergue fighter aircraft to North Yemen and sought political asylum on 14 April. The name of the pilot is reported to be Lieutenant Abera Hailu. The additional information we received confirms that the fighter aircraft flown by Lt. Abera Hailu was a MiG-21, not a Czechoslovak-made L-39. [passage omitted]

### Correction to Pilot Defects With Airplane

EA1804104090

The following correction pertains to the item headlined "Rebels: Pilot Defects With Airplane to PDRY," published in the 16 April Sub-Saharan Africa DAILY REPORT, page 9:

Page 9, first column, first paragraph, only sentence, make read: ...in North Yemen [Yemen Arab Republic, YAR] and sought political... (changing editorial note and headline)

## Tanzania

### Government Statement Warns Striking Students

EA1704213790 Dar es Salaam Domestic Service  
in Swahili 1700 GMT 17 Apr 90

[Excerpt] Dar es Salaam—The government has directed all students at the University of Dar es Salaam to heed the call by President Ali Hassan Mwinyi to resume their studies forthwith. A government statement issued today said that if they do not the government will take appropriate action against students boycotting lectures despite

the advice of the president, who has pledged to meet them early next month to listen to their grievances and suggestions.

The statement said: The government regrets the indiscipline exhibited by those students who have declined to heed the call of the president, who is ready to listen to their demands concerning allowances and benefits, which were more than doubled in January this year. It said: Despite the country's difficult economic situation, the government has been giving full consideration to the university students' demands so as to enable them to meet the high cost of living, just as it has been doing in the case of workers and citizens in general. [passage omitted]

### Uganda

#### Holy Spirit Rebels Attack Refugee Camps

AB1704155290 Paris AFP in English 1136 GMT  
17 Apr 90

[Text] Kampala, April 17 (AFP)—One person was killed and 23 others kidnapped when rebels believed to belong to the remnants of Priestess Alice Lakwena's Holy Spirit Army attacked a refugee camp on the outskirts of the northern Ugandan town of Kitgum.

According to a UGANDAN NEWS AGENCY report, published Tuesday by the official NEW VISION newspaper, the attack occurred on April 7.

The camp, with over 8,000 southern Sudanese who had fled fighting between Sudanese Government troops and rebels of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), is located in Jenge village on the outskirts of Kitgum.

Camp commandant Julius Laput told the paper that there was general panic when the rebels attacked.

He said the rebels seized the camp's dispensary chief Galdino Loryany, forced him to open the dispensary and then looted all the drugs available.

They robbed camp inmates of nearly 200,000 Ugandan shillings (600 dollars), set fire to 12 grass-thatched huts and two tents. Three other tents were taken by the rebels.

The rebels had given warning of the attack almost a week earlier in leaflets circulated in the camp. The rebels said they would be seeking youths to conscript into the rebel army.

Meanwhile four people were murdered by National Resistance Army (NRA) soldiers in Kelim village of eastern Uganda's Kumi District where government forces have been carrying out mopping-up operations against rebels of the Ugandan People's Army (UPA).

Kumi District's political leader Haji Umaru Okodel told NEW VISION that the soldiers were on the run but being sought by authorities.

The paper did not specify the date of the incident.

## President de Klerk Addresses Parliament 17 Apr

### Views Negotiations Process

MB1704144190 Johannesburg SAPA in English  
1437 GMT 17 Apr 90

[Text] Parliament April 17 SAPA—The irrevocability of the process of constitutional change and negotiation in South Africa placed an enormous responsibility on the shoulders of all leaders in South Africa, the state president Mr F.W. de Klerk, said on Tuesday [17 April].

Opening the debate on his budget vote, he said sterile ideological debate should be replaced—the time for straight, honest talking had arrived.

Since September 6 last year, the government had been endeavouring to promote negotiation, and would continue to pursue this course.

President de Klerk said the government had acted with conviction, and not from a position of weakness.

But the ball was not only in its court—a responsibility also rested on every other leader.

He hoped the debate on his vote would be realistic.

The same applied to those outside, and specifically the ANC [African National Congress].

No-one could have the attitude that there should be victory before negotiation.

There should be a realistic climate for negotiations and realistic negotiations.

The points of view of the various parties had to be clearly understood.

Mr de Klerk said the past two general elections—in 1987 and last year—would be recorded as turning points in South Africa's history.

They had placed South Africa irrevocably on the road to far-reaching constitutional change.

The agenda was open and the overall aims to which the government was aspiring should be acceptable to all reasonable South Africans.

Among others, the aims included a new, democratic constitution; universal franchise; no domination; equality before an independent judiciary; the protection of minorities as well as of individual rights; freedom of religion; a sound economy based on proven economic principles and private enterprise; dynamic programmes directed at better education, health services, housing and social conditions for all.

Mr de Klerk said the politics of confrontation, so typical of the Westminster system and South Africa's history, had to make way for the politics of consensus.

Leaders outside, and specifically the ANC as well, had to moderate their statements in the realisation that negotiation was a process of debate and agreement, of giving and taking.

If negotiations were abused to gain time for secret, disruptive agendas, negotiation would become futile, Mr de Klerk said.

### Comments on Planned 'New' Nation

MB1704151490 Johannesburg SAPA in English  
1456 GMT 17 Apr 90

[Text] Parliament April 17 SAPA—When negotiations for a "new just South Africa" had been completed they would be put to the electorate by way of an election or a referendum and, if approved, would be implemented by the Parliament as prescribed in the new constitution, the state president, Mr F.W. de Klerk, said on Tuesday [17 April].

Speaking in his budget vote, he said the point of view he would be taking to the negotiating table would be that powersharing offered the most safe and reasonable system for a new South Africa.

"This viewpoint was nothing to do with apartheid and is not aimed at continuing discrimination, but merely at keeping account of the inescapable realities of South Africa."

He said the aim of the government was a new and just South Africa for all its people as fellow citizens of the same country. There also had to be fairness towards the rich diversity of the country's population.

"That is the only workable alternative."

In the meantime, while negotiations were still under way, and later when they were already in progress, orderly government would continue in terms of the existing constitutional systems.

"Strategies to disrupt existing systems, such as the governmental structures of the self-governing territories, will be strongly opposed. We are not married to any system, but dare not allow effective government to be brought to a standstill at any level."

Change had to take place constitutionally and in an orderly manner.

Mr de Klerk said everyone was talking about the new South Africa.

"Some are snide about it, other arrogant. However the majority are looking forward to it avidly with hope and expectation.

"One feels sorry for the snide. They are despairing in their fearful refusal to face the realities of South Africa. Like drowning men they are clutching at the straws of oversimplified and unworkable cliches from the past."



They were trying to hide their inability to adjust to realities behind a forceful bravado and aggression. They were dangerous to the new South Africa and had to be opposed vigorously.

Those who arrogantly equated the concept of a new South Africa to a takeover of power should realise that the new South Africa would belong to all its people and would offer security and prosperity to all its inhabitants.

He said the framework for the new South Africa should have justice as its basis and should be characterised by responsible and orderly government.

It had to be properous with opportunities for advancement and guaranteed property rights for all its people.

"It must be a country that everyone will be proud of and untied in their common loyalty and nationhood, enriched by diversity of its population groups."

Such as South Africa was within reach if everyone rose about [as received] selfishness, anxiety and greed.

#### **Details Concept of 'Equal Rights'**

*MB1704152690 Johannesburg SAPA in English  
1506 GMT 17 Apr 90*

[Text] Parliament April 17 SAPA—Anyone who believed that the National Party government would accept a dispensation that dismantled the quality of existing freedoms and rights was making a mistake, the state president, Mr F.W. de Klerk, said on Tuesday [17 April].

Speaking in his vote of the budget, he said while the government was striving to create equal rights for all, it was not prepared to destroy existing rights or allow them to be destroyed.

"Those who presently enjoy full political rights are not planning to apologetically disappear from it in any new dispensation.

"We are not going to let the freedom and values that had been built up over three and half centuries, be thrown overboard," he said.

#### **Criticizes CP's Information Leaks**

*MB1704155890 Johannesburg SAPA in English  
1432 GMT 17 Apr 90*

[Text] Parliament April 17 SAPA—The leader of the Conservative Party [CP] had acted with shocking irresponsibility by circulating an untested piece of security information illegally, the state president, Mr F.W. de Klerk, said on Tuesday [17 April].

He referred to a secret document which purported to be proof that the ANC [African National Congress] was planning to assassinate right-wing leaders.

Mr de Klerk opened the debate on his presidential budget vote and said the document in question was one

of thousands of unverified security reports received daily from the security community.

A subsequent inquiry by him had revealed that the security evaluation had serious doubts about the content and the credibility of the source which had never before supplied verifiable information.

The content of the information had also contradicted information received from other reliable sources.

President de Klerk rejected the insinuation that the government had deliberately ignored the report or that the ANC prescribed to it.

This image which was being promoted was defamatory and devoid of truth, he said.

He said the CP's handling of the matter, which totally ignored the established procedures for dealing with sensitive issues, could have endangered lives.

"It was clearly obtained in an illegal manner. It was marked secret and it must have been clear to any novice that it contains sensitive information.

"It is totally shocking that the leader of the Conservative Party (Dr Andries Treurnicht) had, in order to get at the government, acted in a grossly irresponsible manner."

By going to the press with the report, Dr Treurnicht had made an unevaluated report public. Such unevaluated reports could contain anything from rumours and disinformation to valuable information. Every report therefore had to be subjected to an evaluation process.

"Only information of satisfactory credibility is passed on to the decisionmaker.

"In the present case it was decided not to lay the report before the decisionmaker," he said. It had been decided, in view of the unreliable nature of the information, to subject it to further investigation.

"I cannot expect that every scrap of information obtained be passed on to the government," Mr de Klerk said.

As it turned out the investigation he had asked for had indicated that the information, purporting to reflect a decision by the ANC's National Executive Committee, appeared to be a fabrication by some unknown party aimed at further polarising the South African community, destabilising the authorities and thwarting the present process to establish a peaceful dispensation in South Africa.

All this information the CP could have obtained through confidential inquiry.

"The established tradition of confidential contact between the government and recognised political parties on possibly sensitive security information was totally ignored.

"If it had been from a delicately placed source, the CP's handling of it could have threatened people's lives.

"The Conservative Party, and in particular its leader, owes Parliament an explanation on the obtaining and the handling of a classified report."

#### **Insists ANC Renounce Armed Struggle**

*MB1704182790 Johannesburg Domestic Service  
in English 1600 GMT 17 Apr 90*

[Excerpt] The state president, Mr. F.W. de Klerk, says that in preliminary talks with the ANC [African National Congress] the government will insist that the organization commit itself irrevocably to peaceful change. This must include an end to violence and to the call for an armed struggle.

Speaking during the debate on his budget vote in Parliament, President de Klerk said the continued commitment of the ANC to armed struggle, even if it was only a rhetorical commitment, was an obstacle in the way of negotiation.

He said there were three fundamental alternatives to the existing constitutional dispensation, namely partition, majority government on the basis of one man, one vote; and power-sharing.

President de Klerk called partition an unattainable dream. He said that majority government was not suited to South Africa because it would lead to the domination and even suppression of minorities. He said the government was convinced that power-sharing, based on full participation by all and protection against domination, offered the only workable solution. [passage omitted]

#### **Treurnicht Rebuts De Klerk Criticism on Leaks**

*MB1704174690 Johannesburg SAPA in English  
1642 GMT 17 Apr 90*

[Text] Parliament April 17 SAPA—A document purporting to contain an ANC [African National Congress] threat against right-wing leaders had been given to the Conservative Party [CP] by an official of the National Intelligence Service [NIS], the CP leader, Dr Andries Treurnicht, said on Tuesday [17 April].

Responding to the state president, Mr F.W. de Klerk's address earlier in the debate on his budget vote, Dr Treurnicht said if an official of the NIS deemed it worthwhile and so important that he revealed the contents of the document to the CP, it had tremendous implications.

"I want to ask the state president whether his officials in the department of National Intelligence are playing games or whether they are busy with disinformation in planting the document on us."

Dr Treurnicht said the important thing was the state president had admitted there was such a document.

"He says the document is unreliable and unevaluated. If an official of the NIS deemed it worthwhile to reveal its contents to us, then I consider it important.

"The contents affect me personally. Why should I then go through channels to investigate its validity when it is in the public interest to reveal it?"

"The rest of its contents is old news. I am not sorry I revealed the existence and contents of the document."

#### **Democrats' De Beer Praises De Klerk Address**

*MB1704175690 Johannesburg SAPA in English  
1555 GMT 17 Apr 90*

[Text] Parliament April 17 SAPA—The state president, Mr F.W. de Klerk, had introduced an important concept with his announced support for a constitution based on votes of equal value, the leader of the Democratic Party [DP], Dr Zach de Beer, said on Tuesday [17 April].

Speaking in the debate on the president's vote, he said that although Mr de Klerk had not met the expectations built up around the speech, he had taken a step forward with this concept.

"We have heard before of a vote for each South African but they were not of equal value.

If President de Klerk meant there will be no loaded votes, no gerrymandering, no superior white vote over any other vote, it was an important step.

What he was interested to know from the state president was whether he was in favour of separate or common voters rolls.

"I don't know of a vote of equal value on separate rolls. One vote of equal value to another is only possible on a common voters roll," Dr de Beer said.

He was also pleased with Mr de Klerk's support for the decentralisation of power.

"I am pleased because the DP has stood for a federal system for a long time.

"What a federation does do, by decentralising the sites of power, is to make it very difficult for tyranny to take over."

He said it was necessary to build one nation because if this was not done, the new constitution would fail.

"We must learn to pursue the joint interests that South Africans have in common."

For this reason he was disappointed that there had been no further indications about the repeal of apartheid legislation such as the Reservation of Separate Amenities and Population Registration Acts.



**Further Reaction to Address**

*MB1804062990 Johannesburg Domestic Service  
in English 0500 GMT 18 Apr 90*

[Excerpts] The state president, Mr. F.W. de Klerk, says that when constitutional negotiations have been completed, the results will be put to the electorate in an election, or a referendum.

Speaking during the debate on his budget vote in Parliament, President de Klerk said that, should the electorate say yes to the proposals, Parliament would implement them in a constitutional manner.

He said earlier in the debate that, in preliminary talks with the ANC, the government would insist that the organization commit itself irrevocably to peaceful change. This had to include an end to violence and to the call for an armed struggle. [passage omitted]

The leader of the Conservative Party [CP], Dr. Andries Treurnicht, said the CP believed that Mr. de Klerk had no political formula for avoiding domination by blacks. He said the government was going ahead with negotiations in spite of several ANC officials having stated that the organization would continue its so-called armed struggle.

The parliamentary leader of the Democratic Party, Dr. Zach de Beer, again urged President de Klerk to make a statement of intent about a future dispensation. He said that this would engender trust in those who took part in the negotiating process.

The Labor Party spokesman on foreign affairs, Mr. Peter Hendrickse, said in the debate that his party supported the state president's statement that the new South Africa had to be founded on justice but that this ideal would not be achieved before all apartheid legislation had been scrapped.

The chairman of the Ministers Council in the House of Delegates, Dr. J.N. Reddy, said participants in the negotiating process should not make statement that could harm the South African economy. He said that no one would be able to meet the aspirations of the people with a run-down economy.

**Treurnicht Criticizes U.S. Invitation to Mandela**

*MB1704162490 Johannesburg SAPA in English  
1539 GMT 17 Apr 90*

[Text] Parliament April 17 SAPA—It was unacceptable to the Conservative Party that United States President George Bush had invited Nelson Mandela to America as if he were the state president-designate, the leader of the opposition, Dr Andries Treurnicht, said on Tuesday [17 April].

Speaking during the state president's vote, Dr Treurnicht said that at the same time, the United States still imposed sanctions on this country, which was a form of cold war against South Africa.

"I would like to tell the United States that if it thinks it can impose a dispensation on South Africa, it will have to accept responsibility for the resulting strong reaction."

Referring to outside interference in South Africa's internal affairs, he said the European Community ministers who had visited South Africa had tried to sell an illusion of non-racialism "which they could not even achieve in Europe. They know all about racial tension in Britain, the aspirations of Canadian and American Indians for self-rule and those of the Palestinians.

"They find it impossible to talk realistically about South Africa without donning green spectacles and seeing everyone as being green."

With regards to former restricted organisations, Dr Treurnicht said the unacceptable unbanning of the ANC [African National Congress], PAC [Pan-Africanist Congress] and SACP [South African Communist Party] were contrary to categorical assurances from former State President P.W. Botha as well as from president F.W. de Klerk.

"The government has done what it accused the Democratic Party of aspiring to prior to the September 6 elections."

The stage had now been reached where the negotiation table was beginning to crack under all the problems that had to be discussed.

"This table is the climax of the liberation struggle. The ANC, PAC and SACP are intent on seizing power which they will do with violence if power is not handed over to them.

"The pattern is first power followed by a socialistic state."

Mr Nelson Mandela's plea for sanctions to be maintained against South Africa was a plea for the continuation of the cold war.

"Together with this, the liberal media has continued to dish up Mandela as a great statesman—and still the government is prepared to negotiate with him.

"The official policy of the ANC is one of armed struggle and the organisation's terms for negotiation will ensure a transference of power or else the armed struggle will continue.

"Every member of the delegation for talks announced by the ANC have all, in the recent past, reiterated their commitment to the armed struggle.

"According to the government, negotiation per definition is not wrong as it involves a process of give and take. What is going to happen is that the government is going to give and the ANC will take."

The government was handing over to the black majority and it had no political formula to prevent black dominance.

### Minister Details Earlier Meetings With Mandela

MB1704160890 Johannesburg SAPA in English  
1553 GMT 17 Apr 90

[Text] House of Assembly April 17 SAPA—The minister of justice, Mr Kobie Coetsee, met the then-jailed ANC [African National Congress] leader, Mr Nelson Mandela, three times at his official ministerial residence in Cape Town in 1986. Mr Coetsee said on Tuesday in written reply to a question from Mr S.C. Jacobs (CP [Conservative Party] Losberg).

The meetings had taken place on July 20 and 21 and October 10.

He had met Mr Mandela 10 times outside prison premises.

Others had been at the Volks Hospital on November 17 1985, at Tygerberg Hospital on August 17 1988, at Constantiaberg Mediclinic on September 4 1988 and at Tuynhuys on July 5 and December 13 1989 and February 9 this year, and at his office in Cape Town on January 25 this year.

He had met Mr Mandela in prison 12 times between January 1 1987 and January 31 this year.

### Buthelezi Launches 'Scathing Attack' on COSATU

MB1704180590 Johannesburg SAPA in English  
1740 GMT 17 Apr 90

[Text] Ulundi April 17 SAPA—KwaZulu Chief Minister Mangosuthu Buthelezi, in a scathing attack on the Congress of SA [South Africa] Trade Unions [COSATU] on Tuesday [17 April] accused the organisation of aiming to become a government.

In his policy speech delivered in the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly on Tuesday, Mr Buthelezi said COSATU was building power bases which went far beyond that which a trade movement would require to do its trade union job.

"I predict...that we will yet see the COSATU dog bite the ANC [African National Congress] master and shake it like some vicious brute turned master killer," he said.

"Trade unions have a job to do. Black political parties have a job to do and God help South Africa if we do not keep these two separate.

"The way COSATU is developing, it is quite clear that COSATU is looking forward to becoming a COSATU government over a COSATU-run South Africa."

Mr Buthelezi said he would not tolerate political interference in trade unionism. "Nor...will I tolerate trade union interference in my politics.

"There are two totally incompatible roles that COSATU is trying to play. It is trying to use workers and it is trying to spend workers in the pursuit of national political objectives, while it is trying to define a worker role to increase South Africa's economic efficiency."

Mr Buthelezi questioned how Inkatha could sit down and talk peace with COSATU while the union continued treating him as a leper and Inkatha as a pariah organisation.

Mr Buthelezi said the demoralisation of Inkatha came from the fact that he had never given the word for Inkatha to go out on pre-emptive attacks.

"God knows if I had to say yes, let us go and clean that mess up there would be an awesome spectacle of absolute brute power sweeping all the muck out of the greater Pietermaritzburg area."

He said, however, that this would not be right.

"Do not win victories by violence and have to govern by violence afterwards."

Inkatha was committed to establishing a fair and just society through negotiation, he said.

"There is going to be a new dynamic in Inkatha this year—a new claiming of new areas of centre-ground politics, a new striking of new alliances and new accords to create every-widening circles of support bases for the politics of decency and justice."

### Vlok Outlines Plan for Reducing Natal Violence

MB1704204390 Johannesburg Domestic Service  
in English 1600 GMT 17 Apr 90

[Text] The minister of law and order, Mr. Adriaan Vlok, says the government is convinced that a permanent solution to the unrest in Natal lies in three fields of action. He was speaking during an interpolation in the House of Assembly about measures being implemented to resolve unrest in South Africa in general and in Natal in particular.

He said the three fields were security action, good government, and a constitutional solution that was acceptable to most of the people affected by it.

The Democratic Party renewed its call for the appointment of a commission of inquiry to allow the police who had been accused of bias to clear their name. It also called for the Pietermaritzburg district to be declared a disaster area.

The Conservative Party argued that the government was trying to deal with ANC [African National Congress] foot soldiers while at the same time allowing their supreme commanders to go free.

The coordinator of security forces in the unrest areas of Natal, Brigadier Jaap Burger, says there are sufficient police and members of the Defense Force there to keep the situation under control. He said the presence of the forces had resulted in fewer incidents of violence in Natal in the past few days.

He predicted that they would receive increasing cooperation from residents. Brig. Burger emphasized that residents had been subjected to so much intimidation in the past three years that their attitudes and suspicions could not be banished overnight.

#### **Full SADF Contingent Deployed in Natal**

*MB1804100590 Umtata Capital Radio in English  
0600 GMT 18 Apr 90*

[Text] The full contingent of South African Defense Force troops allocated to Natal has now been deployed in the troubled townships.

The coordinator of security forces in the province, Brigadier Jaap Burger, says violence has decreased in the past few days as a result. He says he expects greater cooperation from local residents in the townships that security forces have received in the past.

#### **Cazankulu 'Tense,' Public Urges Chief To Resign**

*MB1804050690 Johannesburg SAPA in English  
2114 GMT 17 Apr 90*

[Excerpt] Giyani April 17 SAPA—Most civil servants in Gazankulu streamed back to work on Tuesday but the situation remained tense with calls for Chief Minister Hudson Ntsanwisi to resign.

The civil servants have reportedly not yet received their salaries for March, and MPs on Tuesday petitioned Prof Ntsanwisi to pay the workers.

The petition also requested him to "normalise" the situation by removing SA Defence Force personnel from the homeland, releasing those detained under the state of emergency, as well as an end to further detentions.

A SAPA correspondent in Giyani reported that soldiers moved around the homeland capital on Tuesday sounding the message that people who want them to be removed from the homeland were only criminals wanting to perpetuate crimes. During the day the soldiers moved base from Giyani Stadium to Dzingidzingi about 10km from Giyani. [passage omitted]

#### **PAC Founder Masemola Dies in Car Accident 17 Apr**

*MB1804044790 Johannesburg SAPA in English  
0447 GMT 18 Apr 90*

[Excerpt] Johannesburg April 18 SAPA—Pan-Africanist Congress [PAC] founder member and former longterm Robben Island prisoner Japha Masemola, 60, has died after sustaining internal injuries in a motor car accident midday near Garankuwa on Tuesday [17 April].

"Jeff was on his way to Garankuwa Hospital for treatment to his foot. When we heard about the accident we rushed to the hospital but when we reached there at about 9pm he was already dead," Mrs Dorah Maodi, one of the three sisters of the dead PAC leader said on the telephone to SAPA on Wednesday morning.

She said as soon as people heard about Mr Masemola's death they flocked to her house in Atteridgeville which she had shared with her late brother.

"We just couldn't believe it...to die after getting freed after 27 years in prison. He wanted to do so much," Mrs Maodi said.

She added that her brother had died after being admitted to Ward One of the Garankuwa Hospital.

In an interview shortly after his release from prison the PAC political lion said: "We are not paper tigers. We are the real blood tigers."

Mr Masemola, a former teacher, was released from Deipkloof Prison on October 15 along with seven African National Congress leaders after serving 25 years of a life sentence imposed on him on July 2, 1963 (he was in prison at the time of sentencing). [passage omitted]

#### **18 Apr Press Review on Current Problems, Issues**

*MB1804134790*

[Editorial Report]

#### **THE STAR**

**Mandela Must Structure, Discipline ANC**—"The need to maintain international support helps to explain Mr. Mandela's extensive travels abroad," remarks Johannesburg THE STAR in English on 18 April in a page 12 editorial. "But very soon the time will come to concentrate his efforts on bringing structure and discipline to the ANC [African National Congress] at home so that it can serve as a cohesive force for peace, especially in such stricken areas as Natal."

#### **BUSINESS DAY**

**Review of Business Response to Reform**—Nelson Mandela's "persistence in calling ruin upon the South African economy" is "one sign among many that business needs to rethink its response to the turmoil that is likely to continue throughout the present decade, no matter what happens on the political front," says the page 6 editorial in Johannesburg BUSINESS DAY in English on 18 April. Intellectual argument "has no effect on the condition of intense emotional hostility into which apartheid has cast most black South Africans." So businesses should respond to the demands of the trade unions. "Employers need to concentrate their efforts where they can make a difference: on raising the living standards of their own employees." "Arguments for capitalism fall on deaf ears; a stake in the business is likely to have a very different effect. At least, it will be less ineffective than shows of charity or the appointment of token managers in persuading black people to try to preserve the system."

#### **CAPE TIMES**

**'Importance' of White Zimbabweans' Contribution**—Cape Town CAPE TIMES in English on 11 April in a page 8 editorial says Zimbabwean President Mugabe's

appointment of three whites to his cabinet following his election victory "shows the importance he attaches to the contribution of the white minority." "While Zimbabwe is often seen south of the Limpopo [River] as having gone to the dogs since independence, this is simply not true. The country has enjoyed consistent economic growth under the Mugabe government which fortunately pays only lip service to its avowed Marxist economic philosophy." "Zimbabwe is determined to attract local and foreign investment once again. Yet Mr. Mugabe's continuing talk of a one-party state is counter-productive. In the past his actions have spoken louder than his words. Let us hope it stays that way."

**Worker Pay Rises Welcome**—A page 6 editorial in Cape Town *CAPE TIMES* in English on 12 April welcomes the "substantial pay rises" effective from 1 April for some 260,000 lower-paid workers in South Africa. Hopefully, the increases "signal a change in approach by the authorities who appear prone to blurring the differences between social welfare payments and remuneration for services rendered."

#### THE NATAL WITNESS

**'Panicky' Reaction to Pietermaritzburg 'War'**—Pietermaritzburg *THE NATAL WITNESS* in English on 6 April in a page 4 editorial remarks that Afrikaner Resistance Movement (AWB) leader Eugene Terreblanche "tells us that the AWB wants a million guns," and in Pietermaritzburg "gunsmiths are sold out of stock." It is "an understandable, albeit panicky reaction to the war in Edendale, but it is no solution to anything. Indeed there is good reason to believe that that conflict has been exacerbated by the increasing use of firearms, legal, illegal and homemade."

#### DIE BURGER

**Increasing Acceptance of Government Good Faith**—Cape Town *DIE BURGER* in Afrikaans on 9 April in a page 10 editorial says that in "sharp contrast" to the ANC's cancellation of talks with the government "there is evidence that the government's good faith to get the negotiation process underway—especially since President de Klerk's historic speech on 2 February—is receiving increasing acceptance. The ANC must recognize that strong powers in and outside the country are waiting impatiently for a peaceful negotiated settlement in South Africa. Transparent attempts to delay the process are no longer acceptable. The quicker the ANC learns this lesson and removes all doubts about its honest intentions, the better."

**Criticism of Biased ANC Propaganda**—"While it is progress that the ANC finally announced its delegation to the talks with the government early next month, in the same statement it tried to make biased political propaganda," declares a page 16 editorial in Cape Town *DIE BURGER* in Afrikaans on 11 April. "This does not help to create a favorable climate for talks. Clearly the ANC is still feeling the sharp criticism it brought upon itself in

South Africa and abroad by canceling the original talks. It is still trying to place the blame for the stumbling block on the government."

**'Double Standards' on ANC Torture**—A second editorial on the same page says "claims of five ANC dissidents of ANC torture camps can according to international observers be the tip of an iceberg of repression by this organization against members who differ with its policy and methods. Therefore it is a pity that Archbishop Desmond Tutu, to whom the five ANC dissidents turned to for help, did not grasp the opportunity with greater eagerness to find out more about the alleged torturing." "What would the archbishop's reaction be if it were a government organization against whom the allegations were made?" "The slowness to expose the trampling of black human rights by other blacks creates the impression of double standards."

#### TRANSVALER

**ANC 'Abuses' Government Negotiation Intentions**—Gerrit Velthuisen writes in his "My View" column on page 8 of Johannesburg *TRANSVALER* in Afrikaans on 11 April the ANC is "busy abusing the government's earnest intentions to begin negotiations—and to make a success of them, to strengthen its own shaky position. Over the past three months, since the shock it received on 2 February, the ANC is looking to see how far it can go to embarrass the government and strengthen its own position." It is also clear the ANC is trying to establish itself as the "only negotiator on behalf of the 'masses'." For this reason it has tried to keep every other potential negotiator from black ranks away from the table. For this reason the government has not yet succeeded in getting the negotiation process properly under way."

#### BEELD

**Editorial Questions ANC Democracy**—Johannesburg *BEELD* in Afrikaans on 12 April in a page 12 editorial comments on Dr. Beyers Naude being in the ANC delegation that is to meet with the government, saying: "He has already committed himself in his manner to the creation of a just society, but the test of whether it is attainable or not has only dawned now. The dominating question is whether his friends in the ANC are truly committed to democracy in the Western sense. Is that what a Mandela, a Slovo, or a Modise propagate with regards to armed struggle reconcilable with the values, often strongly religious, that Dr. Naude pursued for thirty years? If not, the sacrifices of people such as Dr. Naude will eventually be futile."

#### VRYE WEEKBLAD

**Editorial Examines Buthelezi Stand on Violence**—Johannesburg *VRYE WEEKBLAD* in Afrikaans on 12 April in its page 20 editorial says the time has come that Inkatha Chief Buthelezi's real role in South African politics and in the regional politics of Natal is examined with "brutal honesty." We no longer believe Buthelezi when he insists on his opposition to violence. There is more than



enough evidence that his Inkatha movement and his homeland policy plays an instigating rather than a peace making role in the tragic violence which has become an epidemic in Natal over the last few weeks." "With his repeated view that he opposes violence, but cannot prevent his people if they want to 'defend' themselves, he has created the impression among his supporters that he condones attacks on any one from the opposition."

#### \* De Klerk's 'Ambiguous' Message Viewed

34000556A Johannesburg SOWETAN in English  
23 Mar 90 p 11

[Commentary by Joe Thloloe]

[Text] These past few days have been exciting.

The drama, for my boss Aggrey Klaaste and me, started last Thursday when we went to see State President F.W. de Klerk.

It got rather hairy when we had to report the renewed violence between supporters of Black Consciousness and those of the UDF [United Democratic Front] in the West Rand and the horror ambush in Hammerdale when 15 people died.

It reached an emotional climax when the South African flag was lowered and the Namibian one was hoisted in Windhoek at midnight as March 21 started.

Then we reported on South African remembering the massacre of 69 people in Sharpeville on March 21 1960 and that of 21 in Langa in Uitenhage on March 21, 1985.

#### Waited

I would have paid a fortune to read De Klerk's mind as the South African flag came down in Namibia. He stood there, right hand on his left breast, and emotion swept over him. As he turned to find his seat afterwards, I thought he would shed a tear, but he did not.

Cape Town: The guards at the gate let us through another guarded gate before we reached the door of Tuynhuys. We wait for a while in an elegant meeting room with a South African flag.

Then Mr Casper Venter takes us to meet De Klerk.

I'm surprised that he looks smaller than in his pictures and on television. He has his charming smile as he shakes hands and the photographer takes pictures.

Then we sit down to talk, for 30 minutes off the record and another 30 on record.

#### Process

His major problem is that his vote is coming up in Parliament in three weeks' time, so he cannot disclose too much. But we have to ask what is on everyone's mind now.

[SOWETAN] How do you see the process of negotiations from now, sir. Dr Viljoen has said that the National Forum, for instance, has already shown that it has a constituency and it therefore has a place at the negotiating table.

You have also mentioned people like Dr Buthelezi. How do you see all these people coming into the negotiating process? By invitation?

[De Klerk] I would say that before you can really have full negotiations in the fullest sense of the word, you will have to broaden the consensus as to who must sit around that table ... in bilateral discussions—with maybe multi-lateral but different types of the total leadership in South Africa.

I personally think that it will be a good thing if that broader consensus can be reached as soon as possible.

[SOWETAN] The Pan Africanist Congress has recently said that it believes that there should be a one-person one-vote election for a Constituent Assembly and it believes that this would be a democratic way of getting the negotiation process going.

#### Helping

[De Klerk] My reaction is that—it is not specific to that but you can take it as a reply to that—the negotiating process should in no way be seen as a replacement of normal ... the continuance of orderly government. It is firstly a parallel process.

Secondly, any person or organisation who states a precondition for negotiation which will really offer him a victory with regard to points which have to be discussed at negotiations is really not helping the process of negotiations.

It is for that reason that I emphasise that we want to enter the negotiations without preconditions.

#### Route

[SOWETAN] But is this not a way of saying, how does the process start? And they are saying, if you have a one-person one-vote election to a Constituent Assembly that will debate a new constitution for the country....

[De Klerk] That would appear to be the route that was followed in South West Africa/Namibia and I think that South Africa's position is totally different because South Africa is a recognised State and the effect of that will be to a certain extent to ignore the constitutional realities of South Africa.

[SOWETAN] Dr Viljoen at one point suggested that there might be an election for black representatives.

[De Klerk] He mooted it as a possibility some time ago but the impression that I have is that there was quite a negative reaction to that and we do not intend to force such a method down the throats of anybody.

[SOWETAN] What do you see as a fair way of getting the negotiation process going?

[De Klerk] I think it is getting the most important leaders to agree on how to get it going. So I think we must concentrate now on discussions with each other and leaders of South Africa. How we want to get the negotiation process going and how we hope to structure it ... must be the result of discussions and dialogue and negotiations about negotiations.

I have talked to homeland leaders. I will continue to talk to them—they have a constituency. It is a question of talking to everybody, leaders of smaller groups, leaders of bigger groups, leaders with smaller constituencies, leaders with bigger constituencies.

[SOWETAN] You have already said that the idea of a vote for black representatives was received negatively. Since then have you thought of other possibilities that the Government can put forward to get the negotiations going?

[De Klerk] Yes, but I would prefer to discuss that with leaders and not to discuss it through the media.

And so as we walked out of his office we knew only what De Klerk has been saying all along—that he wants to negotiate a new constitution—but we were as vague as ever about our destination and the route to take us there.

De Klerk and the National Party remain as ambiguous as ever even at this crucial time, on the eve of their meeting with the African National Congress in Cape Town on April 11.

South Africans should pray that after his experiences in Namibia De Klerk manages to pull another rabbit from his hat at that crucial meeting.

#### \* Area Envisioned for Afrikaner Homeland

34000556C Johannesburg THE STAR in English  
19 Mar 90 p 2

[Text] The establishment of an Afrikaner homeland may have come a step closer yesterday when Professor Carel Boshoff, son-in-law of apartheid architect Dr Hendrik Verwoerd, launched a development plan for an area of the north-western Cape along the Orange River.

The Orandee Development Area could be the "core which could eventually become the Afrikaner's fatherland," he said.

SABC [South African Broadcasting Corporation]-TV news showed footage of a ceremony at which Professor Boshoff, leader of the Stigting Afrikanervryheid (Foundation for Afrikaner Freedom), unveiled a name plate for the development region in front of about 50 people.

His wife, Anna, cut a white ribbon across the border road into the area.

"A white ribbon of the hope for a land for us white Afrikaners," she said.

Professor Boshoff later planted an olive tree at Kuruman as a symbol of hope for growth. The growth-point

development plan proposes providing an additional 1,000 hectares of irrigated land in the area and new dams and other developments.—SAPA.

#### \* Country Breaking Out of World Isolation

34000560A Cape Town CAPE TIMES in English  
21 Mar 90 p 8

[Commentary by Anthony Johnson]

[Text] Government ministers are over the moon about the positive spinoffs flowing from President F.W. de Klerk's reform initiatives.

South African representatives at international political gatherings are no longer being shunned, Mr De Klerk and his ministers are being inundated with invitations to see political leaders, and prominent visitors making approving noises about the latest changes are becoming almost routine these days.

Britain's Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd said this week that he believed there had been a "sea change" in SA [South Africa] politics and a high-powered U.S. congressional delegation said earlier this month that they were "very encouraged that a real process of change has begun."

Some of the countries most hostile towards South Africa in recent years are now considering setting up embassies in South Africa and calls by the ANC [African National Congress] to step up South Africa's diplomatic isolation have had little impact.

While African countries have, in general, expressed public solidarity with the ANC's plea for increased pressure on the SA government in the run-up to negotiations, many are privately calling for increased trade and cooperation with the Republic.

Deputy foreign minister Mr Leon Wessels says there is "absolutely no doubt" that Mr De Klerk's reforms have paved the way for a watershed in its relations with foreign governments.

According to Mr Wessels, "Mr De Klerk has launched us into a new trajectory because he has elevated South Africa from the low ranks where we were being criticised to the higher echelons where we can break new ground."

Coming back to earth, however, South Africa will not be able to properly mine the rich diplomatic and economic possibilities opened up by recent political developments until the international community judges that there has been an "irreversible" change away from apartheid towards a non-racial democracy in SA.

Understandably, varying and shifting definitions of what constitutes irreversible change are bound to create anxieties within the SA government and make officials ponder the risks of trying to satisfy the fickle requirements of foreign governments and pressure groups.



But if the government should waver, the leading players in the international community have made it plain that existing punitive measures will be maintained or even strengthened.

For example, the U.S. congressional delegation—while praising changes that have already taken place—noted that “it needs to be understood that the basic structures of apartheid remain wholly in place.”

And Congressman Ron Dellums pointed out that while he was prepared to hold back on tightening existing sanctions legislation in deference to changes, “the conditions that gave rise to our desire to impose sanctions—apartheid and oppression—are still there.”

Even the British Government, which has responded to the latest reforms by lifting some sanctions and increasing aid to SA, has noted that the government's commitment towards ending apartheid and moving towards democracy were by no means complete.

African governments have also been urging Pretoria in recent weeks to “settle things in SA so that we can do business with you openly.” Some of the smaller countries are even keen for SA to join the OAU [Organization of African Unity].

The levels of positive reinforcement lavished on Pretoria by the international community in recent weeks will hopefully serve as a sufficiently powerful incentive to continue along the reformist path.

#### \* Black Consciousness View of Negotiations

34000540A Harare SOUTHERN AFRICA POLITICAL & ECONOMIC MONTHLY in English Feb 90 pp 38-40

[Text] The detente exercise being conducted by the superpowers, geared at reducing world tensions, serves to create a general climate of negotiations and settlement of conflicts through peaceful means in various regions of the world. Attempts to solve the Afghan conflict, the cease-fire in the Iran-Iraq war, the Palestine-US talks, the Central American peace process and the reduction of Vietnamese involvement in Kampuchea, all contribute towards a global trend towards peace.

In Southern Africa we have:

- the agreement involving Angola, Cuba, the US and racist South Africa, which has led to the implementation of UN Resolution 435 on Namibia;
- the Zairean-mediated talks between UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] and the MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola] government aimed at ending the civil war in Angola;
- the gradual movement towards a meeting between the FRELIMO [Mozambique Liberation Front] government in Mozambique and the MNR [Mozambique National Resistance] bandits.

In view of the fact that the South African settler-colonial regime is the principal source and cause of conflict in the region, the question arises as to what effect all these will have on racist South Africa. Is the regime likely to negotiate meaningfully, or not?

#### Indicators

There is doubt that the prospects for negotiations are being actively considered and debated in certain circles of the Azanian political spectrum. Of course, it is mainly what might be called the political middle-ground that seems optimistic about the possible fruitfulness of negotiations at this point in time. Roughly aggregated, the set-up seems to be as follows:

1. The neo-fascist white rightwing is completely opposed to negotiations with representatives of the Black community. It favours the intensification and implementation of a harsh apartheid programme as a solution to the *swart gevaar* (black menace). It is represented by such groups as the BBB, AWB, the Conservative Party, the Herstigte Nasionale Party and a variety of other neo-Nazi political-cum-cultural organisations. It exists in parliament as the official opposition in the form of the CP [Conservative Party], which again, made significant gains at the white elections in September, 1989. It has a sizeable presence in the police force and other security apparatus of the state.

The views of this section on negotiations should be taken fairly seriously because, apart from its ability to mobilise the white racists at the polls on anti-negotiations platform, it is also capable of mounting a violent terrorist campaign against Blacks in particular, but also against whites of moderate political disposition. It has access to arms as well as intelligence information. It is elements from this section that have gone on shooting sprees and other forms of terrorism against Blacks, as well as causing expansions at the homes and offices of white political leaders and parties they regard as being soft on black issues.

2. Currently, the ruling Nationalist Party [NP] of F. W. de Klerk emits lots of noise about negotiations with representatives of the Black community. We need to examine realistically what de Klerk and his Party are able to deliver for the benefit of the Black community. F. W. de Klerk has gained a lot of credibility outside of Azania as a man of reason. This is mainly based on his personal manner, which is less vulgar and less aggressive than his predecessor, P. W. Botha. On his record in the Nationalist Party, de Klerk has always been more conservative than Botha. The Nationalist Party itself at its provincial and national congresses, late in 1989, has only accepted a process whereby over a period of five years, adjustment will be made to the system which will still retain group rights, a euphemism for white domination. The NP is extremely sensitive and vulnerable to attack by the white rightwing if it is seen to be moving realistically from the doctrine of apartheid. True enough, several political prisoners have been released since October 1989. But how

much more repression is the regime scaling down? The State of Emergency is still in place. Many activists are still held in prison or police custody. Many patriots face execution. Moreover, the random violence against communities which resist the moves of the regime continue to be carried out by vigilante gangs, and selective murder of activists continues to be carried out by the army and police death-squads.

In terms of even the more immediate demands of Black people, how is the reform process of de Klerk likely to fare? Nineteen-ninety started with the focus of many Azanians centred on the state of education in Black schools. Only 9 percent of Black high school completers gained passes which qualified them for university entry compared to 68 percent of whites. This is based on a massive disparity in the provision of resources and facilities for Black and white education. The regime spends more than five times as much on the education of each white child as it spends on a Black child. Another issue which has been running alongside the dissatisfaction with the failure of the education system has been the strike by workers of the parastatal South African Transport Services on the railways. Rather than settle the demands of the trade union which are simply better wages, the regime has brought in scabs and organised gangs which accompany police to points of disputes. The police spray striking workers with tear gas. While they are reeling from its effects, the gangs, armed with clubs, knives and other hand-held weapons, attack the workers and hack them to death. If the regime is not willing to give in on demands as basic as education and wages, why are we being expected to believe it is ready to negotiate on state power, on the ownership of the land, and the redistribution of wealth in Azania?

3. The liberal wing of the white settler-minority, the so-called white left is most enthusiastic about negotiations. It is represented by the Democratic Party in Parliament and other groups such as IDASA [Institute for a Democratic Alternative for South Africa] and other white liberal groups outside parliament. Through their links with one of the strains in the liberation movement, they have attempted to promote a climate of negotiations. The weakness of their effort lies in the fact that they have a limited constituency, they have no political power and their approach at attempting to promote negotiations with the Black community are limited by their sectarian approach.

4. Within the national liberation movements [NAM], there is a faction which is actively entertaining hopes of negotiations with the regime. In pursuance of these notions, it has:

- played host to various groups of white liberals, academics, church leaders and South African as well as Western businessmen.
- It has drawn moderate constitutional guidelines to demonstrate to these liberals and academics its reasonableness.
- It has circulated a negotiations strategy within its

ranks, and has harnessed a lot of weight and significance behind this document by getting it endorsed by a number of international organisations. Thus, together with the 'liberals' described above, this camp represents the main protagonists for negotiations.

#### Internal Organisations

5. Due to the high media profile attained by the idea of negotiations in Azania in 1989, the internally based mass organisations of the oppressed started consultations towards convening a gathering of supporters of all sections of the liberation movements and all ideological currents amongst the oppressed, to find a common approach to negotiations. The BCM [Black Consciousness Movement] was one of the conveners of the gathering, known as *The Conference for a Democratic Future* (CDF). After frank and vigorous discussion, there was consensus that given all the factors in the Azanian struggle, the time was not ripe for negotiations. The balance of forces is still too heavily weighted towards the regime. Not all 6 000 delegates at the CDF were able to discuss the OAU [Organization of African Unity] Ad-Hoc Committee's Declaration on South Africa. The BCM delegation at the CDF pointed out that those who presented the Document at the Conference,

- should have proposed it earlier since they were co-conveners of the CDF.
- The Azanian people should have been the first to discuss the Document before it was presented to the international community, and before it was adopted by the OAU, the NAM and the UN General Assembly. It was found unacceptable that the Azanian people should be persuaded to adopt certain decisions about their own future without thoroughly examining them simply because the international community had already adopted them.
- the BCM delegates decided that they were willing to overlook the blemishes in the manner in which the Harare Declaration had been handled thus far. They asked for the opportunity to take the Declaration to their organisations, branches, regions and other structures for full discussion. Thus, only one of the organisations at the CDF adopted the Harare Declaration.

6. The BCM, represented by various organisations inside and outside Azania, while not opposed to negotiations in principle, agrees with the conclusion drawn by the participants at the CDF, that negotiations will not yield positive results for the oppressed Black people of Azania at this stage. The Boers still feel strong and arrogant, and many pointers indicate that the only thing to be gained from such an exercise would be to demonstrate how little the regime is prepared to change. It is doubtful whether much time and energy should be invested in an exercise whose results would be so negligible. In his address to the National Congress of the Black Allied Mining and Construction Workers Union (BAM-CWU), Cde Mosibudi Mangena, BCMA Chairman, pointed out that the road to negotiations is not smooth, and that it has to be worked for and paved with struggle and unity by the oppressed. In many other liberation struggles, the oppressed

have gone to negotiations when their organisational and military strength had come close to matching or surpassing that of the enemy. Black people in Azania today would not be able to enforce any agreement which might be reached in a settlement if the whites, who are armed and trained in hundreds of thousands, decided to undermine the agreement.

### Possible Scenarios

With the Namibian independence process well on its way to completion, there are a variety of options the regime may pursue in response to internal pressure from the masses, and external pressure from the international community in the form of sanctions and other measures.

- de Klerk may stick to the pathetic and insulting package approved by his Party as a five-year plan, and challenge the Black community to take it or leave it. Collaborators and puppets in the Bantustans, the urban local government stooges, who have formed the so-called National Forum, and the 'Coloured' and 'Indian' puppets in the tricameral parliament would 'accept' the package and enter into 'negotiations'. The regime may attempt to draw some discredited former members of the liberation movements to give such a process some credibility. It might also try to sell the concept to elements still active in the liberation movement. A token black may be appointed into de Klerk's cabinet.
- A negotiating process which includes a variation of the above in such a way as to split the liberation movement. This will seek to exclude, isolate and marginalise segments of the liberation movement perceived as being less amenable to shameful compromises. This is a possibility that white liberals and academics as well as American imperialism would most probably work for.
- A comprehensive negotiating process where all three main tendencies in the liberation movement and the Bantustan puppets are involved is another possibility, albeit an improbable one, at this point. If it were activated, some of the collaborators might come into it aligned with one component of the liberation movement.

This is the scenario which would be most likely to resolve the conflict in Azania. However, if this scenario came about, the regime, encouraged by its relative present strength versus the liberation movement, and sensitive to the privileges of its white constituency, is likely to be most intransigent, leading to an early collapse of such talks.

### What Is To Be Done?

It is generally accepted that the situation in Azania is far more difficult and complex than in any country in Africa which has so far waged a liberation struggle. The three main political strains within the Azanian liberation struggle have their own programmes and strategies to bring about a just political order in the country. Firstly, as much common ground between the various organisations as possible must be established, from where united

or complementary action against the regime can be launched. Concerted blows would then bring the point at which the conditions for negotiations would be possible. The minimum demand of the combined forces of the liberation movement would have to be one person one vote in a unitary state and the redistribution of THE LAND and all resources. The fulfilment of the rest of the programmes of the components of the liberation movement would have to be striven for by democratic means by the various parties under new democratic circumstances. Any other arrangement which might recognise races, regional interests and ethnic groups would create new areas of strife instead of solving existing problems.

The racist regime is likely to reject a one person one vote system for the foreseeable future. This means there is the need to intensify the struggle. In that struggle, the united support of the Frontline States is crucial.

### \* Attempts at 'Negotiated Settlement' Viewed

340005408 Harare SOUTHERN AFRICA POLITICAL & ECONOMIC MONTHLY in English Feb 90 pp 40-41

[Article by Alie Fataar: "'Negotiations' Over South Africa—Deadlock, Compromise or Abandonment?"]

[Text] Now that the liberation movement's organisations in South Africa have laid their cards on the table regarding the "negotiations" issue, a pertinent question needs to be considered: What really lies veiled behind the current frantic attempts at conjuring a "negotiated settlement" in South Africa?

1. There was that five-day conference in Paris during the last week of November 1989, when ninety high-ranking business people from South Africa and twenty-five ANC [African National Congress] officials met for talks organised by Madame Mitterand. Reports allege that some of our liberators donned the mantle of collaborators with these South African millionaires: bizarre fragments of news about wining and dining (one professed Marxist remarking that what he was drinking was much better than the Cuban 'communist' stuff) and of the back-slapping camaraderie between a regular ANC spokesman and a well-heeled multi-national tycoon from Anglo-American's 44 Main Street Headquarters in Johannesburg. This comrade "sent a major signal to Pretoria's white rulers on Monday by publicly demanding a *multi-racial* transitional government during expected negotiations for a new South African constitution" (*The Herald*, Harare, 29/11/89).

2. Jacques Pelletier, French Minister of Cooperation and Development who was a participant in the Paris meeting, had just been to the Ivory Coast to meet President Houphouet-Boigny, who played host to Mr F. W. de Klerk a day or two later when the latter went to the Ivory Coast ostensibly to deal with the UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] question. It was revealed subsequently that de Klerk's visit to Houphouet-Boigny was in order for "South Africa to



provide the country with a *comprehensive* and *substantial* aid package, centred on developing its gold mining industry". (*The Star*, 13/12/68).

3. At the Paris soiree, with late night sessions of 'intense discussion over bottles of red wine', the comrades and the capitalists became 'firm friends' (quotes from *The Star*, 6/12/89). According to the report, the Paris 'talks put South Africa on a new course' and established a rapport between opposing economists, such as that between 'the chairman of JCI [Johannesburg Consolidated Investments], Mr Murray Hofmeyr and the ANC's rising star, Mr Thabo Mbeki.' (*The Star*, *ibid.*). The report ends by significantly observing that there was 'potential for developing a unified perspective of the post-apartheid economy'.

4. A big *baas* of South African and international finance capital, Mr Murray Hofmeyr, as Chairman of Johannesburg Consolidated Investments, pleaded for the 'financial survival' of the regime and the creation of an economic community of Southern Africa along the lines of the 1992 EEC model—"if the region is to survive the next century". Ringing the alarm bells on behalf of the regime's economy, he asserted that with the global economy in the midst of a major restructuring, South Africa would have to accommodate to it if it was to avoid decline. Rapid technological changes and sweeping trading and political realignments were the driving forces behind the global restructuring on the part of international finance capital/imperialism. For Southern Africa to survive, a regional economic community had to be created "from which trade and financial barriers had been eliminated between member countries, with the possible incorporation of a common monetary system". Time was running out for the region, he averred.

5. Another economic luminary on a "settlement" said if "negotiations" succeeded "the ANC, Frontline States and the South African government should unite to form a common desk (now) to minimise economic damage to the region in the short term" (*The Star*, 29/11/89). The speaker was Rhodes University's Professor Peter Vale, saying that Southern Africa had a fragile economic system, and "elements of the South African Government could with *external forces* minimise the damage during the negotiations" period. And when "apartheid went" South Africa's neighbours would deepen, not lessen, their dependence on South Africa, he said amid objections from some "delegates who could not be quoted" (*The Star*, *ibid.*).

Regardless of the nature of the objections, the point is that this obviously liberal professor put his right hand finger on the real objectives of the negotiating/settlement pretensions: to give South Africa the breathing space for its economic hegemony to be entrenched further on behalf of imperialism/capitalism over the sub-Saharan region.

6. And finally, who was to speak on the same occasion in Paris but the head and fount of the liberal bourgeoisie spring, Dr Fred van Zyl Slabbert himself, the Institute for a Democratic Alternative for South Africa (IDASA)

ringmaster, manipulator and facilitator of all these inter-continental safaris? He characterised the "unban, dismantle, release, negotiate" calls as merely a "mantra" (incantation) chanted by all those wanting to solve the South African problem. In any case, he said, opportunistically, "the accommodation between the Soviet Union and the US on regional conflict had now altered events". Then the liberal apologist for the apartheid regime soothingly added that "President de Klerk was starting to pick up the prime bits of this mantra by unbanning *marches* (sic), dismantling separate amenities (sic, sic!), releasing prisoners and indicated a willingness to negotiate" (*The Star*, *ibid.*) One does not have to look further for evidence of double-speak, opportunism and plain deception and, in the event, see who the real plotter of the negotiations hoax is and what he and his cohorts represent and are planning to get the liberation movement to 'settle' for.

The editorial comment of *The Herald*, Harare on 20 December 1989 highlighted what is calls the "South African campaign of deception" in referring to de Klerk's 'confusing the liberation movements' and 'thoroughly confusing the situation in South Africa' to the benefit of the apartheid regime. The Siamese twins—van Zyl Slabbert and de Klerk—are joined head and heart, politically and economically: is it not time that the ANC saw through the wholesale deception that Pretoria has now activated in the hope that the world will be convinced that change is imminent in South Africa? (*The Herald*, 20/12/89). The liberation movement should stop deceiving itself and the people of South Africa and get the struggle for liberation back on course after the liberals had attempted to steer it along channels safe for imperialism/capitalism.

Like sanctions, negotiations are not a "strategy that would cause the collapse of a good trading partner and protector of the capitalist exploitative system such as South Africa is. The intention is rather to persuade 'whites' to draw those not 'white' into the same system, as junior partners. It is to save capitalism in South Africa and, thereby, in the whole of the Southern African region that both the present rulers and the organisations striving for the dismantling of apartheid are being persuaded to negotiate... So the agents and agencies of capitalism-imperialism inside and outside South Africa are already working overtime to give high profiles to persons and organisations within the rank of the oppressed who speak in support of the 'free enterprise' system. And they are mounting the offensive against those organisations that proclaim support for socialism... The present struggle in South Africa is not merely for a post-apartheid society. More particularly, the struggle is about the form, the social, political and economic order, that that society will constitute" (*New Unity Movement Bulletin*, Vol. 3, No. 3, November, 1989).

And so, is it a logical conclusion that a section of the liberation movements (perhaps only a section, it is hoped) both internally and externally will collaborate with the liberal bourgeoisie to negotiate a settlement

which will perpetuate the dominance of the interests of local private capital in partnership with globalised capital, which will place Southern Africa in its neo-colonial framework? Our 'ONE NATION' South Africa/Azania will still have to be built by the anti-imperialist, non-collaborationist struggle. It will be the first nation ever to have existed on our soil. ALUTA CONTINUA!

### \* Democratic Party Role in De Klerk Era Assessed

#### \* Liberal or Left

34000533 Braamfontein FRONTLINE in English  
Feb 90 pp 1-3

[Article by Kierin O'Malley, lectures in politics at the University of South Africa: "The Democrats/1: A Coat of Many Colours"]

[Text] Liberal or left: that's the choice the Democratic Party [DP] faces. Is the DP a power-orientated liberal-democratic party geared to evolutionary reform? Or is it a conciliatory, "soft" party of the left, a potential ally of a revolutionary post-apartheid regime?

This isn't a new choice for the left-of-government opposition. The PFP [Progressive Federal Party] faced the same question—and never answered it.

Contrary to Prog protestations, it was *not* simply the Nat propaganda machine, led by the SABC [South African Broadcasting Corporation], that torpedoed liberal politics. Truth is, the PFP never decided whether it was a liberal party or a quasi-radical party of the left.

The Prog cause was a just one, but the Progs were hopeless at convincing white voters that they could jettison apartheid without becoming a tyrannised minority in a typical one-party African state.

The PFP simultaneously tolerated those who were happy to work as liberal reformers within the system and those, like Jan van Eck, who—however well-intentioned—advocated sanctions, glossed over the consequences of the ANC's armed struggle, and showed little concern about the creeping authoritarianism of the extra-parliamentary left.

But while the PFP tolerated diverse views, the DP has raised diverse views to the level of official policy. It is home to anybody who doesn't like the apartheid government. There are even three leaders to choose from.

But in trying to appeal to everyone, the DP could end up appealing to no one.

The DP is an amalgamation of three basic left-of-government groups:

- On the right are old Bloedsappe and NRP supporters, many of whom are more anti-Nat (or anti-Afrikaans) than anything else and are in the DP because it's the only white party to the left of the Nats. This wing also

includes former supporters of Denis Worrall's Independent Party, which unambiguously called for free-market economics and massive devolution of political power.

- In the middle are the traditional Progs, many of them anti-ideological, human-rights liberals who resent their new, uppity partners. They have always been motivated both by their hatred of apartheid and their support of justice and western democracy.
- And on the left are the nouveau liberated Afrikaners who could no longer stomach Nat-led reform and had found a political home in Wynand Malan's National Democratic Movement.

Of course, the positions aren't that clear-cut, and it's not always easy to tell left from right.

Many of Malan's followers have jumped from being prominent Nationalists in the pre-reform days of the early 1980s to being rabidly sympathetic to the "progressive," pro-ANC [African National Congress] forces outside parliament. They are apparently willing to exchange a "bad" form of authoritarianism for a "good" form—without considering the liberal alternative in the middle.

The DP is unwilling to take stands that will offend any of its wings, especially the left. The three-headed leadership is the most obvious sign of that.

But there are other signs, like the pre-election decision to refuse to decide whether the DP will contest seats in the coloured and Indian houses of parliament. This was supposedly due to a lack of time to debate the issue properly. In fact, it was because the DP leadership doesn't want to offend the anti-participation extra-parliamentary groups that the DP left is courting.

If the DP were a liberal or moderate party, it would obviously contest the seats. A liberal party would label the tricameral parliament racist but recognise that liberal victories in all three chambers strengthen the political middle ground—and make it more likely that the racist parliament won't survive.

The unofficial home of "soft liberalism" is the western Cape wing of the DP, which offered a resolution at the recent party congress in Durban calling for "settlement and conciliation" with extra-parliamentary movements and leaders.

The strength of the left is seen in how few old-guard, "right-wing" Progs are in DP leadership positions. It's also seen in Van Eck's decision to join the DP after resigning from the PFP because it was too moderate.

At some stage, the tensions within the party must come to a head. The moderate and radical wings will have to admit that they don't agree on a wide range of issues: constitutional and economic policies (limited government and free enterprise versus centralised neo-socialism); attitudes to negotiations (hard-nosed talks to bring about liberal democracy versus non-prescriptive

negotiations to give power to somebody new); and participation in government structures (addressing white fears within parliament versus airing black grievances outside parliament).

The tensions were highlighted by two contributions to the *Sunday Times* in October after the Durban national congress. Yeoville MP [Member of Parliament] Harry Schwarz complained about the growing dominance of the sellout left in the party, while DP national chairman Tian van der Merwe, who has roots in that faction, waxed eloquently about the tremendous unity of the DP.

"What the Democratic Party has succeeded in doing so far is to create a real political home for all those in the white community who are committed to an apartheid-free South Africa," Van der Merwe wrote.

But lots of people are committed to "an apartheid-free South Africa" yet aren't committed to a single liberal value. The DP is finding it easier to mouth platitudes about "unity" and "anti-apartheid" than to outline a clear, liberal programme that would offend some anti-apartheid activists.

Pretending that the differences within the DP are minor—or, even worse, don't exist—is cowardly naive. And to argue that all parties have a left and right is simply trite. Of course all parties have a left and right, but in the DP you're talking about a Left and Right. The DP contains elements who in Britain would range from High Tory to the outer fringes of Labour. Being a vote-getting, catch-all party is one thing—ideological incoherence is another altogether.

#### \* Need To Make Enemies

34000533 Braamfontein FRONTLINE in English  
Feb 90 p 3

[Article by Mark Heaton, Democratic Party youth organiser for Bryanston: "The Democrats/2: The Need To Make Enemies"]

[Text] In the aftermath of the Namibian election, much has been said of how the DP [Democratic Party] should learn from the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance [DTA]'s success as a moderate, multiracial party.

But there is one lesson that nobody seems to have caught on to: that the DTA clearly distanced itself from Swapo [South-West African People's Organization]. It showed that you fare better distancing yourself from your enemies than trying to align yourself with them.

At no stage did the DTA ever pretend that Swapo was a bunch of well-intentioned freedom fighters. The DTA didn't make excuses for Swapo's violence or ill-treatment of prisoners. Rather, the DTA criticised Swapo on everything from its economics (bankrupt socialism) to its politics (supportive of, and supported by, unelected one-party Marxist states around the world).

The reason the DTA captured such a high level of black support was precisely because it put itself up as a credible party—and said it was fighting against the threat of a new shade of tyranny.

The DP makes the fatal mistake of treating the ANC [African National Congress] as though it speaks for all blacks. It has concluded that to get black support it must suck up to the left. In fact, until the DP positions itself as a clear alternative to the ANC, it will fail to win significant black support.

Suppose, miraculously, that apartheid were lifted overnight and elections were held tomorrow for a nonracial government. Many people believe the DP wouldn't stand against the ANC but would opt for a merger with it. This view might be wrong. But that it even crosses people's minds shows how unconvincing the DP remains. Too many DP supporters see the party's role as helping to get rid of apartheid as soon as possible so the ANC can take its rightful place as the government of South Africa.

That's a suicidal way to view a movement that is patently not committed to classical liberal values.

The DP patronises the silent majority of blacks when it reaches out to the ANC and MDM [Mass Democratic Movement], which mock liberal values, and ignores organisation like Nafoc [National African Federation of Chambers of Commerce], the Black Management Forum, and the African Council of Hawkers and Informal Businesses, which are liberalism's natural allies.

You would have thought that the snub the DP received at the MDM-sponsored Conference for a Democratic Future in December—being allowed to attend only as observers and then, being regularly criticised from the floor—would have altered the way the party views the ANC/MDM/Cosatu [Congress of South African Trade Unions] alliance. But there is no evidence of this. The DP enjoys its masochistic relationship with the radical left, a relationship the DTA must marvel at.

The DP has lost its sparkle. The "Democratic Future Fund," instituted at last year's launch to raise R20 million over three years, has been shelved. Supporters had been asked to make a monthly pledge, payable by debit order over 36 months. The idea was to have a steady flow of income to build the DP into a powerful political force. But the party shelved the fund because it needs lump-sum donations now to pay off election bills and keep its offices running.

Unless the party proudly and loudly embraces its founding principles—free markets, free elections, individual rights, peaceful change—it will continue to flounder and the prospects of liberal democracy will fade.

With its current image, the DP would make nowhere near the DTA's 30 percent showing in a general election, when, in fact, a liberal-moderate party in South Africa could easily receive the majority of votes in a nonracial



election. The DP needs to start making new friends and stop being concerned about offending people who don't support it and never will.

### \* Unique Selling Point

34000533 Braamfontein FRONTLINE in English  
Feb 90 pp 5, 7

[Article by Tony Leon, MP for Houghton and a member of the DP National Board: "The Democrats/3: Our Unique Selling Point"]

[Text] It's a great irony that as the political ideals of the Democratic Party [DP] become common currency, its role and relevance are being questioned.

Many assume that FW de Klerk has stolen the DP's clothes. But he hasn't. His good words and deeds essentially create more legal space for dissent and debate. He hasn't offered a specific programme to end South Africa's conflict. His party has articulated no clear vision of our post-apartheid future.

It is here where the DP should focus. Our unique selling point is liberal democracy.

There was a time, during South Africa's recent years of political stalemate and mistrust, for the liberal opposition to push for negotiations rather than push its own policies.

But now is the time to reverse the roles and emphasise the details that will make sure democratic liberalism is prominent at the negotiations themselves. We shouldn't see ourselves as simply a team of mediators acting between the state and its other opponents.

The DP, uniquely, stands for a "rights culture." The DP is neither pro-black nor anti-white, nor vice versa.

It starts with the assumption that the individual will flourish when the state itself is restricted. Equally, it has the uncompromising view that the post-apartheid constitution must serve the people and not the party, that the instruments of state would check a DP government as vigorously as it would an ANC or AWB government.

This is where a bill of rights, proportional representation, and dispersal of authority in a federation come into the equation. They are the tools through which individual liberty can be extended and preserved.

Millions of ordinary South Africans—the vast majority, I would submit—are not interested in politics. They wish to get on with their lives.

Oppressive institutions that restrict these ends have abounded in our own history—and throughout the world. But as comforting as it is to see Europe's Iron Curtain being torn down, we should be mindful of the continuing allure of the dogmatic organisation of life, be it communism or racist authoritarianism.

As they search for a new system for South Africa, many still call for state intervention and control of the nooks and crannies of daily life and economic activity. It is the DP's role to oppose this notion unequivocally.

Our faith in the virtue of a market-driven economy does not require, though, the constitutional enshrinement of property or the independence of the Reserve Bank and other assorted protective devices—as important as these might be. Rather, it requires the championing of individual rights, from which economic liberalism naturally flows. No centrally planned state or collective mentality can endure in a climate of institutionalised civil liberties.

This brings us to the question of interaction and negotiation. There is little to be gained in pursuing safari treks to Lusaka or internal missions to extra-parliamentary activists simply for the sake of having a chat, a beer, and a photo opportunity. However, there is a point to such dialogue to pursue our agenda: to actively seek out those who share our commitment.

When the tricameral parliament goes, the DP must be ready to secure black allies.

Namibia's DTA [Democratic Turnhalle Alliance] is instructive here. Twelve years ago, the National Party of SWA [South-West Africa] enjoyed a greater monopoly over political power than its parent party ever has in South Africa. Dirk Mudge's breakaway seemed bizarre. But he used his opportunity, and freedom, to stitch together a patchwork quilt of transcending alliances that gave his party 30 percent of the votes of all Namibians. More significantly, he assured his group a pivotal role in negotiating Namibia's constitution.

This brings us to the immediate role of the DP. Some suggest we should wait patiently for FW to "drop the ball"—that is, hang on until the contradictory forces of the NP [National Party]'s policies end the presidential honeymoon.

But then what? The DP shouldn't be seen as the party to turn to by default when the Nats inevitably stumble. It should be a party that people want to support even as the NP muddles through.

A creative role for the DP would be to up the ante in parliament and in city councils, to anticipate the government's piecemeal reform programme and demand wider-ranging, more sensible alternatives. A pro-active role for the party also means creating its own initiatives. The MDM [Mass Democratic Movement] recently convened the Conference for a Democratic Future. Nothing startling happened. But it was at least an initiative. The DP must develop its own political sex appeal. It too must host, arrange, and participate in conferences, rallies, and "events"—to place its principles and programmes centre stage, and to be a party not just against apartheid but clearly for something much better.

**\* Time for Risks**

34000533 Braamfontein FRONTLINE in English  
Feb 90 p 7

[Article by Harald Pakendorf, political consultant and freelance journalist: "The Democrats/4: Time To Take Risks"]

[Text] South Africa's electoral system, inherited from the British, is not kind to third parties. It favours the top two, in our case, the NP [National Party] and CP [Conservative Party].

That ought to make the Democratic Party [DP] think about its future—particularly as the ruling NP has targeted the DP's reformist support base as a growth area.

During the middle of 1989, the NP decided it would no longer worry about drawing back former supporters from the CP, a strategy that became obvious during the run-up to the September election.

Transvaal leader Barend du Plessis, the minister of finance, said so explicitly during the provincial congress in the Pretoria city hall. And State President FW de Klerk has even stopped referring to the CP in public speeches.

Over the first months of his reign, De Klerk has certainly made many a DP voter believe that he is doing all the DP so vaguely promised it would. Of course, he isn't but the voter thinks he is and that's what counts.

If the election were held today, the DP would be knocked sideways by voters rushing past it to vote for the NP.

"Give FW a chance" has worked.

"So it's time for the DP to think about the future. It can continue to sound a little like the NP and gripe that all FW is doing is nibbling at DP policy and slowly moving in the right direction. If it does that, its downward trend can be forecast with certainty.

Or it can be bold. It can define itself not as a nicer NP but as something radically different.

That would entail several things.

The DP would have to realise that the playing field includes, or is about to include, all of South Africa and that there are black voters out there, too, who need chasing.

As long as the NP clings to race-based policies, blacks will be a logical target for the DP.

It would mean that the DP cannot any longer gently feel its way around the edges of extra-parliamentary politics.

It would have to be active both within and without the system.

Taking such a radical stance might lose it some white voters who feel that FW is saying all the right things but

who take comfort knowing that he is not really going to hand the country over to all those blacks.

It might, however, mean that some voters—and activists—might come back to the DP, relieved that at least somebody is boldly facing the real future.

It would mean clarifying its position with political groupings the party is now politely talking to—such as the Labour Party, the UDF [United Democratic Front], and the ANC [African National Congress]—and either publicly disagreeing with them or, in the case of friends, making strategic deals with them.

In short, the DP has a choice.

It can sit comfortably within white politics, making nonracial noises and talking to extra-parliamentary groupings.

Or it can stride into the unfolding South African political world, taking on all corners in the belief that its message holds true for everybody, not just some whites.

The first choice means that its chances of being gobbled up by the NP are very good.

The second is risky, but at least there is a historical example to follow. The DTA [Democratic Turnhalle Alliance] in Namibia has shown that a nonracial, moderate political grouping can transcend ethnic, language, and racial barriers and be an important—indeed, decisive—player in free-and-fair elections.

It did so by going out early into the wide world of all Namibians, not by playing the whites-only game.

**\* Conservative Party View**

34000533 Braamfontein FRONTLINE in English  
Feb 90 pp 8-9

[Article by Gay Derby-Lewis, member of the general council of the Conservative Party: "The Democrats: The DP's Setting Sun"]

[Text] South Africa's liberal ideal as embodied by the Democratic Party [DP] has had the wind taken out of its sails by President FW de Klerk. With alarming haste, De Klerk has accomplished much of what the DP has been badgering the government about for years. The DP is thus left applauding a Nationalist state president.

But if the NP [National Party] has left the Democrats behind, so have the blacks. When blacks were voiceless, DP-style liberals made it their role to act as political missionaries for the downtrodden. This role is of little relevance when blacks perceive real power on the horizon. For them, the white liberal is useful in a transitional government but not beyond that.

In September 1989, the DP was a good package marketed to a disillusioned electorate. But as the NP moves further left and becomes more acceptable to the city liberal, it will encroach upon the DP's ever-shrinking

enclaves. In the end, the DP will be left with the type of support that laid the old UP/NRP to rest—die-hards who re-fuse to vote for the NP for reasons such as dislike for Afrikaner-style politics.

The squeeze on the DP can only get worse. As the Conservative Party [CP] continues to push the reforming NP out of its traditional strongholds, the NP under De Klerk will look more attractive to DP voters, who will vote for the NP "to keep the CP out."

So what is the role of the DP?

As an opposition party, the DP has acquitted itself well. DP MP [Member of Parliament]s are sharp in parliament and ask many cutting, pertinent questions.

But beyond that, there isn't much of a role. The DP can never usurp the National Party. As it is, the NP has moved way ahead of its supporters on the ground, and there are signs that there is no room for both a reforming NP and a DP.

We were told that 68 percent of the electorate voted for reform on September 6—the sum of the NP and DP vote.

But is this the case? When the Pietermaritzburg city council called for a referendum to decide whether to open facilities to all races, the Natal NP advised voters not to support the move. Furthermore, most city councils throughout the country are holding back on applying to become free-settlement areas, because they find the move politically risky.

For those willing to face the truth, the September election results show the rising strength of the Conservatives and the declining appeal of the liberals.

In 1981, the PFP [Progressive Federal Party] and NRP [New Republic Party] won 34 seats. In 1989, the DP won just 33—and that with sycophantic support from daily and Sunday newspapers, columnists, and widely quoted academics. As the CP's Fanie Jacobs notes in *Monitor* magazine, the DP can win a few urban seats, but it holds no appeal for the masses of South African whites.

Now contrast this to the CP's performance.

The Conservatives not only retained their 22 seats but gained another 17, including six in the Free State, previously a Nat stronghold. In the Transvaal, the CP holds 31 seats, just three fewer than the ruling NP.

And the CP came close to getting many more seats:

- It tied one seat (Fauresmith).
- It lost two seats by margins of five and seven votes (Gezina and Vereeniging).
- It lost another six seats by fewer than 500 votes (Geduld, Klerksdorp, Koedoespoort, Nelspruit, Bethlehem, and Virginia).
- It lost another 18 seats by fewer than 100 votes.

And it did this without the support of any major newspaper and in the face of constant attacks by government-owned TV and radio.

As it becomes clearer that the NP and DP are both planning white South Africa's suicide, the CP can only pick up more support.

A two-way fight will develop between conservatives and reformists now that FW de Klerk has opened the doors to black rule. The Nats fear the CP, but not enough to be prudent. As they move left under overseas and nonparliamentary pressure, the CP will get stronger and the DP will fade to irrelevance.

### \* Buthelezi Discusses Vision of Future

90EF0265A Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese  
17 Feb 90 pp 8-R, 9-R

[EXPRESSO interview with Inkatha leader Gatsha Buthelezi at Buthelezi's palace in Ulundi; date not given; first six paragraphs are introduction]

[Text] Heir to the traditions and the pride of the legendary King Shaka, Gatsha Buthelezi is the chief of 5 million Zulus, the largest ethnic group in South Africa. His moderate positions have earned him the epithet of collaborationist. In an interview at his palace in Ulundi he rejects these accusations and looks into the future.

Until the recent legalization of the ANC [African National Congress] and the release of Nelson Mandela, the South African political spectrum was divided into four major groups: the right wing, encompassing almost all the white organizations; the exiles, among whom the ANC, Pan-Africanist Congress, and Communist Party of South Africa carried on their work of indoctrination; the internal resistance, organized under the Democratic Mass Movement, which includes the UDF [United Democratic Front] and other organizations close to the ANC but also includes the religious leaders; and the so-called "incrementalists," a group of organizations having no links among themselves—such as the Federal Democratic Party (white), the Labor Party (colored), and the business community—which has long advocated the peaceful dismantling of apartheid and evolution toward a democratic society based on the free market model.

Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi, who heads the Inkatha political movement, opted long ago for incrementalism. As head of the Bantustan government of KwaZulu the positions he has taken have caused him to be received by Western presidents and prime ministers. The exiles and the internal resistance regard him as a collaborationist and as a product of apartheid, despite the fact that he has consistently criticized the system and has always worked hard to obtain freedom for Mandela.

Buthelezi is an important component of the negotiating process inasmuch as he is the leader of the Zulus, the largest ethnic group in South Africa, numbering approximately 5 million persons. In Natal Province, within



which the territories of Kwazulu are dispersed, Inkatha is locked in a ferocious struggle with organizations that are close to the ANC—a conflict that has already resulted in more than 2,000 deaths.

It is said that the conflict is of ethnic origin, but Buthelezi categorically rejects this interpretation. In his opinion it is political in nature: The ANC wants to destroy him. In an effort to obtain at the conference table a status comparable to that of the ANC—something that the analysts believe is unlikely to happen—he is now denying that Inkatha is basically an ethnic movement, and he claims strong support throughout the country.

He received EXPRESSO's representative at his palace in Ulundi, the former capital of the Zulu empire of King Shaka and currently the capital of Kwazulu.

[EXPRESSO] Do you believe President De Klerk's speech runs counter to the positions that you have been advocating since 1975 at least?

[Buthelezi] The state president has taken an important step in the right direction. With his speech of 2 February and the subsequent release of Nelson Mandela, he fulfilled many of the conditions that we believe to be essential.

[EXPRESSO] Were you surprised at the timing chosen by the president to announce the measures intended to create a favorable climate for negotiations?

[Buthelezi] I was not surprised at the time chosen. Something had to be done, and the sooner the better. After it freed Sizulu, Mbeki, Kathrada, and other "rivonists," the government had to free Dr Mandela. I didn't expect the president to go so far, however. I was greatly encouraged by the positions President De Klerk took.

[EXPRESSO] Do you agree with Nelson Mandela's action in leaving prison before the state of emergency was lifted?

[Buthelezi] I believe Dr Mandela did the right thing. President De Klerk modified the emergency laws, did he not? Much of the violence has taken place here in Natal, where there have been more than 2,000 deaths. My people are asking that the soldiers protect them because they are being attacked, because people have been killed. Sometimes they write me, asking for protection. I therefore believe Dr Mandela should not have remained in prison solely because there is a particularly unstable situation in Natal. When people are dying every day, the victims of acts of violence, I cannot believe it is wrong to take precautions. If the state of emergency can lessen the suffering of the people of Natal, it won't be Buthelezi who demands that it be lifted.

[EXPRESSO] What kind of future do you foresee for your country? What do you want to see negotiated with the government?

[Buthelezi] Emancipation. A single South Africa, indivisible, with one sovereign parliament. We want universal suffrage: one person, one vote. We want equality before the constitution and before the law.

[EXPRESSO] The government wants to draft a new constitution during the tenure of this Parliament, which is 5 years. Do you believe it will be a temporary constitution?

[Buthelezi] That's a matter of no concern to me. If the people who sit down at the negotiating table want it to be temporary, I won't object. But the next constitution can be definitive in character. Look at what just happened in Namibia, where people combined their efforts and drafted a compromise constitution in which everyone had to give a little ground.

[EXPRESSO] A moment ago you mentioned universal suffrage. Is that the direction to take in beginning the negotiations?

[Buthelezi] Absolutely. That's the first thing on which we must reach an agreement. There can be no negotiations unless there is agreement on that point.

[EXPRESSO] Will the white South Africans accept universal suffrage?

[Buthelezi] President De Klerk agreed, in talking with me, that yes, he accepted the principle of one person, one vote.

#### Corrective Mechanisms

[EXPRESSO] I was about to mention the "boervolk," the electorate of the Conservative Party, and the followers of the neo-Nazi movement of Eugene Terreblanche....

[Buthelezi] It's clear that they will never accept it. But their capacity for mobilization will depend a great deal on what we do. We need to understand that President De Klerk can't yield on every point, that he has his own electorate. When we speak of universal suffrage, we must be careful not to interpret it as meaning direct representation, as in those countries where the candidate who gets the most votes wins everything. The situation is a difficult one; mechanisms must be introduced that will ensure a certain equilibrium and protect the minorities.

[EXPRESSO] With what kind of mechanisms do you intend to achieve this equilibrium?

[Buthelezi] The Westminster system is not the only system, nor is it the one that in actual practice is best suited to all situations.

[EXPRESSO] But won't universal suffrage always result in a parliament in which the white minority will have a minimal voice?

[Buthelezi] I believe in civil liberties and in minority rights. It is essential to introduce corrective mechanisms designed to dispel the fears of these minorities.

[EXPRESSO] What corrective mechanisms?

[Buthelezi] That has to be discussed at the negotiating table; it should not be imposed by Buthelezi. A study must be made of the various types of political organization of national governments existing today in the democratic world to determine which type is best suited to South African conditions.

[EXPRESSO] Are you referring to the federations of states?

[Buthelezi] The federal solution could perhaps solve our problems.

[EXPRESSO] Are you advocating the federal model as the ideal situation for post-apartheid South Africa?

[Buthelezi] No. I shall support whatever the people want, whatever the people decide. We cannot compromise on the question of universal suffrage. As for the other questions—the kind of political organization, and the mechanisms that must be introduced in order to allay the minorities' fears—I say only that we should not be tied to the model of the unitary government and refuse to consider other types of organization that could provide a more adequate response to our conditions.

[EXPRESSO] Will you sit down at the negotiating table with the ANC?

[Buthelezi] The ANC has a policy that is different from ours. They support the sanctions, have a socialist platform, and want to carry out nationalizations—things I don't agree with. There's no doubt that the ANC and Inkatha—which I head—are on the same wavelength as far as the basic objectives are concerned. We disagree on some points, however, as for example the destruction of the economy, a goal they want to achieve. They continue to choose violence and advocate armed struggle. It is obvious that we cannot move in the same orbit.

You know, I feel a great affinity for African humanism, and I believe that many aspects of the Western industrialized societies offend my humanistic inclinations. But I am also able to realize that the system works, that mankind has not discovered anything more effective for the creation of wealth than free enterprise.

Moreover, I reject violence. A decent modern society cannot be created through violence.

[EXPRESSO] But the negotiations—in their first phase—will be concerning these basic objectives, on which the two movements agree....

[Buthelezi] To be sure, to be sure. We have nothing against the ANC and never have had. That's why we went to London in 1979 at the request of ANC president Oliver Tambo and talked with him for two and a half days! That's also why Dr Mandela used to write me in a very affectionate way when he was in prison.

### The Negotiating Table

[EXPRESSO] Will you be in contact with the ANC before the talks with the government begin?

[Buthelezi] For a long time we've been trying to talk with the ANC. I wrote Mr Tambo in 1984 offering to visit him, and he didn't reply. I wrote him again last August, suggesting a number of dates on which I could go to London so we could talk, and he didn't reply. Consequently....

[EXPRESSO] Would that have to do with the fact that Inkatha is an organization with an ethnic base—a Zulu organization?

[Buthelezi] That's nonsense.

[EXPRESSO] That's what you read everywhere, and you have never denied it categorically.

[Buthelezi] That's the work of idiotic journalists. That's garbage. Inkatha is a black organization. It has many members who are not Zulus. Since 1976 it's been our policy to solicit members from among other ethnic groups. More than half of our members are not Zulus.

[EXPRESSO] Do you have significant support in any areas of the country other than Natal?

[Buthelezi] Don't you know that my mass meetings throughout that country are attracting thousands and thousands of people? Last December I filled a soccer stadium in Soweto.

[EXPRESSO] You are saying, Chief Buthelezi, that Inkatha has a much larger voice than is generally believed abroad. Could this be an indirect way of saying that the ANC is not as firmly established as people in the West believe?

[Buthelezi] The ANC has supporters in this country; it has its sister organizations such as the United Democratic Front (UDF) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU). Abroad, the ANC is portrayed as the largest—sometimes even as the only—black political organization. It's obvious that this is not true. There are other major organizations. Abroad, when people speak of negotiations, they speak of negotiations between the ANC and the government. That is impossible. President De Klerk himself made it clear that this is not the intention.

[EXPRESSO] Then who should sit down at the negotiating table?

[Buthelezi] The state president said there are a number of interested parties. There are the parties represented in the parliament and also the organizations existing outside the parliament, such as our party and the ANC. All should have a seat at the negotiating table.

People sometimes believe the president is advocating the participation of everyone because he is in a position of weakness. I don't believe that. I believe he is in command of the situation.



[EXPRESSO] Doesn't the president run the risk of losing his support base?

[Buthelezi] Well, that depends on what we do and what he himself does. We blacks have to understand that what De Klerk is doing—the importance of what he is doing—depends on the support he has from his own people. As in any political situation, one's importance is dictated by what his support base does. If we want to negotiate with De Klerk, if we in fact want to find a peaceful solution, we must also take care that he does not lose his support base. We cannot back him into a corner.

[EXPRESSO] At what point is there danger that the situation will deteriorate into a climate of violence?

[Buthelezi] There's a very real danger. I've never suggested that everything would be peaceful. The most difficult part is still just ahead of us. We're going to enter a period of transition, and all periods of transition are dangerous. There is danger, side by side with opportunities. There are great opportunities now, and also great dangers.

[EXPRESSO] Do you believe that talks between leaders of the ANC and of Inkatha can put an end to the violence in Natal?

[Buthelezi] I believe so. Provided they give up their idea of eliminating me and eliminating Inkatha. I believe we can arrive at an agreement and end the violence. But so long as some of them persist in wanting to eliminate me, there will be conflict.

[EXPRESSO] Is the object of the violence to eliminate you?

[Buthelezi] Obviously! I can show you documents in which some of them say that Inkatha has to be crushed, that Buthelezi has to be crushed. I can show you....

[EXPRESSO] And is that because of what they say is your collaboration with apartheid?

[Buthelezi] It's because of what I've already stated, namely that they would like to be the only representatives of the black South Africans. Southern Africa has undergone many changes in the last 15 to 20 years. Machel had a government in exile, as did Neto and, to a certain extent, Mugabe. The ANC claims to be a government-in-exile of the black South Africans; I'm the proof that this is not true.

[EXPRESSO] Won't what is happening in Eastern Europe, and even in the USSR, have an effect on the attitude of the ANC?

[Buthelezi] Dr Mandela and Walter Sisulu continue to talk of socialism, of nationalizations. If they attain governmental power and apply the doctrine they are now preaching, South Africa could be transformed into an economic desert. I don't understand why the recent events in Eastern Europe have taught them nothing....

[EXPRESSO] The ANC also continues to talk of armed struggle, but the number of armed actions has decreased sharply in recent days. Does this have to do solely with

the fact that the armed branch of the ANC is now far away, in Tanzania, after being successively expelled from Mozambique, Angola, and Zambia, or does it also reflect a decrease in support from the European communist countries?

[Buthelezi] They were in fact never a military force, of course. They were in no way comparable to Frelimo, or to the MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola], or to UNITA, or even to SWAPO [South-West African People's Organization]. They were never close to it. You don't gain status as a military power by setting off bombs in commercial centers. They have the weapons, they had help from abroad, but they never achieved anything. Never, actually never, did they confront the South African Army. The electric power system is intact, the water supply system was never affected, and they never destroyed a single bridge.

#### \* ANC, UDF Deny Links to Current Violence

34000545B Johannesburg THE STAR in English  
9 Mar 90 p 2

[Article by Helen Grange: "The Violence Would Not Benefit Us"; ANC, UDF Deny Any Link to Unrest"]

[Text] The African National Congress [ANC] and its offshoot, the United Democratic Front [UDF], have rejected suggestions that the ANC and affiliated organizations are instigating the current violence to upset the negotiation process.

The ANC spokesman in Lusaka, Mr Tom Sebina said the South African Government was "sucking its thumb" when suggesting the ANC was to blame. "There is no evidence to support this," he said.

"The ANC has never directly or indirectly been involved in instigating violence. It would never benefit the ANC," he said.

However, it would be foolish to ignore the fact that the so-called homeland governments were unpopular since their inception. "If the people in these homelands can now take the advantage of telling these despots to get out, they have a legitimate right to do so.

"Unnecessary violence may occur as pent up emotions explode," Mr Sebina said.

Asked whether the ANC would consider calling for a halt to the violence, Mr Sebina said he would have to refer the question to his seniors.

Constitutional Development Minister Dr Gerrit Viljoen placed the blame squarely in the ANC camp yesterday when he said: "We interpret the present unrest and violence as a sign of unreadiness on the part of certain leaders to get involved in the negotiation process."

State President Mr F W De Klerk, also in clear reference to the ANC, said the violence was "to some extent a

result of the continuing war talk and clinging to the armed struggle when it is not necessary".

"It is certainly not in the policies of our organisations that people should behave in this fashion," said UDF publicity secretary Mr Patrick "Terror" Lekota yesterday.

While expressing some sympathy towards the "gushing of political emotion which has been suppressed for a long time", UDF officials said they could not condone or encourage violence.

#### Homelands Rejected

"We have always said the so-called leaders of homelands do not enjoy the people's support. Part of what we are seeing is a violent manifestation of the rejection of these hated administrations, said Mr Lekota."

He added that there was "no doubt" that the homelands would collapse and that homelands resisting this would be dismantled by a democratic government in a negotiated settlement.

Mr Murphy Morobe, UDF spokesman and National Reception Committee member, questioned on whether people involved in the unrest could be controlled, said: "The problem is that there are actors who have agendas different to ours. There are many new structures in hiding and there is a problem in that respect."

He said the violence was area specific in that different circumstances were influencing the direction of events.

"In Ga-Rankuwa, there is a hostile regime clamping down on protest. The violence can be attributed to the reactions of the arrogant and unfeeling Bophuthatswana authorities".

In Venda and Gazankulu, there were problems of corruption and people were also fighting against repression and heavy handedness.

But in Ciskei, much of the violence was the result of unplanned, uncoordinated celebration over Brigadier Gqozo's coup success. "We hope he will remain consistent in allowing the process of re-incorporation to take place," said Mr Morobe.

"But there is no point in violence that does not serve the community. While we could appreciate what happened in Soweto in 1976, we cannot condone and will never encourage it," Mr Morobe said.

#### \* UDF Cultural Desk Emerges From Obscurity

34000545C Johannesburg CITY PRESS in English  
4 Mar 90 p 7

[Article by Sandile Memela: "UDF Group Casts Off Its Shroud of Secrecy"]

[Text] The United Democratic Front (UDF)'s Cultural Desk celebrated its fourth birthday this month by breaking out of the shroud of secrecy that has covered it since its inception in 1986.

The Cultural Desk, which shot into prominence soon after the international release of Paul Simon's *Graceland* album, has been a mysterious body wielding considerable power over music lovers and artists.

But very few knew the faces and names behind the organisation.

National co-ordinator Mzwakhe Mbuli, who effectively runs the Cultural Desk, said this mystery was compounded by the state of emergency which forced many activists involved in its administration to go underground.

"But we have not been a sinister force wielding power blindly; neither have we acted without the interest of the people at heart. Our actions and policies were intended to advance the cause of the oppressed majority," said Mbuli.

The Cultural Desk was launched at the historic meeting of the National General Council (NGC) of the UDF held in Azaadville.

"It was felt there was an urgent need for a body to monitor cultural developments and trends inside South Africa. It was obvious there were many opportunists who wanted to twist facts to suit their own purposes," said Mbuli.

The NGC, the highest policy-making body of the UDF, delegated Murphy Morobe and Mohammed Valli to oversee the creation of the Cultural Desk structure.

As a result, nine high-profile UDF cultural activists from throughout South Africa were commissioned to set up the Desk. These included journalist Sefako Nyaka, author Achmat Dangor, poet Mzwakhe Mbuli, Nana Kutumela and lawyer Krish Naidoo in the Transvaal.

The Natal region was headed by Cosatu [Congress of South African Trade Unions]'s national cultural co-ordinator Mi Hlatshwayo and the Free State was administered by Andy Sefatlelo.

The Western Cape was managed by Jeremy Cronin, who has since gone into exile, and Jonathan De Vries, co-ordinator of the Cape Town-based Music Action for People's Power (Mapp).

However, by late last year only Hlatshwayo and Mbuli remained as active members of the Desk. The rest are committed to other activities.

"Our immediate task is to consolidate international links with anti-apartheid cultural bodies abroad and to monitor the cultural boycott of South Africa," said Mbuli.

"The recent changes, including the release of Nelson Mandela and the unbanning of the ANC [African

National Congress] and other organisations do not necessarily mean the boycott has to be eased.

"The boycott is still in operation until all apartheid laws are scrapped and the people govern themselves," said Mbuli.

According to Mbuli, the Desk's other immediate aims are to:

- Organise "people's festivals";
- Establish cultural structures with UDF affiliates; and
- Become the nucleus of communication between international organisations like the United Nations Committee Against Apartheid and other committees involved in sports, culture and education.

The Cultural Desk has been accused of promoting the ideals of the Freedom Charter and of having strong links with the ANC. But this was denied by Mbuli who said the Desk tries to go beyond sectarian politics.

However, there's little doubt that the Cultural Desk is a strong alliance of the Cosatu Cultural Unit and the UDF.

Mbuli said despite setbacks like detention of members and lack of funds the Desk has a good list of celebrated achievement in its track record.

"One of our greatest achievements was to undermine the efforts of the government through its Peace Song," said Mbuli.

Other achievements include:

- The formation of the SA Music Alliance;
- Co-ordinating cultural policy of foreign governments towards South Africa;
- Facilitating the establishment of cultural structures in the townships; and
- Acting as a consultative body for artists, musicians and other related workers visiting South Africa.

#### \* MK Upgrading Officer Skills for Future Army

34000560B Johannesburg THE NEW NATION  
in English 9-15 Mar 90 p 3

[Text] Umkhonto we Sizwe has initiated a programme to train selected officers for a future South African army.

This was disclosed to NEW NATION by MK [Spear of the Nation]'s deputy-commander and chief of staff, Chris Hani, who also indicated that the African National Congress' military command would soon need to engage in direct talks with the South African Defence Force (SADF).

Hani said Umkhonto has put down, as a priority, upgrading the skills of some guerillas to enable them to perform regular army duties.

"We will not at any stage be happy with a situation where leading officers of a future South African army are from the SADF.

"For a future army whose orientation is for a non-racial democratic South Africa, we need Umkhonto officers participating fully in the process of transforming the army," said Hani.

Hani points out that Umkhonto would have to meet the SADF "to set up the modalities of a ceasefire" and to ensure effective monitoring of that ceasefire.

With the ANC [African National Congress] leadership keen to maintain the current political momentum, such discussions could get underway quite soon.

But these talks, said Hani, would also look at "how we form a future South African army, an army to defend democracy."

More immediately, Hani also saw Umkhonto combatants assisting in setting up self-defence units which would support the current reconstruction of grassroots and ANC structures.

But he emphasised that these units had "to act in a disciplined manner."

Hani also pointed out that any Umkhonto actions had to reflect the sensitivity of the ANC leadership—and in particular that of deputy-president Nelson Mandela—towards white fears about their future.

"We want to concretely convince our white countrymen that for the ANC it is not just rhetoric when we say we are committed to a non-racial democratic South Africa.

"And so as commanders of Umkhonto we are calling upon our units...to express in terms of their actions the approach of the movement in reconciling the South African people," said Hani.

Consequently, the Umkhonto commander, who has in the past ruffled many white South Africans with his militancy, said current military actions must avoid civilian casualties.

"And so we are imposing a certain discipline on our combatants. If they place bombs or limpet mines, they must make sure that when they explode, the possibility of killing civilians is very, very remote. And I am deliberately saying very remote, because one can't say that there will never be civilian deaths."

Hani believes that economic installations of both government and business remain legitimate targets. However, attacks on any businesses had to be "selective."

In his view, private companies that supported the struggle for democracy and treated their workforce "fairly" would not face attack.

"But," he argued, "where we have a feeling that there is a flagrant victimisation of the workers, we come in.

"In other words, our actions must support the struggle of the trade unions, the struggle of the masses in general."

### \* Former PAC Exile Spells Out Goals

34000560C Johannesburg THE STAR in English  
21 Mar 90 p 15

[Returned Pan Africanist Congress exile Barney Desai addressed a special congress of the Pan Africanist Movement (PAM)—which is now merging with the PAC—in Bloemfontein recently. In these excerpts he spells out some of the goals of the PAC—the political movement recently unbanned with the ANC and the South African Communist Party.]

[Text] "We have witnessed to the north of the African continent that so-called co-operation (with Europeans) has led to blatant neo-colonial rule, where the Europeanist has reduced our people to bondage and slavery of a different kind.

"The European ruler has replaced his government with one that has black lips but speaks with a white tongue.

"It is against this background that we are rightly cautioned by PAC [Pan Africanist Congress] President Zeph Mothopeng not to be ensnared by open-ended negotiations at this stage.

"He is right when he says that unbanning our organisations is but a return to the situation of the Sixties.

"The world may be impressed by good intentions enumerated recently by the (South African) regime—but we remain unimpressed until a clear break is made with the past—a break that is fundamental, radical and just.

"I subscribe fully to the proposition that what we as oppressed people have not won on the battlefield we will never retrieve at the negotiation table.

"Our struggle continues unabated because the domestic forces of oppression enjoy a monopoly of economic, political, cultural and military power.

"A settlement based on these acts is undesirable.

"The Press informs us that the PAC rejects negotiations. This is a blatant lie because no other than President Mothopeng is on record as stating in Harare that the PAC was prepared to discuss with interested parties the establishment of a constituent assembly to draw up a new constitution on the basis of one person, one vote.

"There can be no guarantees for group rights—only human rights.

"We stand for a planned economy and the equitable distribution of wealth within the framework of a political democracy. How we work out the new system must be a matter for the delegates of this constituent assembly.

"We further reiterate that in a free and democratic country there is no reason why a predominantly black electorate should not elect a white man to Parliament, for the monstrosity of racism will count for nothing in a free Azania.

"There is no room for hegemony of one group, or organisation, over this country. Our democracy must have a place for dissent.

"Our trade unions must be strengthened far beyond their present membership. Our self-help structures will make us self-reliant. A people's co-operative movement for our economic empowerment is an imperative.

"Europeans who have made their homes in Africa and who identify with the aspirations of Africans are Africans.

"There are no 'coloureds,' for their Khoisan ancestors were the original inhabitants when the Dutch established themselves in the Cape.

"Indians were brought by imperialism to these shores as bonded labour and have made Africa their homeland. We are all Africans, or we are nothing.

"We want peace but not appeasement.

"With deliberation I have said what I have. If this excludes the PAC from negotiations, then so be it. Those who wish to play the Muzorewa role in South Africa—let it be on their heads.

"I wish also to caution my brothers and sisters that the slogan 'one settler, one bullet' is inconsistent with our stated aims. No mature liberation movement has ever had as its stated policy an intention to drive the white people into the sea."

### \* UDF's Lekota Discusses Wave of Unrest

34000561C Johannesburg THE WEEKLY MAIL  
in English 16-22 Mar 90 p 9

[Interview with UDF Leader Patrick 'Terror' Lekota by Anton Harber]

[Text] [WEEKLY MAIL] The government has blamed the ANC [African National Congress] and PAC [Pan Africanist Congress] for the recent wave of unrest. What do you think the causes are?

[Lekota] It is a natural result when people have been for years denied the right to publicly express themselves.

Secondly, the fact that the government has at last expressed itself as willing to negotiate a future with the movement has raised hopes. And now it appears the government is dragging its feet. Frustrations set in. A sense of betrayal encompasses these communities.

Thirdly, the history of our country has taught our people that the government will move forward only if it is obliged to. Our history does create the impression that it is only when pressure is applied to the government that we will advance.

I think it is crucial to mention also that a key element is the corrupt administrations which have controlled the areas our communities live in, such as town councils and some of the homeland administrations.



[THE WEEKLY MAIL] You say the government is dragging its feet. What do you mean?

[Lekota] The government has met some of the demands set out in the Harare Declaration. It has not met others. It has refused or is still reluctant to consider the release of political prisoners, it retains the State of Emergency. It has not granted a general amnesty to exiles. The movement will not approach the conference table unless these things are met.

So what happens to people who are basing their hopes on the beginning of that process? They can only be frustrated.

[THE WEEKLY MAIL] Are you worried that the unrest, and the detentions that have followed it, could derail progress towards negotiations?

[Lekota] Up until last week, I did not expect that the government could use the Emergency regulations and the security laws to suppress those who opposed them. But I have counted 179 leading activists and comrades detained in the Free State. I begin to have apprehensions as to whether the government may not be reverting to their old style of repression.

If the government is taking that line, the optimism and confidence that was beginning to emerge may well flounder.

[THE WEEKLY MAIL] What is UDF [United Democratic Front] saying to those involved in the unrest? Are you calling on them to keep up the pressure on the government, or to cool down?

[Lekota] We have said that pressure must be kept up on the government. But we have underlined that this has to be done in a disciplined and non-violent manner. The rioting, the beating, the loss of life, which is taking place in our areas is something we deplore.

[THE WEEKLY MAIL] What do you mean by disciplined action?

[Lekota] We mean controlled marches, protest marches with the intention of making demands of the government; and a refusal to co-operate with structures which maintain those practices not in the interests of our community.

What is taking place now is more or less outside and beyond what was anticipated by the movement.

[THE WEEKLY MAIL] Many of the problems you say lie behind the unrest are not going to disappear overnight, even if there are negotiations. Are you not worried about a continual process of unrest that will threaten talks?

[Lekota] I believe there are steps which can be taken by the government in the present set-up which can help

undercut this kind of restlessness. Some of the local issues, such as corruption in town councils, can be addressed.

Secondly, it appears that they have released Mandela and Sisulu and others, but the government has not engaged with them. At the beginning the process of negotiations will focus the interest of the people; but they have to act to keep it there or it will wander.

And that is dangerous, because we have to retain the attention of the people for a long, long time.

[THE WEEKLY MAIL] Are you concerned about the rightwing?

[Lekota] A lot is said about how (State President F.W.) De Klerk is under pressure from the rightwing. Hardly anything is said about the pressure our movement has to contend with from its constituency, which is deprived, has no political rights, no hopes, no education, etc. The pressure from them is much heavier than the pressure from the rightwing.

[THE WEEKLY MAIL] Do you think you have a duty to help De Klerk withstand the rightwing pressure?

[Lekota] When the administration of white South Africans begins for the first time to respond sensibly and reasonably to the mass of the people, it is important that everything should be done to encourage it and keep it in place. We would be failing our people and our country if we took action that allowed for the displacement of the government's initiative.

But in all fairness, we don't believe the CP [Conservative Party] has got the capacity to stop the process of negotiation. We don't think the demands of the vast majority should be neglected or delayed because of such a small minority.

[THE WEEKLY MAIL] Are there now a substantial number of homeland leaders on your side? What is your relationship with them?

[Lekota] A number of homeland leaders realise that the only relief for the difficulties of our people is the one offered by the liberation movement. We sense that when the crucial moment comes, they will make common cause and occupy the same side of the conference table as the movement.

[THE WEEKLY MAIL] Are you saying there is a place at the table for homeland leaders?

[Lekota] There ought to be a place for them, that's if it's on the basis of an electoral process to get regional leaders or constituency leaders and they win majority support.

[THE WEEKLY MAIL] Is the movement changing its view on nationalisation?

[Lekota] There are no immediate indications that the movement will change from the position Mandela outlined (in his message from prison last month). I think the



most important thing is the manner in which the movement intends to carry out this programme. The question of nationalisation must be seen against the background of the commitment of the movement to leaving a sector of the economy absolutely free.

#### \* Political Changes Bring Confidence to Unions

##### \* COSATU's Campaigns

34000542A Johannesburg THE WEEKLY MAIL  
in English 9-15 Mar 90 p 6

[Article by Eddie Koch: "Cosatu's Planners Take Advantage of Democracy"]

[Text] The Congress of South African Trade Unions [COSATU] has initiated a set of campaigns to influence political events shaping the country's future.

The labour federation will focus on projects to "revive socialist thinking among organised workers", discuss alternative models of local government in black townships, amend the Labour Relations Act and intervene in the crisis in the homelands.

Cosatu decided, at its last central executive meeting, to make decisive moves in these areas.

Cosatu's highest priority is to revamp the labour law which, it says, has been altered to shackle the power of organised labour.

Talks between a joint team from Cosatu; the smaller National Council of Trade Unions; and a delegation from big business's South African Consultative Committee on Labour Affairs restarted yesterday.

The last round of talks was three months ago.

The labour alliance went into the talks confident it would use the prospect of a democratic government in the near future as a lever to force employers to improve industrial relations.

"Five years ago industrial relations were way ahead of developments in the political arena. But in a short time political developments have outstripped developments in the labour field," said Geoff Schreiner, coordinator of the joint union committee.

"There is clearly a lot of pressure on employers now to put their houses in order as far as labour relations in the factories go. There is no doubt political developments are going to fuel workers' political expectations. Big business, as well as unions, are going to have to meet these."

The unions are confident of winning their "short-term demands".

These include:

- Abolition of management's power to sue unions for profits lost in illegal strikes.

- An end to the use of court interdicts to make strikes illegal.
- Legalisation of solidarity strikes and boycotts as a way of resolving industrial disputes.
- Extension of the law to give all workers, including state employees and farm labourers, trade union rights.

But the unions, buoyed by a sense that they have gained strategic ground since President FW de Klerk announced his reforms, are now suggesting that businessmen deliver more.

They want state departments—railways management and the personnel department for the public sector—to be pulled into the next round of talks.

Then they will demand that the negotiating forum deal with broader issues such as economic restructuring and nationalisation, worker participation in investment decisions, backing for new housing schemes and improved health services.

The unions are also planning to ensure they have considerable influence over the process of rebuilding the African National Congress [ANC] inside the country.

"There is active debate taking place within Cosatu unions as to what the role of workers should be in the building of ANC structures," said Bernie Fanaroff, secretary of the National Union of Metalworkers of SA [NUMSA].

"The idea is that a mass-based ANC will be a working-class ANC with workers' interests firmly in the leadership role."

Cosatu is also pushing for a charter that will enshrine rights that need to be guaranteed for workers in a non-racial South Africa.

At least three drafts of a charter—including documents drawn up by the exiled South African Congress of Trade Unions and the Communist Party—are currently being debated by workers at all levels of the federation. Cosatu will hold a special congress in September to finalise it.

This week Numsa, the most militant union in the country, went into its first round of national wage talks with employers in the metal sector with a sense that the political direction of the country was on their side.

Numsa also plans to infuse a socialist ethic into the process of collective bargaining in the metal industry this year.

Fanaroff argued at the union's conference, held last month to plan for the wage talks, that bargaining should help lay the basis for a revamping of the economy along socialist lines.

Moses Mayekiso, general secretary of Numsa, says he believes Cosatu affiliates can immediately start using

wage talks as a forum to negotiate ways of redistributing wealth and increasing worker participation in economic planning.

"Workers are no longer concentrating only on wages. They are now pushing in to the domain of management control," he said.

Cosatu, he said, had seen that the old "commandist system" of state planning in Eastern Europe had failed and was looking for a more democratic and decentralised form of worker participation in economic planning.

"Workers in factories and businesses, for example, can push their bosses to give subsidies and grants to improve the housing and education system. They can also push businessmen to put pressure on the state to spend more resources in these areas."

#### \* COSATU's Civic Action

34000542B Johannesburg THE WEEKLY MAIL  
in English 9-15 Mar 90 p 6

[Article by Eddie Koch: "Union's Civic Action Goes Back to Its Roots"]

[Text] COSATU [Congress of South African Trade Unions] has decided to call for the creation of a national civic organisation that will devise a method of local government for townships in a non-racial South Africa.

The plan, rooted in a resolution at Cosatu's congress last year to revitalise grassroots civic structures nation wide, will be discussed with the internal committee of the African National Congress and the United Democratic Front later this month.

The meeting will deal with the insurrection currently sweeping the homelands and plans to discuss forms of administration that can replace the fragile governments that now rule over these areas.

The labour federation's executive committee was spurred into action by the militancy that has erupted around black local authorities in recent weeks as well as the homeland uprisings.

Alexandra township, north of the Johannesburg, has been hit by a wave of militancy that poses a fundamental challenge to the official system of black local authorities.

The township was the lynchpin in the government's strategy to win support for its reform programme by upgrading conditions and setting up moderate local leaders to administer these "oil spots".

But the Alexandra Civic Organisation (ACO), under the leadership of former treason trialist Moses Mayekiso, has revitalised a mass-based campaign to oust the councillors and demand a non-racial form of government.

After a march by 80 000 residents last month in support of ACO's demands, two of the councillors secretly met the organisation and offered to resign, says Mayekiso.

There have been a spate of similar protests in townships on the East Rand and in Brits near Pretoria in recent months.

"The state has failed with the Brazilian option—the elimination of militant local leaders and their replacement by moderates backed up by development—in Alexandra and other townships," says Mayekiso.

He believes the government is now considering two options: either to deal with the civic organisation in line with its commitment to negotiations or to repress the resistance in the township and prop up their town councillors as moderate counterparts to the ANC in the negotiation process.

Cosatu's response to both prospects is to mobilise support for a powerful network of democratic civic groups in the townships.

The national civic organisation will be influenced by the alternative development policies that ACO is demanding and should form the basis of negotiation between the people of Alexandra and government authorities.

These include demands for:

- The central government to assume responsibility for the provision of low-cost housing rather than rely on private developers;
- The state to allocate urban land for low-income development;
- Subsidies for basic services such as water, electricity and sewage;
- Support from the government for housing co-operatives and self-help projects;
- Non-racial municipalities with a shared system of rates and taxes that can generate revenue to subsidise development in underprivileged areas.

Mayekiso has been asked to draft proposals about how the crisis in the homeland's can be addressed and plans to adapt the methods used to build township civics to the rural situation.

#### \* NUMSA's Views

34000542C Johannesburg THE WEEKLY MAIL  
in English 9-15 Mar 90 p 6

[Article by Cassandra Moodley: "No Wealth Without Workers"]

[Text] Wealth creation in South Africa can be achieved only through democratic worker participation in planning the economy, a Numsa [National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa] spokesman told businessmen this week.

National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa representative Bernie Fanaroff put the union's view at a conference on creating wealth through good industrial

relations held in Johannesburg this week by the Institute of Personnel Management and the South African Chamber of Business.

Fanaroff concentrated on wealth creation through redistribution, saying a solution to the country's economic crisis should also address the political constraints.

The solution should "change the protected low-wage high-cost economy into a high-wage, low-cost economy" and move towards investment and production which could only be achieved through "a planned economy".

Capitalism had repeatedly been proved wrong and it could not solve the problems of South Africa, he said.

The trade union perspective on wealth creation incorporated the primary principles of socialism—social ownership of the means of production and planning of the economy, said Fanaroff.

He admitted pragmatism would have to be combined with this approach. This involved democracy at all levels of society and a need for economic incentives.

Trade unionists believed that capital had been "comfortable with apartheid and repression for a long time".

This was evident in their support of the tri-cameral system, silence on detentions, and public statements that business confidence had improved as law and order was restored by the State of Emergency. Capital has also taken a stern line on stayaways and has been slow in rectifying racial discrimination in industry, Fanaroff said.

He added that in finding solutions to the economic crisis we should not repeat the mistakes of Eastern European governments.

"Among the lessons we are learning (from Eastern Europe) is that a central command economy does not work."

A more democratic form of nationalisation could mean "leasing back the means of production and resource" and stipulating that employers pay a living wage and give workers participation in management.

#### **\* Homeland Unrest 'Unrelated to Reincorporation'**

34000545A Johannesburg *THE STAR* in English  
9 Mar 90 p 2

[Article by Sefako Nyaka: "Riots 'Unrelated to Reincorporation'"]

[Text] Thohoyandou—The present wave of political unrest in the homelands was a result of black people who differed politically, and was not connected to the call for reincorporation into South Africa [SA], according to Foreign Minister Pik Botha.

Speaking after a two-hour meeting with Venda Cabinet Ministers at the homeland's capital yesterday, Mr Botha

pointed out that there was no independent black state in Natal and yet there was unrest.

"I don't think the unrest is directly connected to that (the question of reincorporation)," he said.

Mr Botha also said his Government had discussed matters of a bilateral nature with the Venda government including economic and agricultural development as well as nursing and teaching problems.

Venda President Frank Ravele had raised the issue of reincorporation. "The president raised with me once more the issue of a possible reincorporation into South Africa," said Mr Botha, adding that Mr Ravele had discussed the issue with President de Klerk.

He said Mr de Klerk believed that if it was in the interest of Venda to return to SA, then it was a matter he would wish to discuss.

"The president (Mr de Klerk) has made it quite clear that all options are open for discussion. The only thing he asked was that the options must be properly discussed and analysed so that the implications become clear to everybody."

Mr Botha said Pretoria had made it clear to Venda that in terms of an agreement between the two countries, SA would not hesitate to provide Mr Ravele with the necessary security, should he ask for it.

Speaking to *The Star* yesterday, President Ravele confirmed that he believed the unrest was a result of clashes between blacks who differed politically.

#### **\* Botha: Homeland Reunification Open Option**

34000544C Johannesburg *BUSINESS DAY* in English  
14 Mar 90 p 4

[Text] Cape Town—The initiative for any reincorporation of Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and the Ciskei (the TBVC states) into SA [South Africa] lay with those territories and it was for them to start negotiating on the issue with the SA government, Foreign Minister Pik Botha said yesterday.

Speaking in an interpellation debate introduced by Colin Eglin (DP Sea Point), he said the government had made it clear that re-incorporation was an option open to them. It realised that they had had difficulties in getting international economic recognition.

They would have to look at the matter carefully and then start negotiating with the SA government.

Eglin said the government should, in the interests of a new SA, state that it had a positive attitude towards reunification.



### Legislation

The trend towards unification was going to be inevitable and the DP [Democratic Party] was asking government to give a lead in the interests of SA.

Botha said re-incorporation could not take place unilaterally—the matter would have to be thoroughly studied and legislation would have to be passed by the SA Parliament.

Questions which would have to be addressed included the position of loans those states might have taken out with banks of foreign countries.

Eglin said he was not arguing about the details, but it had to be borne in mind that for years the SA government had not been neutral.

The choice given to the TBVC states had not been a neutral one, but a Hobson's choice.

"We believe the time has come for the government to bring down the curtain on Verwoerdian apartheid."

Tom Langley (CP Soutpansberg) said Botha had not answered Eglin's question as to whether the government was prepared to take steps to enable TBVC states to be re-incorporated into SA.

Botha said he did not agree that the states had been forced to accept independence.

Andre de Wet (DP nominated) said it was common knowledge that the people of Transkei and Ciskei wanted to be re-incorporated.

"The whole area is calling out for help."

- Sapa reports from Gaborone that Botswana's External Affairs Minister Gaositwe Chiepe said yesterday that any talk of a "bantustan" amalgamating with Botswana was totally misplaced and unacceptable.

It said that Chiepe, speaking in Parliament, stated Botswana had always been opposed to the fragmentation of SA, which was manifested by the bantustans strewn all over the territory.

"Therefore," she said, "any talk of any bantustan amalgamating with Botswana is totally misplaced and unacceptable."

Chiepe said Botswana subscribed fully to the OAU [Organization of African Unity]'s declaration on the absolute need to recognise and observe colonial boundaries.

Recent media reports have quoted Bophuthatswana leader Lucas Mangope as having said his homeland would not be interested in re-incorporation with SA. Instead he would consider amalgamating with Botswana, as both housed one nation, divided by an imaginary border.—Sapa.

### \* Mass Democratic Movement Homeland Policy Noted

34000543B Johannesburg THE WEEKLY MAIL  
in English 9-15 Mar 90 p 11

[Article by Thandeka Gqubule]

[Text] The Mass Democratic Movement [MDM]'s firmly-held tradition of non-participation in government-created structures has never seemed more blurred as the homelands erupt in chaos.

Previously, the MDM and its supporters would not back any homeland government. It was inconceivable that any campaign by the MDM to rid South Africa of homelands would ever coincide with the interests of homeland leaders.

But this week in the Ciskei, Major General Oupa Gqozo rose to power and joined the call for reincorporation into South Africa against a backdrop of African National Congress [ANC] and South African Communist Party flags.

Major General Bantu Holomisa, who led a Transkei coup last year, has also thrown his weight behind the call for reincorporation and has set up mechanisms for a referendum to test Transkeians' opinions on the issue.

He has surrounded himself with MDM supporters as political advisers and has indicated that at a future negotiating table he is likely to seek an alliance with the ANC.

Homeland legislative assemblies are filling up with MDM-supporting chiefs, many of them recent converts, as the MDM-aligned Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa sweeps through the countryside wooing traditional chiefs.

The Conference for a Democratic Future [CDF], held in Johannesburg last year to map out a strategy of political action for the Mass Democratic Movement and its allies, may be the key to understanding the homeland uprisings.

The CDF outlined a new MDM strategy of pulling the support base from underneath homeland leaders—rather than simply boycotting them—while wooing those who have mass support.

How far is the MDM prepared to go? Will it, in homelands such as the Transkei and Ciskei, involve itself in government structures geared towards returning these territories to South Africa?

It is likely that they will remain outside these structures and use mass pressure on the ground to push for the reincorporation of Ciskei into South Africa.

In leftwing circles it is widely believed that the government is likely to try and dampen the impact of the MDM and the ANC by pursuing an equivalent of Namibia's DTA [Democratic Turnhalle Alliance]-option, creating alliances in the centre of the political spectrum.

The ANC/MDM response appears to bring closer to themselves those homeland leaders on the fringes of the MDM, such as Enos Mabuza, the liberal leader of kaNgwane, and try and create their own alliances.

In those homelands where old-style hardline homeland leaders still reign, such as Bophuthatswana, Gazankulu and Venda, the strategy appears to be to step up mass pressure to weaken their position.

Emerging from the CDF was the strategy of rendering some homelands "ungovernable". Acts of bureaucratic sabotage have crippled Venda and Gazankulu in the last few weeks, while people in Ciskei have been burning their homeland party membership cards.

The CDF also resolved to hold referenda in all homelands to test popular feelings on the return to the republic and the creation of one unitary South Africa. The conference decided to call mass meetings in all the homelands between January and March to mobilise people behind the call of the MDM for one unitary South Africa.

It appears that the MDM had accurately read the mood and tapped into popular demands for reincorporation.

However, its time schedule for such moves has been overtaken by events and "popular referenda", signed with blood and fire, that have taken place in the homelands.

President FW de Klerk's February 2 speech at the opening of parliament and the release of Nelson Mandela were catalysts that opened up a new political chemistry and led to the overtaking of the CDF schedule.

The MDM is likely to continue to enter into talks with willing homeland leaders.

#### \* NUM Protesters March for Recognition

34000561B Johannesburg THE NEW NATION  
in English 9-15 Mar 90 p 21

[Text] More than 10,000 members of the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) and residents from Bickersdal marched to Randfontein Estate Gold Mine's Cooke 3 shaft this week to demand union recognition.

NUM organisers, who led the march, said that the protest march was prompted by concern about the deteriorating relationship between workers and management and violent attacks against union members.

According to the organisers, the attacks were being carried out by members of the Inkatha-aligned United Workers' Union of Sa (Uwusa).

Workers at the mine have also alleged that management was supporting members of Uwusa and that bosses were actively engaged in union bashing.

They cited a meeting between Uwusa and management in which the Inkatha-backed union requested support from bosses at the mine. Workers claim that this meeting took place on 29 January.

"The only point on the agenda was a request for funds," a NUM organizer told NEW NATION.

In a memorandum motivating their request for funds, Uwusa officials told management, that because of inexperienced union organisers, much had to be redone to build the organisation.

"It stands to reason that people who started this organisation (Uwusa) did not have much relevant experience and for that, a lot of mistakes occurred," Uwusa told management.

The memorandum listed "organisational restructuring, organisational systems, organisational developments, controlling...reporting, proper staffing" as some of the reasons for requesting funding.

Attempts to reach management for comment were unsuccessful.

NUM members have in the meantime given bosses seven days in which to respond to the demands that they listed in their memorandum.

Among the demands that the NUM members listed are:

- that their union be recognised.
- that union offices be allowed in all hostels for recruitment purposes.
- that the union be granted the right to hold meetings without the consent of the magistrate.
- that the prohibition of union pamphlets, newsletters and T-shirts be lifted.

#### \* Labor Sources: Militancy Disrupting Workplace

34000544B Johannesburg BUSINESS DAY in English  
14 Mar 90 p 4

[Article by Adele Baleta: "Militancy Disrupts Workplace"]

[Text] Increased militancy since the unbanning of political organisations and Nelson Mandela's release has caused confusion and uncertainty in the workplace, labour sources say.

Some employers are already examining the implications of political developments which have heightened worker expectations and seen a "new-found confidence" which is likely to be displayed at the negotiating table.

National Union of Metalworkers of SA (Numsa) engineering secretary Bernie Fanaroff says a consequence of political developments is that union activists are having to spend time in townships dealing with macropolitical issues. This means less planning in the workplace and more spontaneous action.



### Sharing

"Workers feel liberation is imminent, causing increased militancy."

He says worker demands are changing and this is witnessed in a demand for the sharing of the economy.

OK Bazaars industrial relations executive Gavin Brown says the impact of political developments on the workplace is characterised by uncertainty and confusion and unrealistic expectations which still have to be manifested in a tangible form.

Companies, he said, are responding with more tolerance and sensitivity, but this is not part of a long-term policy.

He believes political developments will affect wage negotiations with heightened worker expectations of greater increases.

National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) assistant general secretary Marcel Golding says workers realise it is their right to participate in democratic organisations of their choice.

They believe this right has to be freely expressed, putting the spotlight and pressure on employers to put "their houses in order".

Recent NUM members' activity in the Free State illustrates the continuing demand for the removal of discrimination on the mines.

Golding says: "We are no longer at the level of tabling demands which remain unaddressed. Workers have repeatedly tried to use the grievance procedure without success.

"Workers expect the right to organise on the mines where employers have used their property rights to restrict them."

Chamber of Mines president Kennedy Maxwell says "it is vital the parties work together to seek potential solutions", particularly in the mining industry where recent developments are cause for concern.

He says: "It appears there has been a deliberate attempt to create polarisation (between workers and management)" and prospects for a favourable outcome to future negotiations will be reduced if parties enter the exercise from positions of polarisation.

An article in the February issue of Seifsa News lists employer guidelines on how to manage "the impact of the events which have created conflicting emotions in the labour force ranging from jubilation and raised expectations to anxiety and concern".

### Implications

It states worker reaction to the developments can generate anxiety among other sections of the workforce, leading to confrontation and violence.

Employers are advised to consider the implications of implementing disciplinary action, which should be avoided wherever possible.

Industrial Relations Consultant Andrew Levy said worker expectations had risen and they had been shown that all was negotiable.

"Trade union's will push against the door which is swinging open and one can only speculate there will be an increase in industrial action," he said.

### \* Cape Town Threatened by Rapid Urbanization

34000543A Cape Town THE ARGUS in English  
17 Mar 90 p 1

[Text] New strategies are urgently needed if Cape Town is to avoid becoming "another Calcutta", according to a new research document.

The document is the first in a series and spearheads the launching of a project by the Urban Problems Research Unit at the University of Cape Town and the Urban Foundation (Western Cape).

The project aims at making the future of Cape Town the direct concern of all people who live there and in this way initiating and facilitating debate.

Researchers who contributed to the document say that South Africa's cities are running into problems of a type and scale previously unknown because of rapid urbanisation.

"In large areas of the Durban metropolitan region, the situation is almost totally out of control," the document claims. "The relevant authorities have lost confidence. This, coupled with a fragmented authority structure, has resulted in a situation where nobody is even sure who is responsible for large areas of land."

### "Very Serious Difficulties"

The problem is not yet as acute in Cape Town. However, the same basic administration problems exist: a host of administrations, organisations, institutions and interest groups making decisions to determine which way the city develops and large sections of the city's population effectively disenfranchised.

"The city will run into very serious difficulties if a more cohesive approach does not emerge," state the researchers.

To illustrate the problems facing Cape Town, the researchers quote from recent studies which:

- Estimate that the number of unemployed in Cape Town has quadrupled since 1980 and now stands at about 1.20 000 people—11 percent of the labour force. A further 165 000 could be earning their living in the informal sector.
- Estimate that between 29 and 37 percent of "coloured" families and the majority of African families live below the Household Effective Level (HEL).

- State there is a housing shortage of well over 100 000 units in metropolitan Cape Town, resulting in "massive" overcrowding. A recent survey has shown that an average of more than 12 people live on one site in African areas and more than six people on a single site in "coloured" areas. Many of these people—particularly in the African areas—live in backyard shacks.
- State that poverty, unemployment and poor housing conditions are manifested in poor health levels. While infant mortality figures for the African population have dropped in the long-term, there appears to have been a recent reversal of the trend with deaths increasing more rapidly after 1981.

#### Tuberculosis

In 1986, according to the document, the medical officer of health of the then Divisional Council of the Cape reported a 37,4 percent increase in the African infant mortality rate over the previous year.

- Estimate that one in every 124 people in Cape Town is infected by tuberculosis and the current notification rate for "coloured" people is 56 times higher than for whites.

The introduction of the document concludes with the assertion that the population of greater Cape Town could almost double between 1985 and 2000 to an estimated 4,2 million people.

"Unless action occurs now, Cape Town could face unemployment levels of 30 percent in the labour force by 1990 and 37 percent by the year 2000.

#### 48 800 New Jobs

"The challenge is to create 49 800 new formal sector jobs annually to keep pace with demand. The fact that only 16 142 formal-sector jobs have been created per annum indicates the size of the challenge.

"With regard to housing, about 26 000 to 41 000 new units would need to be produced per annum, compared with the current production rates of 10 000 to 14 000."

- Contributors to this document were Professor David Dewar, Ms V Watson and Ms C Howes (Urban Problems Research Unit, UCT), Ms A Bassios and Ms C Glover (Urban Foundation, Western Cape), Mr B Gasson (Section 7), School of Architecture and Planning, UCT.

#### \* Air Force's Exercise Golden Eagle Described

90AF0016A Pretoria PARATUS in Afrikaans  
Jan 90 pp 8-9

[Article by Anton van Zyl: "SAAF Sharpens Its Claws"]

[Text] "The ground strike squadron of the South African Air Force [SAAF] is equipped to wipe out any enemy target, regardless of the defense present at that target,"

says Commander Labuschagne, strike coordinator during the recently completed Exercise Golden Eagle.

Exercise Golden Eagle is a perimeter for the Air Force to determine whether it is ready for a war situation. It is an exercise that takes place every six months and gives the Air Force an opportunity to test its offensive and defensive capabilities.

The host for the exercise was Upington, and 97 Tactical Airfield Unit provided the infrastructure. A temporary base was set up by the unit, and all the needs of the various squadrons assigned to it had to be met.

The exercise concentrated on offensive techniques, and a number of "enemy" ground targets were identified. The largest number of targets were at Riemvasmaak, just outside Upington. These targets were then bombarded with live ammunition by the various strike squadrons.

In order to make things a little more interesting, ground-to-air weapon systems were set up in another part of Riemvasmaak. Using radar, the "attackers" were tracked down, and an attempt was made to neutralize them. The result was that the attackers' strategy had to be adapted in order to counter this "threat."

Exercise Golden Eagle is an exercise in which the various squadrons cooperate as a team and the Air Force functions as a unit. Reconnaissance was carried out by 2 Squadron from Hoedspruit. With their Mirage 3 RZs, they moved in and took photographs of the "enemy" area. After they returned, these data were processed and further action was planned.

The nature of the target generally determines which squadrons' services will be used. If a bomber squadron is needed, 12 Squadron from Waterkloof Air Force Base is ready with its Canberras to inflict the necessary damage. Should greater speed be required, 5 Squadron from Louis Trichardt Air Force Base, with its Cheetahs, can be used. The various ground strike squadrons from all over the country came together and were ready to act whenever needed.

Exercise Golden Eagle consisted of two phases. The first phase comprised a pure air force exercise, while phase two coincided with Operation Whiplash of the SA [South African] Army.

During the second phase of the exercise, various "enemy" targets were again identified. This time, the target area was Lohathla, and the forces of the SA Air Force and Army were combined. The Army forces went in first and bombarded the target. Upon their withdrawal, the ground strike and bomber squadrons further razed the target.

On the whole, Exercise Golden Eagle was a major success. Problems that emerged were resolved quickly and effectively. The experience gained and the problem situations identified are also of inestimable value.

In order to ensure peace, it is necessary that the Air Force be prepared for any eventuality. Operation Golden Eagle proved that it is just that.

[Boxed item, pp 8-9]

#### **Tactical Airfield Unit Increases Strength and Mobility in SAAF**

A soft rumble in the distance is the only sound that disturbs the Saturday morning calm. The Upington sun bears down mercilessly and creates pools of water on the extended runway. Moments later, searching eyes spot the Impala fighter, approaching low over the horizon. Gnats circle continually, irritating the three firemen sitting there, waiting.

The Impala lands and begins to taxi towards the control center. An escort is ready to accompany it to a parking place. After the two fliers have reported to "Operations," they seek escape in a refreshing shower. The smells coming from the kitchen chase away the exhaustion of the heat and quickly make the line in front of the mess longer.

This may sound like just another scene on an Air Force base. However, what makes this one special is the fact that a week earlier there was no airfield here. Exercise Golden Eagle, an Air Force exercise in northern Cape Province, needed an airfield, and 97 Tactical Airfield Unit was activated to provide one.

A Tactical Airfield Unit (TVE) is a unit that can deploy an airfield anywhere in South Africa within 72 hours. This includes setting up the total infrastructure necessary to meet the needs of a busy Air Force base.

The unit consists primarily of members of the Citizen Force, who come from all over the country. Each member of the Citizen Force is assigned to one of the five TVEs active in the Republic. Each member has a predetermined job and serves as a small cog in the great TVE machine.

When the order is given that a TVE might be set up, the various members are immediately put on standby footing. On the date in question, everyone goes first to the SA Air Force's Mobilization Unit in Verwoerdburg. From here, the convoys depart for the place where the deployment will take place.

The first teams to arrive bring the tents and sleeping facilities with them. Any cleared piece of land (even a dirt road) can serve as a landing strip. Around this strip, tents are erected and the camp is set up. Fences are put in place and storm-water ditches are dug. Roads are laid out, and bulwarks are set up. The water supply as well as sewer facilities are an important part of the duties of the first arrivees. Even electricity is run into the tents.

The personnel division gets to work as soon as possible, handling the administrative affairs surrounding the arrival of the various members. Each new member who arrives is placed in the various sleeping quarters as

quickly as possible. This division is also responsible for providing medical services, legal services, and even recreation. The chaplain services also fall under the personnel division.

As in any other unit, finance is an important subdivision. Here, all the needs such as salary matters and the administration of various clubs and institutions are met.

Some units have a lot of logistical data that must be processed. Vehicles are provided for us by the support services, and the demand for equipment throughout the unit must be provided for. The acquisition and announcement of information is of utmost importance, and a team of intelligence officers sees to this. A fire-fighting team is continually on duty and ready for any eventuality.

Once the unit is established, the airplanes from the various squadrons begin to land. The runway that is being used determines which squadrons can be accommodated. In the just-completed Exercise Golden Eagle, part of Upington Airport's runway was used, and so even Mirage fighters could use the airfield. Amenities are made available to the squadrons so that they can equip themselves and perform their duties without any inconvenience.

The initial set-up phase of a TVE can take place within three days, after which the unit must then maintain the airfield. From the moment that the first tent peg is driven in until the last peg is pulled out, it is important that organization run as smoothly as silk. During the operational phase, the unit functions 24 hours a day, and there is no room for error.

A Tactical Airfield Unit can function for an unspecified period of time in order to lend the necessary assistance to squadrons. It is a dynamic unit that significantly increases the mobility of the SA Air Force and makes its strength even more deadly. Because Citizen Force members are used, this rich source of reserves is effectively utilized and continually kept on a standby footing.

Once the camp is finally over, the tents disappear one by one into large metal crates. The last airplane leaves and the people scrambling about become fewer in number. Convoys begin to set out for home. Another Exercise Golden Eagle has been successfully completed.

The evening after the departure of the last airplane, an antelope visits the open stretch of veld. He sniffs the air nervously, trying to determine the origin of the strong human smell still lingering there.

#### **\* Budget's Debate on Economic Restructuring**

34000544A Johannesburg *BUSINESS DAY* in English  
15 Mar 90 p 8

[Commentary by Greta Steyn: "Budget Develops Debate on Economic Restructuring in SA"]



[Text] In the debate raging about SA [South Africa]'s future political economy, radical free-marketeters and rabid socialists agree on one point—a reconstruction of the SA economy is essential. They differ, however, on the state's role in achieving that aim.

The 1990/91 Budget, with its focus on building a new economy, is a major development in this debate.

Government's main policy instrument seeks to map out a role for government in alleviating poverty and addressing inequality—without increasing its stake in the economy.

In assessing the Budget then, three aspects should be considered—the socio-political, the longer-term economic strategy and the short-term, cyclical considerations. There are trade-offs between different goals, but economic policy is about the setting of priorities. Some are emphasised at the expense of others.

It is a balancing act requiring value judgments. As Finance Minister Barend du Plessis said yesterday, a Budget reflects something of the values and ideals of its society.

The main emphasis of the Budget fell on social spending and what was termed "economic backlogs". The first of the three broad policy considerations was to restructure the economy to raise the living standards of all South Africans.

Du Plessis noted about 40 percent of the Budget would go towards social services—about 10 percent of GDP [gross domestic product] and "much higher" than might be expected of SA at this stage of its development. But this figure is not evidence of a massive shift. It is not much higher than last year's 38 percent of total spending. The Budget simply continues a process started last year of curbing certain expenditures (notably defence) so that more emphasis can be placed on social spending.

The major development here is the creation of a special social fund to address "economic backlogs".

The R2bn transferred to this fund is not included in the total budgeted expenditure of R72.9bn (of which R27bn is on social services). Finance officials say the R2bn has not been included in the Budget because it is a "special fund financed from last year's surplus".

This reasoning is unconvincing. Government is indulging in some Chinese accounting to keep its overall spending total down. Where in government's accounts will this spending item be reflected?

The reason for the fancy footwork is Du Plessis's eagerness to present a Budget that cuts spending in real terms (up only 11.9 percent), rather than one that merely keeps pace with inflation (13 percent). A larger spending total, along with yesterday's tax concessions, would have brought the Budget close to being "mildly expansion-

But officials note the entire amount of the R2bn "conscience money" will probably not be spent in this fiscal year. It is likely to be closer to R1bn, so a real cut in overall spending is still possible.

The financing of the special "social backlog" fund says something about government's priorities. It will be paid for by a transfer out of the huge (almost R7bn) bank balance left after the end of the 1989/90 fiscal year. Significantly, it was decided to put the money back into the economy.

Du Plessis, mindful of the fight against inflation and the roaring growth in the money supply, could have chosen to reduce the forward cover debt (of R14bn) on the Reserve bank's balance sheet by a massive R5bn. Such a move would have amounted to large scale "money destruction"—when liquidity is taken out of the economy and never returned. It had been expected that government would handle its fat bank balance in this way to stress its battle against inflation.

But rather than "overkill" in the inflation fight, government will use the money to address social problems. It makes sense. Even Bank Governor Chris Stals, who sees inflation as his bogeyman, says crushing inflation through austerity policies is no use if the harsh measures aggravate poverty and unemployment.

The focus on social spending has a short-term urgency and a longer-term "reconstruction" focus. In general, government is approaching longer-term economic policy by focusing on the supply side. Through privatisation, deregulation and a reduction in taxes, the idea is to generate growth and wealth through an expansion in supply. This approach rejects the Keynesian focus on the demand side, with its preoccupation with short-term stabilisation policy.

Yesterday's tax reform was substantial progress in implementing longer-term, oft-promised policies. Du Plessis hopes to increase savings and investment through, among others, the exemption of dividends from taxation, the doubling of the exemption on interest earnings and the substantial relief from fiscal drag of just over R3bn.

But the meaningful tax relief in the Budget (R4.5bn in total), together with the larger deficit (2.8 percent of GDP compared with 1.5 percent) and the effective spending increase of about 13 percent prompts the question: Is this Budget right for the short-term, cyclical needs of the economy, given foreign debt payments of \$3bn and a precarious gold price?

The question is whether it will encourage spending and imports, thus threatening the balance of payments. Probably not. The reduction in the import surcharge is not likely to lead to a surge in imports.

Du Plessis hopes the tax relief for individuals will encourage savings. The interest rate structure lends support to this view. Nonetheless, the Budget cannot be



described as restrictive. At best, it is neutral and at worst, mildly expansionary. It assumes a relatively strong gold price and, probably, debt roll-overs.

Again, it was a question of priorities. The choice was between a tiny deficit and giving tax relief. With no tax relief, government would have announced a deficit of only R2,1bn. Such a low figure would have meant a second year of no "dissaving"—defined as the financing of current spending with long-term loans.

With capital spending at R5bn and the deficit at R7,99bn, the practice will reoccur. But perhaps the country's development needs have rendered this criticism invalid and of technical importance only.

As Du Plessis said yesterday—a huge part of government spending is investment in human capital. With the debate focused on wealth inequality and reconstruction of the economy, not all the old theories apply. In any event, the Budget makes an effort to address social issues within the framework of longer-term economic policy and short-term stabilisation policy. It is an imaginative exercise in balancing needs.

#### \* Local Plant Soon To Make Oleochemicals

34000531A Johannesburg *ENGINEERING NEWS*  
in English 2 Mar 90 pp 1-2

[Article by Kim Trollip, staff writer of *The Engineering News*: "Esterification Plant to Save SA Millions"]

[Text] Henkel SA [South Africa]'s planned R3,5-million esterification plant at its Trochem facility in Wadeville will save South Africa R5-million in foreign currency, claims a company spokesman.

The plant will manufacture chemical compounds used in the cosmetics industry.

He tells *The Engineering News* that the plant should start operating in December this year, although a small scale replica or pilot plant will be complete by June.

The objective of the move is to replace present imports of speciality oleochemicals.

This investment was approved by shareholders Rembrandt and Henkel of West Germany.

The oleochemical division of Henkel SA has been promoting and selling these products, imported from Dusseldorf, but will soon be able to sell locally manufactured versions of the chemicals.

The Trochem amine plant, commissioned in 1982, manufactures a number of oleochemical products as well as mining chemical products.

Due to the many uranium plant closures, Trochem was in a position to take on additional production.

It then signed a toll manufacturing agreement with SA Amines to manufacture quaternary ammonium compounds—a base for fabric softeners—at its Wadeville facility.

The technology provided for the manufacturing process will be imported, saving the country a substantial amount in foreign currency.

The technology and engineering design for the manufacturing process will be provided by Henkel KGaA, which is in its own right a market leader in this field.

This too will save the country a substantial amount of foreign currency.

The esterification plant will be situated next to the existing amine plant, although it will operate as a stand-alone unit.

#### \* SASOL 1 Plant To Move Into Chemicals Arena

34000531B Johannesburg *ENGINEERING NEWS*  
in English 2 Mar 90 p 7

[Article by Kim Trollip, staff writer of *The Engineering News*: "Revamped Sasol 1 Plant To Move Into High Value Added Chemicals Arena"]

[Text] SASOL [South African Coal, Oil and Gas Corporation] is currently being streamlined and upgraded in line with the company's strategy to move into high value added chemicals and the design of new technology for special wax and chemical production is being given high priority.

About half the envisaged output of Sasol 1 will be exported and in some cases South Africa's dependence on imports will be reduced.

To date R136-million has been spent on chemical projects at the plant.

The revamped plant will contain the latest environment-friendly technology.

If current design is duplicated and modernised, the new processes can go on stream within months, however, a Sasol spokesperson tells *The Engineering News* that there are advantages in using new technology which looks more attractive but will take longer to implement.

Sasol will spend substantially more on introducing the new processes and equipment but, because the technology has not yet been developed, it is difficult to access the amount still to be spent.

For the same reason no decision has been made on contractors or tenders at this stage.

The Sasolburg plant will continue to produce industrial gases but will step up the production of chemicals which make the largest contribution to the growth in group earnings.

Synfuel production will eventually be phased out and more sophisticated jobs will be available to the people of Sasolburg.

Staff will be redeployed and re-trained.

The group has been involved in intensive R&D to design new equipment and introduce new processes; it expects to spend substantially more on introducing the new technology.

The Sasolburg plant has been moving in the direction of chemical production for some time and the original ethylene plant has been revamped and is using feedstock from Sasol 2 and 3.

A blending plant has been installed at Sasol 1 for making customised solvents and the standard purification plant has been upgraded to produce high-purity phenols.

The research will develop new chemical processes and methods to take up other intermediate streams.

Existing equipment from an uneconomic plant that had been shut down is being used to purify the industrial alcohol n-Propanol which is an important building block in chemical and pharmaceutical applications.

This is all in line with a strategy to increase Sasol's "flexibility" as stated by chairman **Dr Joe Stegmann** in the last annual report.

In the report, Dr Stegmann said he hoped "that a more acceptable framework for protection of the indigenous liquid fuels industry will shortly be approved by the government".

The spokesperson told *The Engineering News* that there is still no news on a revised system of protection for the indigenous liquid fuels industry.

It has been said that this may indicate a change in direction not only for the synfuels industry but also the state.

Sasol approached the government, towards the end of 1989, requesting a revised system and was optimistic that a new system of protection would be introduced before the end of the year.

In the past Sasol contributed one cent a litre to the stabilisation fund, compared to seven cents by other companies.

This means that another revised system of protection could push up the petrol price.

According to a press report, the difference between the 7c/l that oil companies pay and the 1c/l that Sasol pays represents the 6c/l protection offered to Sasol and agreed to by the government at varying rates.

When the protection was raised from 3,6c/l to 6c/l in December 1988, Sasol agreed that the 6c/l which came from the equalisation fund did have the effect of reducing the size of the fund.

The report goes on to say that Sasol was paid about R100-million in cash as the increased protection was back-dated.

With regard to the Sasol 1 move away from synfuels, the group will not walk away from its "basic business", but will have the flexibility to respond to any opportunities.

Synfuel production will continue as before at Sasol's other two plants.

Diseconomies of scale, inflation and the ageing equipment at Sasol 1—commissioned in 1955—make synfuel production less profitable there than at Sasol 11 and 111.

Sasol 1's synfuel production will be phased during the next few years, but will not affect general synfuel supply as both the Secunda plants are producing substantially more than their original design level.

Responding to questions from *The Engineering News*, the spokesperson said synthetic fuels are likely to remain the mainstream of Sasol's business and co-products from Sasol 2 and 3's synfuel production will go to Sasol 1 for further processing.

## Angola

### 'Part Two' of Van Dunem News Conference on Peace

MB1704205990 Luanda Domestic Service  
in Portuguese 1935 GMT 17 Apr 90

["Part two of news conference" by Foreign Minister Pedro de Castro van Dunem Loy with unidentified correspondent in Luanda on 16 April—recorded]

[Text] [Correspondent] While referring to the development of the military situation in southwestern Angola a few weeks ago, Savimbi pointed out that UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] could not negotiate with the government with a knife at its throat. How do you view this about-face in UNITA's position as it has now recognized the Angolan state, even if this was with some reservations, as you pointed out a few moments ago?

[Van Dunem] Some UNITA elements have begun to understand the great need to achieve peace. I would also like to believe that there is some pressure, particularly military pressure, and that the UNITA leadership must have understood that the conflict cannot be solved by a military victory. Thus, it is necessary to reach an agreement at the negotiating table.

[Correspondent] However, do you not feel that the talks would start from a stage of weakness in light of this political framework that you drew up? In other words, the government does not recognize UNITA, and UNITA will not negotiate with the government as long as it is not recognized.

[Van Dunem] We do not recognize UNITA as a political party because, according to the establishment [preceding word in English] in the People's Republic of Angola, we follow a single-party system. UNITA could be recognized later on when and if it is the desire of the Angolan people for us to opt for a multiparty system. At this particular point, no. We have recognized UNITA as an existing force that will discuss the solution of the internal conflict with the Angolan Government. However, we do not recognize UNITA as a political party.

[Correspondent] Now, would a possible negotiating agreement with UNITA be interpreted as the beginning of a multiparty system in Angola?

[Van Dunem] We have already expressed our position on this issue. As a matter of fact, the ongoing reforms would be developed within the framework of broadening democracy. Efforts will be developed to change the existing conditions if that is the desire of the Angolan people. In my opinion, it would be necessary for us to achieve a certain economic, social, and political development in the People's Republic of Angola before we could begin to speak of a multiparty system. I believe that this is only possible if we attain peace. If we are able to restore peace, then we shall be able to continue to develop efforts to broaden democracy, which would

eventually develop—as was rightly pointed out by the comrade president himself and a number of other Angolan leaders—into a multiparty system, as long as this is the desire of our people.

[Correspondent] Would there be room for other parties, apart from the government party and UNITA, once peace is restored?

[Van Dunem] What would be established is the principle of a multiparty system. As for how many parties will emerge thereafter, I don't know.

[Correspondent] What will be the prerequisites?

[Van Dunem] It is very difficult to say what will happen in the future. Everything will depend on the development process itself. Now, the people themselves will examine the issue and define what they want. They may even opt for a single-party system.

[Correspondent] Mr. Minister, when you say it is up to the Angolan people to decide, can one assume that there could be a referendum?

[Van Dunem] It could be understood that way, yes.

[Correspondent] When will it be?

[Van Dunem] When conditions have been created. Within the framework of the broadening of democracy, the entire Angolan people would be consulted and listened to. They will express their views on this issue.

[Correspondent] It seems as if the term integration of UNITA continues to be part of the official vocabulary.

[Van Dunem] I believe that it is perhaps not very useful to insist on this vocabulary which has already caused a lot of confusion, for it is interpreted differently and even translated differently into various languages. The basic point is that we want to see UNITA elements, like all other members of our population, have the possibility to participate in all activities which characterize the political, social, economic, and cultural development of the People's Republic of Angola. That is the idea.

Now, the interpretation of the term could vary. Naturally, what would the UNITA armed elements do? They will be integrated into the armed forces. This term integration has many interpretations, and it seems as if UNITA elements do not like it for its ambiguousness.

[Correspondent] Don't you think that at this point UNITA has (?embarked) on a military initiative, from information that we are able to obtain daily?

[Van Dunem] Yes. Unfortunately UNITA continues to carry out operations, as was pointed out here. It is continuing to develop warmongering operations throughout the national territory, and it does not appear to be ready to halt this course. As a matter of fact, what is going on along our northern border is (?well known).

[Correspondent] Why doesn't the Angolan Government condemn the mediator for not playing his role properly? Again, why does the Angolan Government find it difficult to mention Zaire when it speaks of UNITA's foreign assistance? The Angolan Government finds it difficult to point a finger at Zaire as UNITA's rearguard. Why?

[Van Dunem] You are saying that the Zairian Government is giving support to UNITA?

[Correspondent] Mr. Minister, you pointed out that there was a UNITA concentration along the northern border. The north borders Zaire. What is more, Congolese television recently made such accusations.

[Van Dunem] I am referring to concentrations along the northern border but on the Angolan side. I don't know what the Angolan Government should condemn. There is no doubt whatsoever that we have some difficulties with the northern border. Our performance there is not perfect. Obviously, there could be elements, officials of countries who along the border could give some support to certain rebel elements to carry out military activity in other territories. This is the case for Zaire. However, I do not believe that the Zairian Government is directly involved, directly involved in rendering military assistance to UNITA to destabilize the People's Republic of Angola.

As for the role of mediator, it is natural that direct dialogue will be the eventual thing for conflicts of this nature. Now, if we are able to establish dialogue, then why should there be mediation? What we shall need is everyone's assistance to sensitize UNITA to genuinely accept peace proposals. We shall no longer need mediation. If there are direct contacts, then there is no need for someone to come between us, which might just further complicate things.

[Correspondent] Let us say for argument's sake that the Angolan Government has clear, solid proof of the Zairian Government's involvement in the country's destabilization by UNITA. Would our government then admit the principle of (?condemnation)?

[Van Dunem] We [pauses] I personally would like to see this conflict end due to dialogue and not through war.

#### Foreign Minister To Attend U.S. Economic Meetings

MB1804081690 Luanda Domestic Service  
in Portuguese 0600 GMT 18 Apr 90

[Text] Angolan Foreign Minister Pedro de Castro Van Dunem Loy is scheduled to arrive in New York for two international economics meetings.

The Angolan minister will participate in a meeting organized by the African-American Institute, which will discuss the future cooperation between that organization and the member countries of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference.

Minister Loy will also attend the 18th UN special session on economic cooperation and will address issues relating to the economic and financial reorganization program and the drought afflicting southern Angola.

Loy's visit will end 25 April.

#### UNITA Reports 17 Apr Military Operations

MB1804055590 (Clandestine) Voice of Resistance  
of the Black Cockerel in Portuguese to Southern  
and Central Africa 0500 GMT 18 Apr 90

["Political and Military Situation Report" for 1200 GMT on 17 April—read by announcer]

[Text] 1. Our forces destroyed another BMP-1 armored vehicle and two cargo vehicles belonging to the 4th Group, stationed on the Mavinga front. The three FAPLA [People's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola] soldiers who surrendered to our forces have given accounts of the unbearable situation faced by their comrades. This clearly shows the MPLA-PT's [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola-Labor Party] inhuman face.

2. At 0045 on 17 April, our forces stormed the enemy barracks at Monte Alegre, Malange Province. Eight FAPLA soldiers were killed and a radio operator assigned to the border guard troops was captured. Three KrAZ vehicles were destroyed, and 23 AK-47's, two RPG-7's, two 60mm mortars, 70,000 rounds of ammunition for 7.62 calibre weapons, 35 RPG-7 shells, and one radio transmitter were captured.

3. The war will only end when the MPLA decides to hold honest and direct talks with UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola], instead of resorting to maneuvers.

[Issued] Office of the Chief of General Staff, 17 April 1990

[Signed] Brigadier Zacarias Mundombe, deputy military intelligence chief

#### \* UNITA Admits Mavinga Situation 'Confusing'

90EF0308A Lisbon O DIABO in Portuguese  
27 Feb 90 pp 16-17

[Text] The case of the war in Angola is continuing to hold the attention of U.S. politicians and analysts. The National Security Council (NSC), the Senate Committees on Foreign Relations, Intelligence, and Defense, the CIA, the NSA, the Department of Defense and the DIA, the White House, and the Department of State are watching every step of the process. And they are worried.

One of O DIABO's correspondents in Washington was told by a member of the NSC: "In Washington, UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] is becoming a matter of life or death. No one wants to appear to be throwing more logs on the fire, but neither does anyone want to run the risk of being blamed later for a military defeat in southern Angola."



A Washington political analyst with close ties to the Heritage Foundation, a conservative institution, told us: "I can tell you that there are even plans to provide UNITA with a minimal air force if the taking of Jamba becomes imminent." According to his information, the United States might try in such a case to make up for one of the most glaring shortcomings in Jonas Savimbi's movement: the absence of air support due to the fact that because of its serious problems at home, South Africa has neither the forces for resuming such support nor any intention of doing so. The aircraft to be supplied to UNITA would have to pass through Zaire and would be of the F-5E Tiger-II type—a fighter-bomber with accessible though somewhat obsolete technology that could have a devastating surprise effect on FAPLA [People's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola]. The F-5's could use a landing strip which reportedly has been constructed near Licua or even the landing strip at Jamba if the latter were "made somewhat larger." Another possibility would be the use of ground attack helicopters of the Cobra type, but these would be more vulnerable to fire from the ground or from Luanda's MiG's and Sukhoi's.

Who would pilot those aircraft? Our source said: "Not Americans, that's for sure."

It is known that Jamba has been visited by Israeli-trained Zairian and Moroccan officers, of whom some are qualified to command "sophisticated" artillery batteries and others can pilot "advanced aircraft."

#### Mavinga: What Is Happening?

UNITA itself acknowledges that the situation in Mavinga is confusing. Some of its sources admit that the airfield was occupied for several days in early February by special groups from the MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola] that were later forced to withdraw. But it is also said that news reports from Luanda saying that Savimbi's forces had "recaptured" the town in ruins are intended only to justify, in the eyes of Luanda public opinion, the fact that FAPLA has never really taken the essential part of the locality, which consists of a well-built system of underground bunkers and antiaircraft defenses.

It is known, however, that the fighting was merciless and included the summary execution of prisoners by both sides. It is also reported that long-range UNITA groups found FAPLA soldiers near the Lomba River who had died of hunger or thirst several days earlier owing to the destruction of successive reinforcement columns sent out from Cuito Cuanavale and from Menongue, which is even farther away. According to some sources, those columns included hundreds of armored personnel carriers and reconnaissance vehicles (BMP's, BRDM's, and BTR's) as well as SA-13 mobile missile launchers, T-5 and T-62 tanks, and a Cuban rapid intervention battalion which reportedly later refrained from advancing to the battlefield.

#### U.S., Soviet Aid

Although it is no longer supplying modern equipment "on credit," the USSR is continuing to sell modern weapons to the MPLA. Use of many of those weapons is restricted to units integrated with the Cuban contingent. One well-informed source told us: "Some of those weapons could not be used a few months from now, because by then they will be in the hands of the forces that must leave Angola." He concluded by saying: "That is one reason why the MPLA had to attack now."

The same source told us: "In any case, the scene north of Mavinga is impressive. The rivers are cluttered with the carcasses of trucks and armored vehicles. Even UNITA committed a few units of conventional armor to the conflict—including a few T-55 and PT-76 tanks captured from FAPLA some time back." A communique sent to us through UNITA and referring to 20 February says, in fact, that Savimbi's men lost 8 T-55 tanks and 8 BTR-60 armored vehicles, compared to 58 T-55 tanks and 117 BMP-1's lost by FAPLA.

The MPLA has continued to make sizable bombing raids, using MiG-23's and 27's against Mucundi and Su-22's and Su-25's against Mavinga.

For its part, UNITA has reportedly launched attacks to the north and even tried to strike blows against important MPLA bases such as those in Munhango and Luena, from where aircraft capable of attacking Jamba can take off. The United States has increased its C-130 flights from Zaire to Jamba, delivering dozens of missile systems: Stingers, Avengers (Stingers mounted on light vehicles), Rolands (probably acquired through Paris), a "a type of longer-range rocket—apparently the Chaparral—coupled with rapid-firing Vulcan guns. Many of those weapons, as well as towed and self-propelled versions of the TOW antitank missile and LAW antitank rockets, reportedly went to the vicinity of Mavinga.

It is also said that the United States is thinking of providing UNITA with 10.5 and 15.5 [as published] howitzers, heavy mortars, and light armor, as well as "special forces" equipment, including precision rifles, night vision equipment, and sensors. The amount of communications equipment and electronic warfare equipment has also been increased.

#### Crucial Months

The next few months may be crucial. Savimbi will have to reinforce Mavinga, if he can hold on to it, and he will need to beef up to some extent his ability to put pressure on the north. The problem of air support will also have to be faced in "a very serious manner," to quote a South African military man speaking to us from Pretoria.

But the outcome over the next few months will also depend on another factor: FAPLA's situation at the rear, especially as regards supplies and logistics. Another question is what the MPLA wants to do: Will it move forces that might be needed in the north and deploy

them all in the Mavinga area? Will it decide not to repeat the intensity of the current offensive? Or will it shift once again to a negotiating position?

Above all, Jonas Savimbi will now want to know whether the very intensive U.S. aid in the military area can be accompanied by political pressure on the MPLA. And if things get complicated in the south, it may be necessary once again to consider transferring bases, men, and equipment to the north, with Zaire providing the "corridor" which the South Africans have traditionally maintained in northern Namibia.

#### \* Possible Advisers to MPLA Listed

90EF0308B Lisbon O DIABO in Portuguese  
27 Feb 90 p 17

[Text] The top Portuguese military adviser to Jose Eduardo dos Santos seems to be a former major in the Portuguese Army, Eliseo de Figueiredo. Considered a "moderate" opposed to most of the theses which led Rosa Coutinho to recruit mercenaries for Angola, he often visits Lisbon and distinguished himself by wiping out many of the actions by UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] in Luanda's factories as far back as the early 1980's.

Eliseo de Figueiredo was trained as a commando, has never had any major ideological leanings, and was one of the men who, along with Pezarat Correia, controlled the former Katanga gendarmes in northern Angola who made Mobutu think twice about his geostrategic plans. There are those who say that Figueiredo was in Lubango and then in Cuito Cuanavale around the time that FAPLA [People's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola] launched its operation in the south.

Captain Leitao Fernandes and Captain Amarante are two other former Portuguese officers mentioned as having cooperated with the MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola] military machine. Also mentioned are Lieutenant Gil, a former commando, and from 20 to 30 other former NCO's and enlisted men who served in Portugal's Overseas Army. Almost all of them are said to be serving as commanders or as advisers on guerrilla warfare, antiguerrilla warfare, and long-range reconnaissance patrols (LRRP). None of them have been directly involved in the current offensive, although they may have helped plan the operation.

It is said that the Portuguese serving the MPLA regime went there in three "convoys." The first two were planned by Rosa Coutinho, but the last one is said to have been organized in other quarters. Generally, soldiers are attracted by the promise of hefty pay—paid in dollars and probably transferable abroad—that is never less than 600,000 escudos per month. But there have been a few quarrels and problems resulting in "resignations," particularly in the area of helicopter support for FAPLA.

#### Men From the East

The Cuban contingent and its history are common knowledge, although the question still exists as to the extent to which Cuban soldiers, especially blacks, have adopted Angolan nationality. There are probably still a few hundred Soviet military advisers, about 30 of whom probably commanded the operational center that launched the current offensive.

There are also indications that men from the GDR, Czechoslovakia, and Poland—former members of the security (special police) and defense (elite forces) *para*rauses—are advising MPLA units, especially in the field of operational training in heavy vehicle operation and maintenance, missile systems, artillery, and aircraft. Our sources tell us that the newly arrived advisers include two East German officers named Munz and Dietz (or Dieter) and another, probably Bulgarian, officer named Belov who are "disillusioned by certain features of the current political process in the East."

It is very possible that the Su-25 Frogfoot fighter planes recently brought into the conflict are not being piloted by Angolans.

#### \* New Nonaffiliated Group Draws Up Platform

90AF0010A Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS  
in Portuguese 11 Mar 90 p 13

[Text] The draft bylaws for a new organization called the Civic Association of Angolan Youth are being circulated in Luanda.

According to our correspondent in the Angolan capital, Carlos Ferreira, this draft, which is not very different from that submitted earlier by the Angolan Civic Association (ACA), says that the association is adopting the name "Juvangola" and is defining itself as a patriotic and democratic, nonracial, and nonreligious organization.

Juvangola, according to the draft bylaws, is an association which does not seek to support any political ideology, philosophical approach, or religious credo, and deals with individuals on an entirely nondiscriminatory basis.

Generally speaking, the embryonic bylaws of the new association are not very different from the proclamation issued by the Civic Association of Angola, which DIARIO DE NOTICIAS was the first to publish. For example, ACA proposes to organize Angolan citizens and groups with a view to greater participation, in an organized and objective fashion, in social life and in the development and advancement of the country. On the other hand, it also seeks to defend and encourage freedom of expression, above and beyond the "adamant" defense of human rights.

In its bylaws, ACA defines itself as an organization of a nongovernmental nature and open to all factions and sectors of national thought.

The Angolan Civic Association, which has as its sponsor Canon Manuel das Neves, says it is prepared to sponsor campaigns seeking to preserve and develop moral values and civic and professional principles.

### Mauritius

#### \* Delegation Seeks Sweden as Trading Partner

90AF0012C Port Louis THE SUN in French  
15 Mar 90 p 4

[Article: "Swedes Interested in Launching Industrial Projects in Mauritius"]

[Text] The Lutchmeenaraidoo mission to Sweden could result in the launching of as many as 10 projects in such diverse manufacturing fields as silver forks and spoons, fashionable shoes, household electrical appliances, and electric transformers.

The mission, described as "extremely useful," also gave the finance minister an opportunity to note the similarities between Mauritius and Sweden, a country with some of the highest tax rates in the world. The minister, who was shocked to learn how little is known about Mauritius in Sweden, said more vigorous work is needed to exploit the Swedish tourist market, which has too long been neglected.

According to the minister, the Scandinavian mission was part of Mauritius's overall strategy of opening up new markets, in furtherance of the government's diversification policy. Missions have traveled to Madagascar, Hong Kong, Japan, Sweden, and Finland. The trip to Sweden was treated as a high-level visit because the delegation was received by the Swedish king. That is why the minister described the mission as both political and technical. The technical side of the trip included talks with businessmen as well as representatives of agencies that work with African countries, including BITS [expansion unknown], an aid organization that provides concessional financing for development projects.

There was also a meeting with the Suede Fund, a governmental agency responsible for investments. There are excellent prospects for joint ventures, the minister indicated. He said "interesting discussions" were held with IMPORT, whose modest exports to Mauritius come to about 60 million rupees [per year]. The minister said it is clear that production could quadruple with closer relations. MEDIA [Mauritius Export Development and Investment Authority] will participate in the Stockholm and Gotenburg fairs.

The Mauritian mission did not forget about training, and obtained the agreement, in principle, of BITS to provide financial assistance. The Swedish Government also agreed in principle to provide concessional financing for Swedish projects in Mauritius. A meeting was held with representatives of Sweden's two biggest banks, and

Lutchmeenaraidoo invited them to establish facilities at Mauritius's "offshore" [banking] center.

"We emphasized the usefulness of Mauritius as a port of access to Africa," said the minister. To that end, the minister said, bilateral double taxation accords will have to be negotiated with countries establishing themselves on Mauritius. He said the agreement with Sweden will be signed as quickly as possible.

In Finland, a financing agreement was signed providing for the rehabilitation of Roche-Bois's main drainage system.

The minister was particularly struck by an economic similarity between Sweden and Mauritius, especially since Mauritius has low taxes. In Sweden, people are trying to get taxes down, but have not been able to do so while at the same time maintaining a "welfare state." So far, Mauritius has been able to do both.

### Mozambique

#### New Police Unit To Monitor Ethics, Discipline

MB1804121890 Maputo Domestic Service  
in Portuguese 1030 GMT 18 Apr 90

[Text] Commander in Chief Joaquim Chissano issued a service order creating a counterintelligence police service within the Mozambique People's Police [PPM] to ensure police ethics and discipline.

There will be a service department at the PPM's General Command and a section at the PPM's Provincial Command.

The counterintelligence police service will study, assess, and investigate extraneous phenomena or behavior within PPM. It will also inform any police station or PPM member about potentially irregular conduct as part a persuasive and preventive campaign.

#### \* South African Investment Faces Obstacles

34000527A Johannesburg THE STAR in English  
6 Mar 90 p 13

[Article by Sven Lunsche, The Star's Africa News Service: "Frelimo Woos SA Business"]

[Text] Maputo—As East European countries and the European Community tighten up on the flow of funds to Mozambique, Frelimo [Mozambique Liberation Front] is looking to South African investors to rescue it from economic collapse.

And South African companies are responding, albeit cautiously.

Political considerations have taken a firm back seat, although the recent reform moves by President de Klerk have made it easier to justify the financial approaches.



"South Africa is best placed for investment in this country and any kind of investment is welcome," Mr Fernando Sumbane, the director of the Unit for the Co-ordination of Import Products (GCPI), recently told a visiting delegation of about 40 South African businessmen.

But behind the official courting is the dour reality of foreign investment cuts by the Eastern Bloc and European Community. Countries within the EC are also likely to divert previous investments in the developing world to the expanded European common market in 1993. This puts the spotlight firmly on South Africa.

The Office for Foreign Investments Promotion (GPI) has been given increasing powers to get swift responses from other departments to facilitate investments. It now guarantees a response to any investment proposal within 90 days, but in practice dealings with government departments are still a bureaucratic nightmare.

More importantly numerous laws have been introduced to sweeten the deal for any potential investor:

- A company tax holiday of two to 10 years, depending on the type of investment, as well as no personal tax payments for technical staff for up to five years.
- A state guarantee that all profits can be repatriated.
- Exemption of fiscal duties on company tax and dividend payments.
- Exemption of import duties for imported raw materials and machinery equipment.
- A free lease on the land for an indefinite period, but the land itself cannot be bought.
- Fifty percent of export earnings can be retained by the company in foreign exchange while the remainder will be converted into meticals.

Apart from these benefits, labour is also extremely cheap—the average salary of an unskilled worker is about R75 a month.

The government insists, however, that all investments are undertaken on a joint venture basis with Mozambican companies or parastatals, even if the representation is minimal.

A number of private firms and associations have been established in Mozambique to allocate partners to foreign investors and some South African companies are using this route for entry into the country.

However, most South African investments have been focused on the tourism sector. In one of the biggest developments so far, Karos Hotels has taken a major 43 percent interest in the Polana Hotel and plans to spend around R30 million in upgrading it.

Of the total number of 60 joint venture projects that were given the official go-ahead last year, six involved South African companies, ranging in value from about R750 000 to about R5 million.

So far this year 15 applications have been received, four of them from South Africa, according to figures provided by the GPI.

Overall, foreign investment has increased from about R12,5 million in 1987 to about R125 million last year, and the government is optimistic that this figure will soar in the years ahead.

South African companies should be on the forefront of this development, although a number of factors still inhibit the growth of private sector ventures.

Foremost among them is the security situation, which limits investments largely to Maputo and the coastal islands, and precludes a large portion of potential agricultural projects.

In addition companies are largely required to finance their own expansion as development of the country's financial market is in a rudimentary stage.

Foreign exchange allocation, as a result, is a major problem and once again companies will have to rely heavily on their own resources to bring in essential machinery and spares.

South African groups are also often excluded from tenders for projects sponsored by Scandinavian and other European governments, which provide a large portion of the aid to the country.

On a risk assessment analysis these factors alone give Mozambique an extremely negative rating for potential investors.

But, as the GCPI's Mr Fernando Sumbane points out: "Political changes are taking place fast and once the country opens it will offer investors a consumer market of 15 million people. The earlier you get in the better."

#### \* 'Tenuousness' of IMF/World Bank Programs Seen

34000527B Johannesburg THE STAR in English  
6 Mar 90 p 13

[Text] Maputo—An IMF/World Bank-backed economic recovery programme has led Mozambique on an increasingly fragile path to economic recovery.

The programme has demanded huge sacrifices and over the past two months the population has vented its frustration in an unprecedented wave of strike actions which could seriously hamper further efforts to revitalise the shaky economy.

Currently teachers are on strike, following prolonged and bitter strikes by the country's rail and harbour workers and hospital employees.

The grievances and demands are similar—increasingly difficult working conditions to be compensated for by at least a 15 percent rise in monthly salaries.



Renamo [Mozambique National Resistance] has claimed responsibility for the wave of strike actions, but there is little to suggest that anything but economic hardship is behind the labour disputes.

Underlying the deteriorating conditions faced by workers, not to mention the hundreds who every day flood Maputo from the war-torn countryside, is a hard-hitting economic recovery programme aimed at re-introducing a market economy.

In 1987, with the country near virtual collapse, the government, with the guidance and financial aid from the IMF and the World Bank, introduced sweeping reforms aimed at rebuilding the economy.

The programme involved a wide restructuring of the economy, centred around the easing of administrative controls and the promotion of foreign investments.

It has produced some encouraging results and the economy has grown by between four and six percent annually over the past three years, largely as a result of increased food production.

However, apart from fruit and vegetables, there is little else the average Maputan can afford. Payment for Mozambique-produced and South African goods is in rands or US dollars, to earn desperately needed foreign exchange.

Everyone is willing to accept rands at the parallel market rate of around 700 meticals. The official rate is currently about 300 meticals, but under the conditions of the IMF programme the metical will have to be further devalued.

#### **Wages Frozen**

At the same time all prices must continue to rise in real terms—and wages remain effectively frozen.

This gives the government little leeway in their negotiations with the strikers, and with per capita income estimated at less than \$150 a head, and inflation running at about 30 percent, further social unrest is virtually inevitable.

Nevertheless the Mozambican government has indicated it will continue to apply the economic recovery programme.

Foreign aid remains the only lifeline of the economy and the government will do nothing to upset the aid inflows, scheduled at about R3,5 billion a year up to 1994.

Much of this will go to meet the payments on the country's estimated R10,5 billion debt. Little is left to finance the government's investment and capital programmes, especially since the war with Renamo swallows up to 36 percent of the Budget and up to 10 percent of GDP [gross domestic product].

The government is also looking at privatising up to 45 state enterprises this year, mostly those which have become too expensive to maintain.

A wide-ranging package of incentives is offered to potential investors, including exemption on import duties for raw materials and machinery and free land.

The repatriation of profits is guaranteed and no industries will be nationalised, a commitment which is underlined by the fact that Mozambique is set to join the World Bank's Multinational Insurance Guarantee Agency.

Exports last year fell to R250 million compared with R575 million in 1982 and a low point of R185 million in the mid-1980's.

The World Bank estimates that this figure should double by 1994, but this looks difficult to achieve, given the declining production of the country's major export products: cashew nuts, prawns and sugar.

#### **\* Economic, Social Dislocation Termed Unique**

34000527C Johannesburg FINANCIAL MAIL in English  
2 Mar 90 pp 34-35

[Text] The universal economic and social dislocation which has engulfed Mozambique since independence in 1975 is almost entirely manmade. It represents a serial disaster unique—even in Africa—and there is absolutely no easy way out.

The precipitate abandonment of the colony by the Portuguese stalled new development and ensured that what was left by way of infrastructure and regulatory systems would decay. It left the fledgling People's Republic with a shortage of skills so severe that incompetence and bureaucratic delays are in some ways the most enduring legacy of colonialism. To run the country, the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique had Marxist theory.

The breakdown of order extends from top to bottom. Government cannot cope with rural banditry—which is what Renamo [Mozambique National Resistance]'s attacks have degenerated into—and there are spiralling public-sector strikes. Critical shortages have created an atmosphere of corruption and cynicism which thrives on a black market in goods and currency.

Since 1987, when the ruling Frelimo [Mozambique Liberation Front] party was compelled to engage in perestroika and seek a return to at least some elements of a market economy, some revitalisation has taken place. This is evident in the streets and tenements of Maputo, where hawkers (peddling fruit and cigarettes) and shoe-shine stands have sprung up around the cafes and marketplace near the decaying station where trains continue to limp in from SA, despite frequent and vicious attacks on the line.

The odd disco booms out rap music and Tracy Chapman as a form of contribution to nightlife, and prostitution has returned having survived mass arrests and re-education on collective farms. But this has also helped the spread of Aids.

To outsiders this kind of resurgent life may seem marginal: but it's an improvement on the utter destitution of four years ago when the war, droughts and the bizarre imposition of Marxism-Leninism on a demoralised and starving population of 15m meant, for example, that the appearance of a line of cough mixtures in a pharmacy was a small miracle and an occasion for queuing. Prawns (which with cashew nuts account for 75 percent of exports) are available again in selected outlets; there is some refurbishment of hotels, including the Polana; and businessmen, especially South Africans, are in town again looking for deals.

Unfortunately, even the minimal economic revitalisation is illusory—it is buoyed by foreign aid, debt relief and BoP support from the World Bank, IMF and friendly governments. Mozambique is reluctantly returning to the Western sphere of influence. In exchange for monetary and fiscal reforms—which with inflation have triggered the strikes—the inflows are projected at about US\$1.4bn a year until 1993, much of which will go to service debt arrears which had reached \$1bn by 1986-1987 when Frelimo instituted an Economic Rehabilitation Programme. The annual BoP current account deficit runs in excess of \$500m.

Because Mozambique was born out of a guerrilla struggle and has ever since lived with war—against what was then Rhodesia and Renamo—military spending consumes 10 percent of GNP [gross national product] (an estimated \$4.08bn, though all estimates must be regarded as suspect) and debts to military sponsors such as the Soviet Union are unlikely to be paid. A meeting was scheduled in Moscow this week on what to do about Mozambique's 1.5bn rouble indebtedness to the Soviets—most of which is for military equipment.

For its part, the colonial power, Portugal, showed its concern by a State visit to Maputo in September when protocols were signed to facilitate the conversion of debt into shareholdings in Mozambican enterprises. Such construction as is taking place in the capital is on the basis of consortium agreements in partnership with Mozambique underpinned by what might best be described as charitable lines of national credit.

SA [South Africa]'s involvement in Mozambique's affairs—now that at least overt security support for Renamo has been acknowledged by Frelimo's Joaquim Chissano as officially at an end—must be regarded as very much a long-term commitment. The rehabilitation and safety of the Cahora Bassa hydro-electric dam, the smooth functioning of the port and the security of road and rail links are primary concerns to Pretoria.

While a few mining houses are interested in prospecting, economic rejuvenation led by the private sector depends on the restoration and creation of infrastructure, not to mention some major project currently in the realm of fantasy, preferably on a Moss gas scale. And above all on an end to the war.

The war is the bedrock of every aspect of Mozambican life. While there have been no officially acknowledged attacks in Maputo, the countryside has been devastated and is the heartland of one of Africa's greatest human disasters. Its dimensions are merely suggested by the fact that into SA and two of its homelands—Gazankulu and KaNgwane—480 000 illegal Mozambican immigrants have fled the conflict, crossing immense physical and human barriers to an uncertain future. Some have been found as far afield as Cape Town and 3 000 are repatriated each month, many simple to return to SA.

Foreign Minister Pik Botha visited Mozambique in August and, in response to closer co-operation between the "new SA" and the People's Republic, a group of Mozambican "intellectuals, writers, scientists, men and women from the arts, from journalism, from sports," wrote an open letter to President F W de Klerk, stating: "The first condition for the establishment of peace in our country is the eradication of all mechanisms conceived in the light of 'total strategy' to destabilise the region militarily."

A million people were said to have been affected by the war, and even if assistance to Renamo (now said to have decayed to barter: ivory for arms and food) has officially been severed, De Klerk was felt to have a responsibility to take further steps and increase assistance to Maputo. Various commercial agreements are filtering through.

Meanwhile, the war—quite evidently lacking centralised control, though Renamo's Afonso Dhlakama claims otherwise—has intensified in viciousness, quite possibly because resources for its concerted propagation are running out. At least 66 people were killed in a train attack in southern Mozambique in mid-February, and hostages have been taken on the Zimbabwean frontier, a new development. In January, an attack on an oil pipeline cost 1.3m / of imported fuel.

The cities are under a dual economic threat: from the shortages and disruption of the war and the failure of centralised planning. State revenues from internal sources are dwindling. While the largely abandoned residential housing stock of Maputo was nationalised, and used for settling families, rent collection has broken down and the peeling facades face streets in which garbage mounts up and disease proliferates.

Hundreds of thousands of squatters—most from the countryside—ring the city and will also have to be housed, fed and schooled in accordance with socialist promises which simply cannot be translated into reality as things stand. The birthrate is 3.2 percent a year; literacy runs at only 30 percent.

Though only for a while, Frelimo can at least blame the war for the catastrophes which have overtaken it and the populace. It remains to be seen whether it will survive the economic restructuring forced on it by the aid agencies; and in concert with that, the proposed evolution towards a multiparty democracy which would have to include Renamo as a major political factor.

Both these processes are already causing severe strains in Frelimo's capacity to govern—never really tested outside the cohesion of a guerrilla movement. From last year, devaluation of the metical became a monthly, incremental affair—but in 1987-1988 the fall had been precipitate and the effects disastrous. Officially the currency is nudging towards Mt1 000 to the dollar—whereas in 1986 it was about Mt40/\$—but the "parallel" or black market rate is about Mt2 000/\$. The rand is exchanged at banks at R1 for Mt250-Mt300, but can fetch Mt750 and upwards in taxi cabs.

The cash economy is thus forex driven and the greatest shortage is precisely of forex, for which weekly State auctions are held. The rand is a hard currency. Since there are so few goods available anyway, and availability varies from one area to another, inflation is difficult to calculate. It is certainly verging on hyper-inflation and, needless to say, interest rates are gravely negative. Economic adjustments—driven by aid and debt regimes—do attempt to bring reality to bear, but with predictable short-term results.

A wave of service and utility price hikes—in posts and telecommunications, electricity and water—coupled with wage curbs in the public sector led directly to strikes, though Renamo claims them as a political victory. Basic food costs—of which the largest component is administered agricultural prices—are set to rise 64 percent in March. A kg of rice will cost \$1, from 55c. Maize, cooking oil and soap will also rise.

And to meet international criteria for the restructuring, all prices must continue to rise in real terms, the currency devalue, and wages remain effectively frozen. Difficult when a labourer earns perhaps \$30 a month, distribution networks are chaotic, and there is a primordial scramble for foreign exchange.

Now the schools are closed because the teachers are on strike, following the health services and the port workers. The teachers want a 100 percent increase and last weekend the entire Cabinet held an emergency session to consider the matter; nothing came of it.

On the political and constitutional front, matters are improving. Kenya's Daniel arap Moi and Zimbabwe's Robert Mugabe—the official mediators on the resolution of the Mozambican war—have had steady Western and Soviet support for their efforts and, while it is premature to suggest that Chissano and Dhlakama could sit down together soon and take the next step, many believe a peace agreement will be thrashed out by the end of the year. Mopping up bands of roving militants will take another five years, government officials believe.

Dhlakama, now, is unwilling to accept a clause in a seven-point peace proposal relating to an acceptance of "the legitimacy of the Republic of Mozambique and its constitution." But if indeed the rebels' supplies are dwindling—as suggested by the ferocity of their attacks on civilians, and the fact that robbery is increasingly evident as a motive—it should be only a matter of time

before compromise is achieved. The international pressure is certainly on for a settlement.

Meanwhile, in January, Chissano released a new draft constitution which makes provision for a secret ballot and, by implication, a multiparty system. It outlaws the death penalty, enshrines the right to strike and to own private property. This is a significant rolling back of the mass nationalisation that occurred after independence. There have already been some human rights reforms, such as the abolition of public flogging of certain categories of criminal.

If the war can be ended, and economic rationality restored, Mozambique's potential for development is real enough. It has two great fertile river valleys, a splendid port, high-value tourist offerings like big game hunting and fishing, and some untapped mineral wealth.

Now there is the struggle for daily survival. Enough stability must be ensured for that potential to be evaluated, and the needs of the dispossessed population to be addressed. The tragic effects of violence, misguided policies and outside intervention upon Mozambique look certain to endure into the next century.

## Namibia

### UN Security Council Approves Country's Membership

MB1804074190 Windhoek Domestic Service  
in Afrikaans 0600 GMT 18 Apr 90

[Excerpts] The United Nations Security Council yesterday voted unanimously in favor of Namibia's application to become the 160th member of the organization, officially effective from 23 April.

Namibia had asked to join as a member in time to participate in a special assembly session on international economic cooperation. [passage omitted]

The delegation will include Prime Minister Hage Geingob and Foreign Minister Theo-Ben Gurirab.

### Finance Minister Views Future National Currency

MB1704140690 Johannesburg SAPA in English  
1331 GMT 17 Apr 90

[Text] Windhoek April 17 SAPA—A Namibian currency, to be introduced in about two years' time, would probably be linked to a basket of currencies, the finance minister, Dr Otto Herrigel, said in Windhoek Tuesday [17 April].

He indicated that Namibia would liberalise its foreign exchange regulations as soon as it had divorced itself from the South African rand monetary system.

"As long as Namibia forms part of the common rand monetary area, there is little we can do as far as liberalising foreign exchange is concerned," Dr Herrigel told a media conference.



"Once we have introduced our own currency we will be able to introduce our own foreign exchange regulations."

Dr Herrigel said until the present currency dispensation was changed, foreign aid and grants to Namibia would be received through the financial rand system.

### National Airline To Begin Flights 25 Apr

MB1704172890 Johannesburg SAPA in English  
1600 GMT 17 Apr 90

[Text] Windhoek April 17 SAPA—Namibia's national airline, Namib Air, is to take over from South African Airways [SAA] international air passenger and freight services between Windhoek and Frankfurt on April 25, managing director of Transnamib Limited, Mr Frans Uys, said in Windhoek on Tuesday [17 April].

Namib Air would operate two non-stop flights weekly using a 262 seater Boeing 747 SP leased from SAA for a two-year period. The elimination of stopovers at Abidjan and Sal Island would reduce flying time from 13 hours to 9 hours and 55 minutes.

Mr Uys said SAA would continue to operate the route until April 24.

Namib Air services would conform to international standards and be comparable to those of SAA and Lufthansa.

Negotiations with Lufthansa to operate the service as a joint venture were at an advanced stage, Mr Uys said.

The further development of other international routes was also being investigated.

### 18 Apr Press Review on Current Problems, Issues

WA1804142590

[Editorial Report]

#### TIMES OF NAMIBIA

**Namibian Foreign Debt**—Windhoek TIMES OF NAMIBIA in English on 10 April in a page 2 editorial says it is "inconceivable" why President Nujoma "complains about foreign debt." "An inherited foreign debt of R500 million [rand] is small change when a country just received a gift of R8 billion in armaments. As a country which has repeatedly proclaimed its peaceful intentions, Namibia could sell off half of the armaments to launch itself into prosperity unknown in our region of the world."

### \* Nonviability of Walvis Bay Port Considered

34000557A Cape Town THE ARGUS in English  
22 Mar 90 p 18

[Article by Graham Linscott: "Another Coastline for Black South, but..."]

[Text] Namibia is independent and certain to join the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC), which celebrates its tenth anniversary next month.

This provides the SADCC with another maritime state and the potential for another outlet to the sea—a potential which is being investigated by the British multinational, Lonhro.

The SADCC—Tanzania, Zambia, Mozambique, Angola, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Malawi, Lesotho and Swaziland—exists largely to escape economic dependence on South Africa's transport network.

Its efforts have concentrated so far on restoring traditional import and export routes disrupted by war, such as the Beira Corridor through Mozambique (which connects Zimbabwe with the outside world) and the Benguela Railway, which connects Zambia and Zaire to the Angolan port of Lobito.

Namibia's independence has caused increased speculation that Walvis Bay could become another SADCC port.

However, the prospect is discounted by a specialist on the transport network of Southern Africa.

Writing in the HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW, Professor Gavin Maasdorp, of the Economic Research Unit at Natal University, says the reasons are political and economic.

"Walvis Bay is a South African enclave (in the same way as Cabinda is an Angolan one)—a legacy of the colonial period and, despite a UN resolution to the contrary, supported in terms of international law.

"Significantly, the NEW YORK ACCORD has left the fate of Walvis Bay to be decided by negotiation between Namibia and South Africa. As long as the port is in the hands of Pretoria, its use by the SADCC would increase, not diminish, dependence on South Africa.

"But more important are the economic reasons. Costly road or rail construction would be required either through the Caprivi Strip or across the Kalahari Desert to link the Namibian transport system with that of Zambia, Zimbabwe and Botswana, and it is doubtful whether traffic volumes would justify the investment.

"Plans for a trans-Kalahari railway based on exports of coal from potential mines in Botswana were shelved when coal prices fell in the mid-1980s, and anyway both Zimbabwe and Botswana have closer ports and hence less costly routes to the sea.

"Although the British multinational Lonhro is investigating a Caprivi route to link the Zambian and Namibian railway systems, this would offer only a relatively small saving in distance for Zambia (especially the traffic-generating Copperbelt) compared with existing routes to Lobito, Beira and Dar-es-Salaam.



"The use of Walvis Bay therefore does not seem to be an economic proposition."

Professor Maasdorp says a post-apartheid South Africa could well become a member itself of the SADCC and he notes the criticism by a former Tanzanian cabinet minister of policies aimed at duplicating efficient South African systems.

#### \* Democratic Model for South Africa Seen

34000557B Cape Town CAPE TIMES in English  
21 Mar 90 p 8

[Article by Hans Middelmann]

[Text] Namibia's new constitution is in force today, the day of independence. Namibia has achieved, in a matter of months, and in a peaceful and orderly manner, a dispensation which augurs well for its future. In one clean sweep Namibians have effectively given themselves an entrenched constitution guaranteeing all citizens the franchise and basic human rights, and limiting the powers of government.

Time will tell whether Namibians will be able to build a viable nation. One hopes that, despite their ethnic and diverse population mix, and their history of outside rule and influence, they will be able to take full advantage of the unique opportunities now open to them. There is certainly no doubt that Namibia is a step ahead of South Africa in the worldwide march to democracy.

South Africa's fundamental constitutional questions are unresolved. The majority of its citizens remain without the franchise. There is no visible way to establish the legitimacy of the partners required to agree on a new dispensation. The uncertainty over these questions makes it imperative for us to examine closely how we could gain from the Namibian experience.

#### True Reflection

For a constitution to be inviolable it must have the support of virtually the entire population it is designed to serve. The ground rules to achieve this were spelt out by the United Nations. They required a two-thirds majority of all citizens to agree on the terms of Namibia's constitution.

The first step, therefore, was to give the entire adult population the opportunity to form political parties of their choice. This was followed by free and fair general elections under universal franchise and proportional representation. The multi-party elections were thus not on a constituency basis (where the winner takes all and the other votes are lost) but on a party basis. This point is of vital importance.

The resultant constituent assembly was consequently a true reflection of the political views of all citizens through their parties. Because no single party achieved a two-thirds majority, all parties were forced to seek the

common ground for a constitution that would command at least a two-thirds vote. This is the essence of democracy—and it worked!

In the event, the Namibian constitution that comes into force today has all the fundamental characteristics of all the constitutions of the successful democratic countries in the world. Only on that account did it receive the unanimous support of all parties in the assembly in Windhoek.

#### Human Rights

When it came to determining the crucial issues SWAPO [South-West African People's Organization], the majority party, and all the others found that democratic constitutions cannot prescribe and entrench specific political ideologies.

The entrenchment of the fundamental human rights and freedoms of assembly, through religion, association and movement is, of course, central to the constitution, as is the giving of the vote to all citizens at the age of 18.

While the economic order shall be based on "the principles of a mixed economy," the protection of property rights is entrenched:

"All persons shall have the right in any part of Namibia to acquire, own and dispose of all forms of immovable and movable property individually, or in association with others and to bequeath their property to their heirs or legatees..."

Furthermore, every person is entitled "to enjoy, practise, profess, maintain and promote any culture, language, tradition or religion," provided these rights "do not impinge on the rights of others or the national interest."

There is a total prohibition of racial discrimination and an affirmation of women's equal rights in the political, social, economic and cultural life of the nation. The entire chapter on fundamental rights prohibits parliament from making any laws, and government from any action, "which abolishes or abridges the fundamental rights and freedoms conferred by this chapter."

South Africans will be particularly interested to read the chapter on education and language. Article 3 determines the official language to be English. This shall, however, not "prohibit the use of any other language as a medium of instruction in private schools as well as schools financed or subsidised by the State." It also shall not preclude the use of any other language "for legislative, administrative, and judicial purpose in regions ... where such other language/s are spoken by a substantial component of the population."

There is a National Assembly of 72 members directly elected every five years by proportional representation. The second house will be the National Council. Each region (still to be delimited) which will elect a Regional Council will, in turn, elect two members to the second house.

The president is elected by direct universal suffrage and must have at least 50 percent of the votes cast. His period of office expires after five years and cannot be extended beyond two terms. Executive power rests in the president, who appoints the cabinet with whom he must consult in the exercise of his powers. Laws are passed by the Assembly with the approval of the National Council and the assent of the president.

### Common Ground

The judiciary is independent and is the ultimate guardian of the citizens' rights under the constitution. No repeal or amendment of the clauses guaranteeing fundamental human rights "shall be permissible" nor "shall be valid or have any force or effect." Any other appeal or amendment of the constitution requires majorities of two-thirds in both houses of parliament. These are formidable obstacles to a ruling party being able to tinker with the basic rights of the citizens.

Sooner or later the fundamental principles of the Namibian constitution will have to be the fundamental principles of a South African constitution. It is an intriguing thought that the Namibian experience could serve us well now.

Why can we not use the new Namibian constitution as the basis for discussion of the terms of our own? Why do we not invite existing political parties and all non-parliamentary groups to state what changes to the Namibian document they would require to accept it for South Africa?

Such an exercise would quickly establish common ground, as it did in Namibia. Everyone would then concentrate on the emotional and structural differences which exist and which must be resolved.

These would form the platforms of the new political parties contesting the eventual free and fair elections under universal franchise to give South Africa a constitution that has legitimacy.

### \* Future Relations With South Africa Viewed

34000557C Cape Town THE ARGUS in English  
19 Mar 90 p 11

[Article by Gerald L'Ange: "With Namibian Independence, the Fight Will Be on for Walvis Bay"; first three paragraphs boxed item]

[Text] Once the Namibian independence festivities this week are over Namibia will press its demand for Walvis Bay.

South Africa will then have to decide whether the advantages of keeping the enclave are worth suffering the international campaign for its surrender that will result.

Gerald L'Ange, editor of the Argus Africa News Service, looks at future relations between Namibia and South Africa.

The Namibians are not going to allow their independence ceremonies this week to be soured by South Africa's continued refusal to give up Walvis Bay, Namibia's only deep water port.

They have agreed to South Africa playing a key part in the ceremonies, with President F.W. de Klerk scheduled to deliver one of the two main speeches.

There are several possible reasons for the equanimity with which the SWAPO [South-West African People's Organization]-dominated government-to-be is accepting Pretoria's intransigence on the Walvis Bay issue.

One of them is that, whether it liked it or not, Namibia is going to have to maintain relatively close economic and other links with South Africa after independence.

### Watertight

Another could be that the future government of Namibia is confident that South Africa has little option but to relinquish Walvis Bay fairly soon.

If it hangs on to the port an international campaign is likely to be waged to force South Africa to give it up. And some analysts think this might be as harmful to the Republic as was the campaign to force Pretoria to grant independence to Namibia.

It may not matter that South Africa has a legally watertight claim to the 1,200 sq km enclave of Walvis Bay and to 12 islands off the Namibian coast.

The legalities involved may count for no more than they did in the struggle to get independence for Namibia, during which the international community ignored the fact that the legality of South Africa's right to administer Namibia was never challenged with complete success in the World Court.

But possession, as they say, is nine points of the law however the law is interpreted. And there must be strong opposition in some government circles to South Africa abandoning Walvis Bay and the ability it will give to Pretoria to put a stranglehold on Namibia's foreign trade and thereby to influence political decisions in Windhoek.

In addition, possession of the port and of the army base and airfield there gives South Africa a strong strategic influence in the region.

If, however, it is accepted that keeping Walvis Bay and the islands will not be worth the price that would have to be paid in international condemnation the South African government will have to consider what price it should demand for giving them up.

It might be too much for South Africa to be expected to surrender them for nothing, considering that South Africa's claim to Walvis Bay is probably as good legally as is the United States' claim to Alaska.

There are several things Pretoria could demand in exchange. Top of the list would probably be admission of South Africa to the Organisation of African Unity [OAU].

That might be asking for too much, however, for it would compromise the OAU's stand that South Africa must not be readmitted to good standing in the international community until apartheid has been eliminated.

A lesser demand, but one which would still bring major political and practical benefits, would be for South African Airways [SAA] to be given overflying or even landing rights in African countries.

The ban on overflying that was imposed on SAA several years ago has forced the airline to fly round the bulge of Africa to reach Europe, making its operations more expensive and less efficient.

A relaxation of the ban would not only remove these handicaps but would represent an important step closer to acceptance of South Africa in black Africa.

It is possible that the weight of African and, indeed, international opinion will be in favour of South Africa giving up its Namibian possessions without recompense.

If South Africa accepted this all it would get in return would be goodwill, although that could in turn lead to material political benefits.

#### Reciprocity

The least that Pretoria could expect would appear to be some sort of reciprocity from the Windhoek government alone, such as granting SAA rights to fly over Namibia so that its flights to Europe would not have to head out to the Atlantic south of the Orange River.

There is little chance that Namibia will not demand Walvis Bay and the islands after independence, for its sovereignty over them has been proclaimed in the constitution adopted in January.

Some in Pretoria might feel that it is better to give them up voluntarily now rather than be seen to be forced to give them up later.

The South African government will not, however, be overlooking the fact that the validity of its claim in international law is so strong that it cannot seriously be challenged without undermining one of the cardinal principles of the OAU: the acceptance of whatever colonial boundaries each African country inherited at independence.

Viewed in this light, Pretoria's chances of getting a good price for its Namibian possessions seem strong—if it agrees, that is, to give them up at all.

#### Zambia

##### \* Kaunda Thanks Norwegian Royal Family for Aid

90AF0023A Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian  
27 Mar 90 p 16

[Article by Elisabeth Holte: "Kaunda Commends Norwegian Development Aid"; first paragraph is AFTENPOSTEN introduction]

[Text] "To us, Norway stands for something special," Zambia's President Kenneth Kaunda said on the afternoon of 26 March 1990 when he received the Norwegian crown prince and crown princess in the State House in Lusaka after a very colorful welcoming ceremony featuring vigorous movement at the airport.

Lusaka—"You do not support us in order to gain advantages for yourselves from it. Norway and the other Scandinavian countries benefit mankind," Kaunda said, and he said that ordinarily there are many kinds of aid a developing country gets. Kaunda received Crown Prince Harald, Crown Princess Sonja, and Minister of Developmental Aid Tom Vraalsen in his official red brick residence in the green and fertile country on the outskirts of Lusaka. Kaunda was in Norway on a state visit himself in 1985, and there was no doubt yesterday that Norway stands for something honest and unimperialistic in that part of the world.

##### Warm Joy of Life

The crown prince and princess, who had had a "technical stopover" in Zimbabwe's capital city, Harare, since Saturday, 24 March 1990, received a full dose of southern Africa, with all its heat and joy of life, when they got to the Lusaka Airport on the afternoon of 26 March and were received by the secretary-general of the United National Independence Party (UNIP) and the second most powerful man in Zambia, Grey Zulu. After repeated playings of the national anthems and the crown prince's inspection of the military guard of honor to rumba rhythms, dancing and singing by the approximately 200 dancers in colorful skirts and chitenge's—the familiar African draped cotton skirts—began. And nothing needs to be said in regard to the sense of rhythm of people in that part of the world!

Crown Princess Sonja was dressed in a black silk dress with very colorful flower motifs and a yellow silk jacket when she arrived in Lusaka. Thereafter she changed into a leopard-patterned dress for the meeting with Kaunda and the absolutely heart-warming visit to a factory for handicapped tailors. That factory for 10 tailors went into operation in the fall of 1986 because of the receipt of 70,000 or 80,000 Norwegian kroner from the Norwegian Directorate for Development Aid and the efforts of an enthusiastic Norwegian named Wenche Hovstad. And it has gradually managed to advance to where it is standing on its own legs now and sewing school uniforms and



coveralls for the local council—in other words, an unreal, dreamlike project in an otherwise everlasting jungle of development.

#### Modest Train of Attendants

Previous to Kaunda's visit to Norway in 1985, the fact that he intended to bring a delegation totalling 650 people aroused consternation among us Norwegians. It was thought that that was unsuitable for a small and penniless country, and the delegation was shrunk somewhat. Hardly anyone could have any fault to find with the crown prince's and princess's train of attendants on 26 March. It consisted of the crown prince's aide-de-camp and the crown princess's lady-in-waiting, two bodyguards, a valet and a personal maid, plus three people from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Protocol and Press Sections. In addition, a Swedish physician who lives in Lusaka accompanied the royal entourage.

While Crown Princess Sonja was visiting the Mtendere tailoring factory and receiving a total of two specially-sewed skirts and 30 eggs as gifts, Crown Prince Harald continued his meeting with President Kaunda. Earlier in the afternoon, the crown prince and princess together had visited the Chilenje allotment house where Kaunda lived and led the fight for freedom from 1960 to 1962. Then the crown prince placed a wreath on the freedom monument in the space in front of the impressive new headquarters of the UNIP that is being built, for the party is the real power factor in Zambia. It is not without significance that people there talk about "the party and its government."

#### Big Media Interest

Minister for Developmental Aid Vraalsen came to Zambia on 23 March 1990 directly from a celebration in Namibia, so he was in Zambia at the same time the crown prince and princess were there. He met with Zambian Finance Minister Gison Chigaga on 24 and 26 March 1990.

A great deal of interest in the Norwegian visit was shown in the Zambian press. After Vraalsen had taken over Kaunda's customary leading position in the DAILY REVIEW on Sunday, 25 March, there was coverage of the royal couple's first day in Lusaka in the DAILY REVIEW in the evening of 26 March. But the big Norwegian program that was to have been broadcast, the cassettes for which had already been brought down from Oslo, met a tragic fate. Instead, there was broad coverage in the usual evening paper.

### Zimbabwe

#### 10th Independence Anniversary Celebrations Noted

##### Kenyan, Botswanan Leaders Arrive

MB1704121390 Johannesburg SABA in English  
1212 GMT 17 Apr 90

[Text] Harare April 17 SABA—The leaders of Zambia, Kenya and Botswana arrived in Harare on Tuesday for

Zimbabwe's 10th independence anniversary celebrations, the news agency ZIANA reports.

They were met at Harare International Airport by President Robert Mugabe, senior party and government officials and diplomats.

Those who also arrived Tuesday afternoon included Mrs Coretta King, widow of black American Human Rights Activist Martin Luther King, and ANC [African National Congress] Secretary General Alfred Nzo and ANC External Affairs Secretary Thabo Mbeki.

ANC Deputy President Nelson Mandela is expected later Tuesday afternoon.

First to arrive was Botswana President Quett Masire followed by Kenyan President Daniel arap Moi and Zambian President and Frontline States Chairman Kenneth Kaunda.

Mrs King and the ANC officials arrived on the same flight as Mr Kaunda.

#### Banda Notes RSA's 'Positive Steps'

MB1704135590 Johannesburg SABA in English  
1258 GMT 17 Apr 90

[Text] Harare April 17 SABA—Malawian President Kamuzu Banda, an advocate of dialogue with [the Republic of] South Africa [RSA] for many years, this week said the South African Government and the ANC [African National Congress] should enter into talks if a lasting and peaceful solution to the problems in the region was to be achieved.

Speaking at a state banquet held in his honour in Harare, the Malawian leader, in Harare for Zimbabwe's independence celebrations, said he was happy to see the policy of contact and dialogue had culminated in the independence of Namibia.

According to a report by the SABC's [South African Broadcasting Corporation] Africa desk, the Malawian leader said it was pleasing to see the positive steps the South African Government had taken by releasing Nelson Mandela and others and the legalisation of the ANC.

Genuine dialogue involving the South African Government and the ANC required continuing encouragement so there could be a peaceful solution to South Africa's problems, Dr Banda said.

#### ANC's Mandela Arrives 17 Apr

MB1704153990 Johannesburg SABA in English  
1449 GMT 17 Apr 90

[Excerpt] Harare April 17 SABA—African National Congress Deputy President Nelson Mandela arrived in Harare on Tuesday [17 April] and said the South African



[SA] Government had to remove all apartheid laws to ensure progress towards peace, reports ZIANA news agency.

Mr Mandela, arriving from London at Harare airport to attend Zimbabwe's tenth anniversary independence celebrations, said if SA President F.W. de Klerk wanted change, he would "remove all laws which are cause for concern to black people of South Africa".

Mr Mandela arrived on the same flight as Organisation of African Unity Secretary-General Salim Ahmed Salim and North Korean Vice-President Pak Song-chol.

Another dignitary to arrive on Tuesday afternoon was Tanzanian Second-Vice-President Adris Abdul Wakil. [passage omitted]

#### **Zambia's Kaunda Arrives**

MB1704184290 Lusaka Domestic Service in English  
1800 GMT 17 Apr 90

[Text] President Kaunda arrived in Harare, Zimbabwe this afternoon to attend that country's 10th independence celebrations which begin tomorrow.

According to the ZNBC [Zambian National Broadcasting Corporation] correspondent, Ripa Chinandu, Comrade Kaunda was met on arrival by his Zimbabwean counterpart Robert Mugabe at Harare airport.

#### **Ethiopian, Namibian Leaders Arrive**

MB1704225090 Johannesburg SAPA in English  
1856 GMT 17 Apr 90

[Text] Harare April 17 SAPA—Six African heads of state are in Harare for Zimbabwe's 10th independence anniversary celebrations, ZIANA national news agency reports.

The last to arrive on Tuesday [17 April] were Ethiopian president Mengistu Haile Mariam and President Sam Nujoma of Namibia.

The leaders of Mozambique, Botswana, Kenya and Zambia arrived earlier and Malawian President Kamuzu Banda, who is on a seven-day visit to Zimbabwe, arrived on Monday.

#### **Mugabe Addresses Independence Ball**

MB1804050390 Johannesburg SAPA in English  
2339 GMT 17 Apr 90

[Text] Harare, April 17 SAPA—Zimbabwe President Robert Mugabe today held an independence ball where he told visiting dignitaries that the 10th independence anniversary celebrations were three-pronged, ZIANA reports.

He told the ball, attended by seven heads of state, African National Congress Deputy President Mr Nelson Mandela, Pan-Africanist Congress President Zephania Mothopeng and a number of other foreign dignitaries

that the initial celebration was to mark Zimbabwe's victory over colonialism, imperialism and racism.

"The second is obviously the fact that after the attainment of our independence, in 1980, we have managed to consolidate this independence, preserve and protect it as well as use it for the social transformation of our society.

"The third...is the fact that we are celebrating this event after our election victory, but a victory, mark you, of the united ZANU (PF) [Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front]," he said.

Mr Mugabe said Zimbabweans had fought and won against a system of oppression of man by man as was practised under the unilateral declaration of independence by former Rhodesian Prime Minister Mr Ian Smith.

He said Zimbabwe was now a non-racial country where human beings were treated as equals.

#### **Chissano Meets With Mugabe, Moi**

MB1804122290 Maputo in English to Southern Africa  
1100 GMT 18 Apr 90

[Excerpt] Sources in Harare say that President Chissano met yesterday with Presidents Robert Mugabe and Moi, who are mediators of the peace process in Mozambique. President Banda is also expected to be informed about the peace process in Mozambique since Malawi is the venue proposed by President Chissano to hold direct talks with the MNR [Mozambique National Resistance] to end the war in this country. The MNR have rejected the proposal and proposed Nairobi instead. [passage omitted]

#### **Mugabe Delivers Address 18 Apr**

MB1804123790 Johannesburg SAPA in English  
1229 GMT 18 Apr 90

[Text] Harare, April 18, SAPA—South Africa should first transform its system of government in accordance with the will of the majority of its people before it can be welcomed as part of southern Africa, President Robert Mugabe said in Harare on Wednesday.

The news agency ZIANA reported President Mugabe was addressing more than 55,000 people on Zimbabwe's 10th independence anniversary.

President Mugabe called for the eradication of apartheid and on the international community to continue its pressure on Pretoria to establish total freedom and democracy in South Africa.

"South Africa should now proceed with speed to transform its entire system of governance in accordance with the will of the majority.

"That way, it will be welcomed into our midst as part of this region and the region's structures and mechanisms of cooperative peaceful development," he said.

The present also condemned Israel for "continuing to oppress Palestinians," according to ZIANA, and reiterated support for the Palestine Liberation Organisation.

He also congratulated Namibian President and SWAPO [South-West African People's Organization] leader Sam Nujoma on his country's independence.

Mr. Nujoma is one of seven African heads of state in the country to witness Zimbabwe's 10th independence celebrations.

#### \* Mugabe Discusses Mashonaland Election Dispute

34000131A Harare THE HERALD in English  
24 Feb 90 p 1

[Excerpt] The Mashonaland Central Zanu (PF) [Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front] provincial executive council has been dissolved and all primary election results there have been nullified, the President and First Secretary, President Mugabe, said in Harare last night.

Fresh provincial elections will be held tomorrow at which all districts will be properly represented. The party took action because the province was in "a state of serious conflict with itself," the President told local newsmen last night during a break in discussions by the Central Committee.

"Mashonaland Central is very divided. Split within itself, there are two blocks in that province and the height of that conflict showed itself at the time of provincial elections."

This was soon after the National People's Congress held in December last year.

#### Power

"It was at that time and you know that the (provincial) by-elections were held not long ago, we saw very glaringly that the province was split between itself. There are two solid blocks vying for power with each other."

Cde Mugabe said at the by-election in Bindura, where some 66 districts were represented and where at some stage in the election process, 30 of them walked out, turmoil was experienced later.

There were then several delegations from the two blocks asking the party to nullify the results. But, he said, the party did not have enough time to look at those results as it was preparing for the primary election.

This was done before the party had remedied the conflict, hence the decision to dissolve the provincial council and nullify the election primary results.

#### Polarity

"But of course we recognise that this exercise could very well reproduce the polarity or, by polarity, the situation of conflict we would want to remedy and so we are

sending to the province teams of people from the highest level of the party to bring together the two vying blocks.

"Unfortunately, the two vying blocks tend to be sub-regional blocks. You have Chiweshe, Mvurwi, Bindura, Glendale, Mazowe, Guruve as one block and the rest as another block," said the President.

"The two groups also had ethnic overtones, the Zezurus and the Korekores. There were "those who think they are more advanced than others and cannot be led by those others who they believe are not as highly educated," said the President.

He added that Mashonaland Central was the only province which had shown such blatant division thereby making it difficult for the party to organise.

"We therefore would want to remedy that situation and get the people to work together."

This was a time that everybody should recognise that the unity forged between PF-Zapu [Patriotic Front-Zimbabwe African People's Union] and Zanu (PF) offered an environment conducive to unity within the province's district areas and branch areas. [passage omitted]

#### \* Cabinet Rules on Parastatals Reorganization

##### \* Committee Recommendations

34000132 Bulawayo THE CHRONICLE-BUSINESS  
CHRONICLE in English 8 Feb 90 p 1

[Text] Harare—All or most of the functions of five parastatals should be merged with those of the Zimbabwe Development Corporation [ZDC] which should hold all the shares the Government owns in any company, recommends the committee of inquiry into the administration of parastatals.

The general report of the committee chaired by Mr Justice Smith, was made available on Tuesday.

The committee found that there were great difficulties co-ordinating the work of the development parastatals, despite the setting up of the Zimbabwe Development Corporation which was supposed to play that role. No parastatals could serve both its minister and the ZDC and there was no machinery to solve disputes.

The committee recommended that the Industrial Development Corporation [IDC] and the ZDC be merged under the name of the ZDC and while the necessary changes were made to legislation both should have a common board of directors.

The operations of the Small Enterprises Development Corporation and the Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation should be merged with those of the ZDC and their staff transferred to the ZDC. More capital should be made available to the ZDC to help small enterprises.

The Zimbabwe Tourist Development Corporation should be dissolved. Its functions of operating hotels and buses for tours should go to the ZDC. The ZDC should take over the shares of the Harare Sheraton. The Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism would take over the responsibility of promoting Zimbabwe as a tourist centre, and the Zimbabwe Tourist Development Board would handle the advisory functions.

The Urban Development Corporation should be disbanded and staff sent to the ZDC or back to public service as appropriate. The ZDC would take over the old corporation's development functions, including provision of financial and technical assistance, management counselling, training and other services. Planning would remain with the Department of Physical Planning and not go to the ZDC.

Unless there were special reasons all shares owned by the Government in any company should be held by the ZDC. Unless there were exceptional circumstances no other parastatal should be involved in joint ventures, operate subsidiaries or operate industrial projects.

Links should be set up between the ZDC and the Zimbabwe Development Bank possibly by having some people being members of both boards.

The bank should give greater emphasis to projects creating more jobs, project procedures should be streamlined and speeded up, a committee should be set up in the President's Office under the Vice-President to consider complaints about delays.

The committee agreed that the idea of having one body responsible for co-ordinating development was sound. There must be one body in charge of development projects. The IDC was 25 years old and the committee did not want to interfere with its efficiency but there were bound to be conflicts if it and the ZDC continued together. The wide all-embracing policies of the Government and its socialist thrust meant that a parastatal with wider responsibility was needed and hence the recommendation to merge the two.

Similar reasoning, or obvious problems faced by some of the development parastatals, led to the recommendation to merge all parastatal development work, except for agriculture, into one parastatal.

The Zimbabwe Institute of Development Studies has never operated in the way intended, and has been allowed to drift without direction from its board or parent ministry. It should be abolished said the committee, and staff transferred to the University of Zimbabwe, absorbed into the public service or discharged on the grounds of abolition of office. The University was better placed to do the needed research.

#### \* Cabinet Decisions

34000132 Harare THE HERALD in English  
14 Feb 90 p 1

[Text] Zana—The Government has rejected recommendations made by the Committee of Inquiry into the Administration of Parastatals that several other development parastatals be merged with the Zimbabwe Development Corporation [ZDC], saying the new ZDC would be unmanageable.

Also rejected was the recommendation to abolish the Zimbabwe Institute of Development Studies [ZIDS] although it agreed its functions should be transferred to the University of Zimbabwe.

The reply to the report was given in the House of Assembly by Vice-President Muzenda, who detailed the reaction of the Cabinet to various sections of the 180-page general report of the committee.

Set up by President Mugabe in March 1986, the committee was chaired by Mr Justice Smith.

The Government adopted most of the other recommendations and complimented the committee for what it said was an excellent job.

Cde Muzenda said the Cabinet had rejected recommendations that the Industrial Development Corporation, the Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation, the Zimbabwe Tourist Development Corporation and the Urban Development Corporation should be merged with the Zimbabwe Development Corporation.

"Government does not want to see the ZDC become the unmanageable mammoth that is suggested in the recommendations."

Cde Muzenda told the House that Cabinet could not go along with the suggestion that ZIDS be abolished, even though Government accepted its establishment and development had been poorly handled.

ZIDS was set up in the mid-1980s to study and promote Zimbabwe's development.

Cde Muzenda said it could perform an important role in doing research for Government ministries and, accordingly, the Cabinet had decided it should be transferred to the university.

He did not give details of how this would be done.

#### \* MNR 'Bandits'-Villagers Cooperation Suspected

34000131C Harare THE HERALD in English  
13 Feb 90 pp 1, 3

[Article by Elliot Mahende]

[Excerpt] There is growing concern among villagers and security forces on the border with Mozambique about the apparent collaboration between MNR [Mozambique



National Resistance] bandits and some locals which has now extended to the smuggling of ivory, rhino horn and mbanje into Zimbabwe.

Security forces in Mutasa and Fombe areas of Manicaland confirmed last week that they had picked up the information and were investigating. Intelligence reports also indicated that some Zimbabweans with relatives across the border had joined the ranks of the South African-backed bandits.

This information is now being used to unravel the hitherto undiscernible patterns of MNR bandit atrocities on Zimbabweans amid the rising toll of defenceless civilian victims of the bandits.

During a tour by THE HERALD of some of the affected areas last week it became apparent that the bandit campaign of terror along the border inside Zimbabwe was not indiscriminate but that the bandits, with information from Zimbabwean sources or their own intelligence, carefully selected their targets.

These were fairly wealthy families in most cases from whom they would loot substantial amounts of food and clothing. Some people were murdered simply to cover up information about bandit activities and their collaboration with some locals.

Others were being killed because they might have entered into deals with the bandits and then failed to keep their side of the bargain, both security sources and villagers said.

This was where the issue of the rhino horn, ivory and mbanje smuggling into Zimbabwe came in. There were reports that in the Sagambe area of Mutasa the bandits left behind a list of people whom they claimed owed them "our things."

These "things," the sources said, were rhino horn, ivory or mbanje, which the bandits brought across the border and gave to their "friends" to sell for them and bring them goods including food and clothes which the bandits desperately needed to sustain their war against the Mozambican government. [passage omitted]

#### \* Seminar on Land Reform Lacks Consensus

##### \* Researcher's Analysis

34000133 Harare THE HERALD in English  
15 Feb 90 p 4

[Text] There has been a relatively slow pace in land reform in Zimbabwe and the expiry of the Lancaster House agreement of 1980 in April this year could be the reformists' final chance of pushing land redistribution policies, a research fellow at the Zimbabwe Institute of Development Studies has said.

Presenting his paper, Land Reform and Development Strategy, in Harare at a three-day conference discussing land reform policies in the country, Cde Sam Moyo

analysed the reasons why land redistribution in Zimbabwe had been slow since the country became independent in 1980.

Much economic decision-making was dominated by the Ministry of Finance, Economic Planning and Development and the Reserve Bank, which carried responsibility for macro-economic policy and other long-term plans.

The land reform issue had not been discussed in light of such concerns and the field had been left open for commercial farmers to argue that more redistribution could only lead to loss of foreign exchange earnings.

A well-functioning economy was also necessary to withstand pressure from South Africa and finance military intervention in Mozambique. In that sense, said Cde Moyo, there was good reason for an international political-economic nature why Zimbabwe would want to move cautiously on the land reform question.

He said it was also tempting to say that the class of capitalist farmers had been able, on the basis of a very important economic resource, to re-assert its power after independence in 1980. It was also the influence of this class upon the Government policies which explained the slowness of changes in agriculture.

Cde Moyo said he believed that a large degree of the influence of commercial farmers wanted people to believe that they were indispensable.

Bureaucracy had also played its part in slowing down land reform. One legacy from the settler era was the technocratic, top-down attitude of dealing with peasants.

For instance, in the Ministry of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development, there was reportedly much "mistrust of the peasant option." The Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement on the other hand, was geared towards servicing agriculture, but this dualist approach had a tendency of leading to confusion over the direction of agricultural policy and the links between the various aspects of it, said Cde Moyo.

Land reform programmes had also been slowed down in part by the lack of political pressure to maintain or increase them, he said. Because of the value placed by Zimbabweans on education, when the Government shifted emphasis from land redistribution to supplying better agricultural services and more education, it was able to do so without risking much in political terms.

Farming associations such as the National Farmers' Association of Zimbabwe and the Zimbabwe National Farmers' Union carried little political weight and influence and, in many cases, it was uncertain to what extent they were interested in acquiring new land.

However, the population pressure in communal lands was still there and there was enough squatting on commercial farms to underscore the fact that there was still demand for new land, he said.



There was a possibility, however, that the State might transfer assets to peasants. Such action, however, was unlikely, due to a change in the balance of class and interest forces in the country, said Cde Moyo.

This skepticism was partly due to the weakening of forces backing land reforms. It was also caused by Government and party officials buying farms in increasing numbers.

There was also the danger that continued economic crisis could cement the current cautious attitude of the Government and push it into outright inertia.

#### \* Proposed Land Commission

34000133 Harare THE HERALD in English  
16 Feb 90 p 1

[Text] The seminar on land reform policies in Zimbabwe after the expiry of the Lancaster House Agreement on 18 April this year has recommended that a land commission to look into land tenure be appointed and people whose land has been acquired by the State should be compensated.

The concept of a willing buyer, willing seller had failed and should be done away with although the seminar recommended that the section of the Constitution dealing with property and other rights, should be retained and only those parts that dealt with the land issue should be amended.

The other parts of the section should be upheld to protect private property "as a human right."

The State should acquire any underused and derelict land and compensation should be based on both improvements and the price at which the land was originally sold.

Compensating the landholders after the acquisition of their property by the State would be another "historical crime."

#### \* Further Details

34000133 Bulawayo THE CHRONICLE in English  
16 Feb 90 p 9

[Text] Harare (Ziana)—The land issue in Zimbabwe remains as thorny today as it was decades ago when it sparked off the two Chimurenga wars which eventually saw a return of the country to majority rule in 1980.

Debate at the three-day seminar here on the land policy that should be adopted in Zimbabwe after the expiry in April of the 10-year entrenchment of restrictive clauses of the country's Lancaster House Constitution, reflected a division on whether or not land should be nationalised with compensation, without compensation or with compensation for capital spent on development only.

The seminar ended yesterday with several resolutions and conclusions put forward by delegates without a consensus being reached on them. The conclusions included both or all conflicting views from participants.

Hardliner University of Zimbabwe lecturer Cde Krempton Makamure was adamant that the land should be expropriated without compensation, saying the mandate for the liberation struggle was to acquire land.

Other participants were of the opinion that the willing-buyer-willing-seller principle was not tenable. They suggested that the under-utilised and derelict land be acquired, while compensation could be given only where there had been improvements made on the land.

Participants agreed that a commission to investigate the methods or mechanisms to re-distribute the land should be set up. Different interest parties from labour to peasantry, public and private sectors should be represented in the constitution of such a commission.

There were suggestions that there should be uniformity of land tenure and that Section 16 of the Lancaster House Constitution on land should be amended without necessarily removing other rights enshrined in it.

The new policy should also put ceilings on land acquisition and allow commercial farming to continue but with ceilings on land acquisition.

#### \* Production Figures for 1989 Reported

34000131B Harare THE FINANCIAL GAZETTE  
in English 23 Feb 90 p 2

[Text] The volume of manufacturing production increased by 6.2 percent in the first nine months of 1989 compared to the same period the previous year, while mineral production rose by 4 percent in the third quarter of 1989, according to the December 1989 issue of Stats-Flash, published by the Central Statistical Office (CSO).

In the manufacturing sector, the CSO said that the chemicals and oil products and metal and metal products groups recorded the highest increases of 12.2 percent and 5.6 percent respectively.

#### Increase

Gold and nickel had the largest increases in output of 8.6 percent and 2 percent, respectively.

Overall crop sales increased by 11.4 percent in 1989 compared to the previous year. The CSO said sales from commercial farming areas increased by 15.2 percent and those from the communal lands fell by 2.2 percent.

Cattle slaughtering by the Cold Storage Commission (CSC) fell by 11.8 percent in the first 11 months of last year, compared to the same period in 1988.

The CSC said the prices paid by higher and lower income urban families increased by 0.4 percent and 0.2 percent between October and November last year.

## Burkina Faso

### Popular Front Deputy Chief Removed From Post

AB1704151990 Paris AFP in English 1455 GMT  
17 Apr 90

[Text] Ouagadougou, April 17 (AFP)—The deputy chief of Burkina Faso's ruling Popular Front, Oumarou Clement Ouedraogo, was sacked by his own party at the weekend from the post of secretary-general of the Organisation for People's Democracy-Labour Movement (ODP-MT).

A plenary session of the Central Committee found him responsible for "quite serious failures of principle and party policy", the group's secretary for political affairs Salif Diallo said here Tuesday.

It remained unclear whether Mr. Ouedraogo would keep his position in the Popular Front as minister in charge of coordination, which made him second in command after President Blaise Compaore.

The ODP-MT, a grouping of Marxist-Leninist and revolutionary parties dominates the front with some 50 members compared to a dozen for the other movements.

Mr. Ouedraogo, 45, was rector of the university 1984-87, then higher education minister 1988-89.

### Signals 'Crisis' Within Government

AB1704225290 London BBC World Service in English  
1709 GMT 17 Apr 90

[From the "Focus on Africa" program]

[Text] The atmosphere of political harmony in Burkina Faso, the theme of last month's inaugural congress of the Popular Front, has been shattered with the sacking this weekend of Clement Ouedraogo. He was secretary general of the dominant party and the Popular Front coalition, but he seems to have fallen victim to a struggle inside the Burkinabe leadership. From Ouagadougou, Alison Mboya telexed this report:

[Begin studio announcer recording] The official reason given for the dropping of Ouedraogo was that after an official inquest, it had been decided that his behavior was, and I quote, indiscrete; and news of Ouedraogo's dishonorable discharge is being played down by the Burkinabe Government. However, those who have been following the recent pattern of events here say that the expulsion of Ouedraogo may signal a crisis within the government which goes far deeper than Ouedraogo's indiscretion. Observers here had noted an ideological power struggle between Ouedraogo and another key person in the Popular Front, Captain Arsene Ye, which seemed likely to lead to the sacking of one of them. Ye is sometimes described as a simple spokesman for President Blaise Compaore, but now sits alone next to the president.

The execution of Compaore's two vice presidents following last September's alleged coup plot and now the sacking of Ouedraogo have left many here with the impression that all the official talk of democratic openness may in reality be a rhetorical cover for a more effective political process of elimination. [end recording]

## Cape Verde Islands

### \* PAICV National Council Opts for Pluralism

#### \* End of Single Party

90EF0309A Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS  
in Portuguese 2 Mar 90 p 4

[Article by Praia correspondent Fatima Azevedo]

[Text] The measures adopted by the National Council (CN) of the PAICV [African Party for the Independence of Cape Verde], the highest body during the interval between two congresses, are such that it can be said that Cape Verde has entered into a new phase which coincides with the new decade. In fact, the National Council of the PAICV met for 7 days in the capital of the country, and after an exhaustive analysis of the political life in the nation, proposed such important measures as alternative slates for the legislative elections (as early as the 1990 elections) and approval of a constitutional amendment by the Fourth Legislature to change Article 4 of the Constitution, which establishes the PAICV as the leading political force of the state and society. The CN also decided to convoke a special party congress to approve the changes proposed and to draft new programs, bylaws, and strategy.

These measures were welcomed by many, and the cafes, small squares, and other gathering points have been the sites chosen for the exchange of views about the more liberal measures, which were expected. However, as Deputy Secretary General Pedro Pires said during a recent press conference, "The CN went beyond what people expected."

In addition to the alternative slates in the legislative elections, the process launched by the party will now make it possible for other parties to emerge in this insular country with its more than 300,000 inhabitants and a still fragile economy. This last aspect has been the cause of some concern among the people, but only time and experience itself can provide the answer.

Many of the citizens of Cape Verde believe that the change which is dawning in their society may be a useful one and may lead to improvements on the economic and social levels. Others—and there are more than a few—prefer to wait and see how things will progress along the path already being pursued.

In the view of many people, the PAICV has succeeded in making Cape Verde a country which is respected at home and abroad.

For a certain younger sector, "more participation in political life is needed, and with the more open policy projected, it will be possible."

This plurality of opinions, moreover, linked with the changes which are occurring in the world, justifies the attitude adopted by the National Council of the party.

The choice of political openness was unanimously approved in an atmosphere of calm, and as the deputy secretary general of the PAICV said during a press conference, "There is no crisis, either political or social, nor any starvation in Cape Verde."

He said that after analyzing the entire process of Cape Verde's development and all of its political practices, the domestic situation in the country and the expectations of the citizens, the Council made the decision to cease to be the guiding political force in order to become the party in power.

All of the proposals of the CN will be assessed in broad discussions on the national level, and they will then be submitted to the extraordinary congress, which will have the last word.

#### **We Are Not Unknown**

At a press conference held after the historic meeting of the CN, the deputy secretary general of the PAICV appeared with the leading official of the party in the capital, Georgina de Melo, at his side. Many members of the CN, administration cadres, and the people at large attended this press conference.

It provided an opportunity for Pedro Pires to clarify certain ideas about which there is still confusion, such as the timeliness and the basic reasons for these changes the PAICV has decided to make.

The proposal that the constitutional provision establishing the PAICV as the guiding political force in society and the state in Cape Verde be revoked was one of the most important issues taken up by the CN at the meeting held between 13 and 19 February.

Pedro Pires was to say that "as early as the meeting held in the month of May of last year, the National Council had considered this matter. It was discussed again in November, at which time a commission on constitutional amendment was appointed."

This time, he said, the discussions went deeper, in view of the fact that it is essential to provide instructions to the party commission on constitutional amendment.

On this basis, after extensive discussion, the National Council came to the conclusion that the time has come to submit this proposal, "which opens up the future prospect of the emergence of other political organizations in Cape Verde," to the Congress.

In the opinion of the deputy secretary general of the PAICV, people should reason, as this new state begins, in

terms of "Cape Verde and the specific situation in Cape Verde, and they should not transfer this reasoning to other countries and other coordinates. Our coordinates must be the Cape Verdean national coordinates." And he went on to say that "there is a political reality, there is an institutional reality, which cannot be transferred either spontaneously or instantaneously. There is a whole process to be pursued."

In the view of this Cape Verdean government official, "We are not an illustrious unknown. We are a country with credibility in the eyes of the large and small powers." And he explained: "It is this established government, this country, which is going to change, not another. This is not an abstract country."

"In politics, it is time for the most important things," Pedro Pires said. He added that the leaders of the PAICV came to the conclusion that the proper time had come for change in Cape Verde. "The national unity is now being preserved," he went on to say.

In the opinion of Pedro Pires, it makes no sense to establish insular parties in Cape Verde. "This should be an accepted principle," but there should indeed be "national parties." For this Cape Verdean government leader, no element which could disturb or provoke dissolution of the national community in Cape Verde should be introduced.

In commenting on the fact that a group of individuals in Lisbon is making preparations for a congress of Cape Verdean democrats, Pedro Pires said he believes that "these people, by establishing themselves there, are not doing so out of a desire to fight for Cape Verde, but rather because they do not believe in the future of the country."

In his opinion, the people of Cape Verde should not "give them any opportunity. Either one is a patriot or one is not. And the leading requirement in Cape Verde is to be a patriot. The battle for power takes place in Cape Verde, and not in Lisbon."

On the other hand, Pedro Pires was clear in his confirmation of the rights of emigrants in the political life of the country.

He believes that those who retain Cape Verdean nationality have always voted, and naturally they will continue to exercise their rights.

#### **\* People Express Views**

90EF0309B Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS  
in Portuguese 2 Mar 90 p 4

[Article by Fatima Azevedo: "People Want Parties"]

[Text] In the middle of January, a poll was taken in Praia and Sao Vicente to learn what the views of the citizens and cadres are, in particular with regard to the Cape Verdean political system. This work was directed by the PAICV [African Party for the Independence of Cape



Verde] Social Research Center (CIS). In all, 522 individuals from the general population were interviewed, along with another 112 in the higher and middle cadre categories.

More than 57 percent of the individuals questioned are concerned (greatly or a little) about the advance of democracy; 54 percent believe that any citizen can participate in political life in Cape Verde; 72 percent agree that political issues are discussed freely in the country. Almost 37 percent believe that "those who do not agree with the PAICV run the risk of having problems."

Among those in the general population interviewed, 26 percent agree without reservations that "there should be other parties." Among the cadres, this percentage rises to 40 percent.

The tendency to approve a multiparty system is most important among the cadres, above all, in which category 69 percent fully or partially favor a multiparty system.

The public opinion poll taken by the CIS further indicates that in the opinion of 44 percent of the people of Cape Verde, "the most important thing for a political leader is that he defend the interests of the poor." On the other hand, 18 percent believe that such a person "should not take advantage of his post."

Where the PAICV is concerned, 86 percent of the people of Cape Verde believe that "it is thanks to the party that the country is advancing," and another 10 percent agree with this statement in part.

As to the state, 79 percent of the citizens believe that it has done good work, 16 percent agree partially, and only 4 percent disagree.

The processing of the data was the responsibility of four sociologists, two of whom are Belgian and two Cape Verdeans.

## Ghana

### \* OAU Should Discuss East Europe Implications

34000134C Accra GHANAIAN TIMES in English  
26 Feb 90 p 2

[Text] The OAU [Organization of African Unity] has announced that it is considering holding a special summit meeting to discuss the political changes in eastern Europe and their consequences for Africa.

Making the announcement at the OAU headquarters in Addis Ababa last Friday, OAU Deputy Secretary-General Sylvestre Nsanzimana said that the situation in eastern Europe could lead to the rich countries' showing less interest in Africa and less willingness to extend assistance to African countries.

The idea of the summit, he said, was suggested by Madagascar, which proposed that the summit also

examine the reforms in South Africa. The summit should be worthwhile in two crucial respects in connection with the developments in eastern Europe.

It would discuss, as Mr Nsanzimana said, how the situation will affect the Western countries' aid relations with Africa. In this connection, some authoritative Western sources are already making it clear that eastern Europe will be receiving the West's greater attention.

The summit would also consider how the developments in eastern Europe will affect the relations between Africa and the eastern European countries. This is important because African and the east European countries have taken common positions on various issues.

Many Africans are confused about the question of socialism. They see the changes in the East European socialist countries as a rejection of socialism. This has to be discussed for a number of reasons.

By the beginning of the last decade, West European ideologists had begun to deny some of the abuses of the capitalist system, claiming, for instance that after all most capitalist industries were already socializing their practices—such as granting their workers some of the facilities normally enjoyed by workers in the socialist countries.

That was the recognition that in some respects socialist practices are superior—and most of all, that if the socialist reforms were not voluntarily introduced into the capitalist system, there was the danger that they would be introduced by force through revolutions.

So that just yesterday, the West was ready to acknowledge the merits of socialism not just theoretically, but in many practical ways.

Then came the reforms that are now going on in the socialist countries, and we are hearing from the same Western sources some of the worst things about the socialist system.

Africa has not been torn between two contesting ideologies. African countries have been trying with extreme difficulty to chart their own path. But it is not possible, under the present world economic order, not to be seriously affected by the ideologies East and West.

And therefore what does it mean if socialism was good yesterday and no more good just the next day? And what does it mean when the countries with which we shared a lot of common grounds just yesterday on international issues are saying other things the next day? The OAU must discuss the situation thoroughly.



**\* Soviet Delegation Visits PNDC Member Tsikata**

34000134A Accra GHANAIAN TIMES in English  
17 Feb 90 p 1

[Excerpts] The three-man Soviet delegation currently touring the country yesterday paid a courtesy call on Captain Kojo Tsikata, PNDC [Provisional National Defense Council] member responsible for Foreign Affairs and National Security.

Led by Mr A.N. Ilyin, first Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union for the Region of Pskov, the delegation was accompanied by Mr Sam Garba, Deputy Secretary for CDR [Committee for the Defense of the Revolution]s. [passage omitted]

Briefing newsmen later, Mr Ilyin said the visit was to enable them to study on-going Ghana-USSR co-operation projects and to work out ways of resolving present problems.

On the question of the re-unification of the two Germanies, Mr Ilyin said the issue should be considered in the general framework of the World War II and the future of world peace. He did not elaborate.

Recent changes among Soviet allies in Eastern Europe should be viewed separately in the light of events in each country, he said.

**\* Tema Harbor Customs Operations Computerized**

34000134B Accra PEOPLE'S DAILY GRAPHIC  
in English 27 Feb 90 p 1

[Article by Kofi Yeboah-Agyemang, Tema]

[Text] Operations of the Customs, Excise and Preventive Service (CEPS) at the Tema Harbour have now been computerised.

The computer system known as the ASYCUDA is an internationally accepted customs clearing process which is supported by the United Nations.

A source at the CEPS said that the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) which was responsible for the training of the personnel also provided infrastructure back-up.

The source pointed out that the measure is to ensure efficiency in the clearing and forwarding of goods and to eliminate as much as possible fraudulent practices.

Under the new system, importers or exporters are required to quote their importer/exporter and declarant numbers on the entry or forwarding forms, any omission should result in a rejection by the computer.

The source said there were delays in the first two days of operations of the computer process as shipping agents refused to release delivery orders, a pre-requisite without which proper assessment of goods could not be carried out for the entries to be processed.

Graphic investigations revealed that the refusal of the shipping agents in releasing the delivery order stemmed from fears that importers might evade payment of excess demurrage.

**\* Substantial Maize Production Increase in 1989**

34000134D Accra GHANAIAN TIMES in English  
24 Feb 90 p 1

[Article by James Addy, Tema]

[Text] Ghana recorded 715,000 tonnes of maize as total national production last year.

Commodore Steve Obimpeh (rtd) Secretary for Agriculture, announced this yesterday at the Tema Harbour where he supervised the loading of a consignment of maize to Angola.

The consignment is under an agreement between the Ghana Food Distribution Corporation (GFDC) and the European Economic Community (EEC) for the supply of maize to Angola.

Commodore Obimpeh said the country realized 50,000 tonnes of maize as surplus after domestic needs had been met.

He said the Ministry was currently negotiating with the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) for the supply of 5,000 tonnes of maize to Niger.

A consignment of 1,000 tonnes was also expected to be shipped to Guinea soon.

The Secretary described the increase in maize production last year as a great achievement since the country had to import 10,000 tonnes from the World Food Programme (WFP) in 1983.

He attributed the excess in production to the efforts of the people, especially small-scale farmers who worked tirelessly over the past five years.

**\* National Investment Promotion Conference**

**\* Rawlings on Foreign Investors**

34000504 Accra PEOPLE'S DAILY GRAPHIC  
in English 27 Feb 90 pp 1, 8-9

[Article by Joe Bradford Nyinah]

[Excerpts] The leader of the Revolution, Chairman Jerry John Rawlings has cautioned that Ghana would not tolerate foreign investors who would take advantage of the country's size to arrogantly throw their weight about, bribe petty functionaries and engage in smuggling during business trips.

Chairman Rawlings said though he did not doubt the integrity of any investor, the country has experienced some such instances and would not permit such things to go on.

He said the warning should also go to local officials who will offer to assist potential investors from other countries boasting that they have "important contacts" and can smooth their way only to dupe them in the end.

Chairman Rawlings said though investors seek ways to apply their capital to earn profits they would be encouraged in that bid only in so far as this will be beneficial to the country. He was speaking at the opening of the National Investment Promotion Conference at the Kwame Nkrumah Conference Centre in Accra yesterday.

He said Ghana has experienced the exploitation of her wealth to benefit others.

Chairman Rawlings said this was done with a certain ruthless efficiency and aroused anger at such exploitative arrogance, an experience which the Chairman said lingers in the consciousness of a people for a long time and especially where traces of such practices still exist. [passage omitted]

Flt-Lt Rawlings described the situation as a sad but a real fact, adding that the country's history and experience have taught Ghanaians to look for the catch, even when logic tells them that there is a need for the partnership of foreign capital to develop the nation's abandoned resources.

He expressed regret that some of the nation's citizens carry this suspicion to paranoid levels and by their over-zealous assumptions that any foreign businessman must be a shark to exploit the people, manage to discourage some genuinely beneficial investments before they even get off the ground.

He assured genuine investors that they are "very and truly welcome" and appealed to them to just deal fairly and openly with Ghanaians.

"It is to our mutual advantage to bring together our various factors of production and this should be done with mutual respect.

"But I am obliged to state, and to emphasise, that we cannot however tolerate foreign investors who think because Ghana is a small developing nation, they can arrogantly throw their weight about, bribe petty functionaries to cut corners with regard to necessary procedures and even combine a little profitable gold or diamond smuggling with their business trips" he warned. [passage omitted]

#### \* Botchway on Monetary Policy

34000504 Accra PEOPLE'S DAILY GRAPHIC  
in English 27 Feb 90 pp 1, 8-9

[Article by Abigail Bonsu]

[Text] Dr Kwesi Botchway, Secretary for Finance and Economic Planning, has said that within the next two years, the government will pursue institutional and other reforms aimed at giving greater effect to the country's monetary policy.

He said particular attention would be paid to improving liquidity management with a view to rapidly restoring positive real interest rates on time and savings deposits.

The Finance Secretary was speaking on "Economic, Financial and Trade Policy changes affecting Private Domestic Investments (PDI) and Foreign Domestic Investments (FDI)" at the opening session of a three-day conference on investment promotion for the country at the Kwame Nkrumah Conference Centre, State House, in Accra yesterday.

The conference, jointly organised by the Ghana Investments Centre (GIC) and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), aims at encouraging and stimulating PDI into the Ghanaian economy with special emphasis on FDI.

He said additionally, the government will take vigorous action to achieve convertibility in the foreign exchange market and to bring down the rate of inflation.

On the foreign exchange front, tremendous progress has already been achieved," he said.

He explained that certain inefficiencies which characterised the operation of the forex bureaux have been corrected as a result of which the over 40 percent gap which existed between the forex bureaux and the weekly foreign exchange auctions has been reduced to around 10 percent.

"From the objective standpoint of the private foreign investor, the degree of exchange rate risk is accordingly much reduced," Dr Botchway pointed out.

On inflation, he said the government now has a better understanding of the problems underlying it and reiterated that the necessary institutional, financial and monetary arrangements along with appropriate management restructuring is to be undertaken shortly.

Mr Ghassan El-Rifai, Vice-President of MIGA, noted that FDI is currently an important element of economic development and a crucial source for private sector growth which needs to be tapped and significantly expanded.

He called on the government to use the conference to find out from potential investors, policies and conditions which will attract investment to Ghana as well as policies and perceptions which may hinder or discourage private investments.

## Ivory Coast

### Minister Views Succession Issue, Liberian Charges

AB1704142090 London BBC World Service in English  
0630 GMT 16 Apr 90

[From the "Network Africa" program]

[Text] Those of you who heard the later editions of Network last Thursday, will remember our interview with an American journalist, Steven Smith, in the Ivory Coast. He discussed the prospects of the successor to President Felix Houphouet-Boigny. He said that traditional chiefs from the president's home region had already been consulted about a successor and had indeed given their blessing to one man, National Assembly President Henri Konan Bedie. But it seems as if the authorities in the Ivory Coast were pretty upset by that interview.

The defense minister, Jean Konan Banny, one of the regime's heavyweights—he is also mayor of Yamoussoukro—has been on national TV and radio accusing the BBC of telling lies in order to destabilize the country.

So, Elizabeth Blunt, the BBC's West Africa correspondent went to see Mr. Konan Banny and asked him if that wasn't how a new president was being chosen, how would it be done.

[Begin recording] [Banny in French fading into English translation] I want to get one thing clear here and that is, it is the People's Democratic Congress that every five years nominates a candidate and has the right to nominate any candidate it chooses.

[Blunt] But do they vote towards it by acclamation or how do they [do] it?

[Banny] Well, by means of discussions employed by the Congress.

[Blunt] Yes, but the parties have different ways of doing it. In America it an electorate college, in Britain the two main parties have different ways of choosing leaders. And how is it done in the party here in the Ivory Coast?

[Banny] Well, the party meets in congress together with all responsible leaders, parties, secretaries general and members of the administrative committees and they discussed all the problems put to them until they are satisfied and then from there they are going to vote.

[Blunt] And so, it's a vote—not a consensus?

[Banny] Hang on, hang on now there... A vote can end up being a consensus. I do not understand. You have a peculiar way of posing your questions, you know. To vote in other words, to put a ballot paper in a ballot box, is not the only way to express one's feelings. You created the ballot boxes, we also have other ways to make our discussions and decisions. I think you always want other nations to behave exactly the way you do. Do not forget,

a long time ago, it was taken for granted that the only civilized way of eating was with a knife and a fork. But some people eat using bread as an implement and others used their fingers. Well, it does not really matter how you show what you want. You can raise your hands, put your thumbs down or even your head down and your legs up. Each is a way of voting and the important thing is that what counts is the willingness of the people to express themselves.

[Blunt] What about you? Would you like to be a candidate?

[Banny] Are you the Congress? [laughing] I do not think I want to answer that question. [end recording]

That is Jean Konan Banny translated from French, of course. But before Elizabeth Blunt left the defense minister's office, she put him a couple of questions about the food situation in neighboring Liberia, with war on the western border, especially in the Ganta area, and refugees flooding into the Ivory Coast. How did he see the situation?

[Begin recording] [Banny] The Ivorian National Army is charged with the task of safeguarding the territorial integrity of Ivory Coast. That is what interests me and that is what concerns me. What is taking place elsewhere is not my concern. What is taking place in Ivory Coast is my concern.

[Blunt] What about the border? The rebels are operating just on the other side. What orders have you given your soldiers about people going back? For instance, the Liberian ambassador here says that arms are going across the border to the rebels.

[Banny] You know, it is very easy to say such things, but it is very difficult to prove them.

[Blunt] Well, he says that there were four lorryloads of arms which arrived in Ivory Coast from Burkina Faso on 6 March, which then went down to Danane on the border with an Ivorian military escort.

[Banny] But I am really astonished that with such precise information, he did not draw the attention of the Ivorian authorities to this, and that he did not even intercept them.

[Blunt] So, he was not able to intercept them, but I believe he did notify the Ivorian authorities.

[Banny] Well, it is you who are giving me this information.

[Blunt] What is your policy on the matter?

[Banny] It is a constant policy. It is a policy of nonintervention into the affairs of other states.

[Blunt] But do your authorities have orders to stop the rebels crossing?



[Banny] Well, Ivory Coast is a free state. It is a state where people move freely. Ivory Coast is in the center of our subregion and has never crossed its frontiers to anybody. [end recording]

### Government Decides To Postpone Salary Cuts

AB1704210590 Paris AFP in French 2037 GMT  
17 Apr 90

[Text] Abidjan, 17 Apr (AFP)—The Ivorian Government has decided to postpone the salary cuts that were at the root of the social dissatisfaction that since 2 March has resulted in violent anti-government demonstrations, it was learned from well-informed sources yesterday.

Communications Minister Auguste Miremont has told AFP that the postponement of these measures has not yet been officially announced, as the decision has to be discussed by the Political Bureau of the Democratic Party of Ivory Coast (PDCI, only party). A meeting of the country's political organ is slated to be held in the next few days, he pointed out.

### \* Lebanese Accused of Fraud, Corruption

90EF0320A Paris LE MONDE in French  
15 Mar 90 p 8

[Article by Jose-Alain Fralon: "The Lebanese, Scapegoats of the Crisis"]

[Text] Abidjan—"Fraud is as old as the world. However, in our times the greatest defrauders are the Arabs, and among the Arabs the Lebanese." Citing a study by a Lebanese economist, Ivorian President Felix Houphouet-Boigny gave this response during his press conference in Abidjan on 5 March. "It is a bad school for the Ivorians, but one has to say that the pupils have often surpassed the teachers," the chief of state added. Curiously, this brief passage disappeared from the "complete" rebroadcast on television of the presidential statements as well as from the columns of the official daily FRATERNITE MATIN.

Without doubt certain advisers of Mr. Houphouet-Boigny—who had previously always defended "his" Lebanese—preferred not to throw oil on the fire and incite an already generally hostile feeling toward a Lebanese community that is particularly numerous and dynamic. Indeed, the fact that shop windows of some Lebanese nationals were broken during demonstrations by college students on Friday, 2 March, was enough to cause the specter of more violent confrontations, or even pogroms, to reappear.

The discovery in Abidjan at the end of 1988 of an arms cache in the house of a Lebanese Shi'ite, Mr. Abkel Taki, had already caused a stir. Likewise, the rumors—and everyone knows how rapidly they develop here—that the imam of the Lebanese community in the Ivory Coast, Sheik Adnan Zalgouth, had reportedly also played a role in the freeing of the French hostages in Lebanon. To the reproaches, longstanding but intensified today by the

economic crisis, regarding a too quickly achieved wealth, fraud and corruption aimed at the Lebanese of the Ivory Coast, has thus been added in the past few years that of protecting terrorist networks and promoting a pure and hard Islam in a country that is mainly Catholic and animist.

"Exaggeration!", "Nonsense!": the Lebanese in the Ivory Coast angrily defend themselves against these accusations. One businessman said ironically: "Every time a plane blows up, they are going to say it is our fault." However, all recognize that a problem does exist, but it is not up to them to solve it.

### "As for the French, They Are Protected"

"The other whites, the French in particular, are protected by their embassy, by the power of their country, which gives a lot of money to the Ivory Coast. We, on the other hand, are alone. Wedged between the Europeans and the Ivorians, we become the ideal scapegoats," said a manufacturer.

It is clear, in fact, that everything is not really clear. Thus, trying to find out, even approximately, the number of Lebanese living in the Ivory Coast is like an obstacle course. "There are at least 150,000," say some Abidjanese. "More than 100,000," President Houphouet-Boigny recently told President Jumayyil [as published] during a recent Francophone summit. Representatives of the Lebanese community privately admit "80,000." "At maximum 60,000," says Monsignor Paul Khawand, the superior of the Lebanese mission. "Between 35,000 and 40,000," Sheik Adnan Zalgouth believes.

All agree on one point: Christians, previously in the majority, are now much less numerous—about 20 percent of the total—than Muslims (more than 90 percent of them Shi'ites). In fact, the Lebanese community arrived in the Ivory Coast in successive waves. The generation of the "pioneers" that arrived here before the country's independence, often just after the first French colonizers for whom they served as middlemen for their contacts, particularly commercial, with the Ivorians, was followed between 1960 and 1975 by the generation of Lebanese driven from other African countries: Uganda, Kenya, Guinea...

Later, with the conflagration in Lebanon in 1975, there arrived the "others," the most criticized by the Ivorians, but often also by their own compatriots. "Some of them give the impression of having come here to rest between two battles in Beirut. They are extremely arrogant," protests a French doctor. A Lebanese responds to him: "Ridiculous, one would have to be totally ignorant of Lebanese family structures to believe we could accept that." However, another reveals that some members of warring groups in Lebanon come to Abidjan to collect the funds needed for their fighting by imposing a kind of racket on some members of the community. "They imply that if we do not help them, the assets we still own in Beirut could be less well-protected."



However, these practices appear to be exceptional, and one can estimate that the number of "fanaticized" Lebanese living in the Ivory Coast is less than a hundred. "Those who are afraid of the Hizballah are those who really want to be afraid," admits a Lebanese in Abidjan, thus recognizing, however, that the phenomenon does exist. How could it be otherwise? How, despite all the efforts of the Lebanese leaders in the Ivory Coast, could the war that has ravaged their country for 15 years now completely stop being felt only a few flying hours from Beirut?

Nevertheless, "politics" does not seem to be the main concern of the Lebanese of the Ivory Coast. All admit quite frankly that they are there primarily for "business." Business that they conduct briskly, being finally the only ones still investing in a country in crisis. The figures are eloquent: 80 percent of the buildings belong to Lebanese, as well as more than 70 percent of wholesale trade and 50 percent of retail trade. And the Lebanese are not satisfied with trade. Indeed, they now own almost 180 industrial enterprises of the Ivory Coast.

#### "Without Us Everything Would Collapse"

"That is really it, it is really our success that they hold against us," said a manufacturer. "As long as we were only the middlemen for the French, as long as we did the dirty work, they left us in peace. Now that we have risked our money but also worked like crazy to fill the openings that no one wanted to fill, and now that we have made money, they do not forgive us for that." There is indeed an enormous difference between the European businessmen, French for the most part, comfortably installed in their air-conditioned offices, and knowing at any rate that their monthly paycheck is assured by their administration or their company, and these Lebanese, who often live in the midst of the popular districts of the interior towns.

How to judge things? "The Lebanese exploit the local people outrageously, they own everything and it is they who make the law," said one Abidjan resident. "Without us," answered a Lebanese who had lived here for more than 40 years, "everything would collapse. To some degree the Lebanese are a social security fund for the quarter or the village. If a kid is sick, people come to ask the Lebanese to advance money; if there is a funeral, they also come to the Lebanese. Who transports the cocoa? The Lebanese. The cement to build a house, the Lebanese. The construction, again the Lebanese."

#### "People Will Always Ask Me for Money"

The main criticism addressed to the Lebanese of the Ivory Coast, and one to which President Houphouët-Boigny himself referred, can be expressed in two words: fraud and corruption. From the 500 CFA [African Financial Community] francs slipped to the janitor of an administration to the tens of millions diverted "to a minister's Swiss bank account," and the car given to the wife of this same minister, fraud is so widespread in the

Ivory Coast that it is impossible to imagine that the Lebanese could withdraw from it. In private, they themselves recognize this. "The Lebanese," explained a businessman in full candor, "do not like red tape and detest administration. They prefer to give paper money directly to officials rather than filling out the forms."

Ivorian officials, at all levels, they also doubtless having a horror of red tape, have understood how they can take advantage of this shortcoming. "Because I am Lebanese," said one of them, "I will always be asked for money. Any time a gendarme stops me, I know I will be compelled to put my hand in my wallet, even if I am completely according to regulations. A Frenchman summoned to an administration will choose to wait several hours or even return three or four times to obtain such and such document. We, on the other hand, prefer to give a little money, and, like a miracle, the document that was lost will be found."

Higher, much higher, the story is that each Ivorian minister has "his" French technical assistant to draft his reports and "his" Lebanese to settle his personal affairs. "If that is true, anyway the minister would not show much gratitude. Today, a minister rarely agrees to appear at a restaurant with a Lebanese, even if he knows him well, even if he is a friend. He will give the impression of compromising himself," a Lebanese said regretfully, adding: "The suspicions of us are so great that we cannot even participate in charity activities. For example, one of us recently donated an ambulance to a village. Well, they said: That is in order to be forgiven for the money he has stolen!"

The relations among "Europeans," Lebanese, and Ivorians, but also among all the nationalities composing the Ivorian mosaic, are certainly not always so tense, and, after all, this country has lived for 30 years in a climate of peace that is rare in the region. However, the economic crisis afflicting the Ivory Coast risks, if it continues, intensifying the rancor of Ivorians toward the Lebanese, while at the same time making the latter's presence more necessary. "We know very well," concluded a businessman, "that in case of disturbances we will be the first to suffer, but we are fatalists, and then, where can we go? This is our country, here."

## Senegal

### \* Reactions, Reasons for School Strike Noted

#### \* Opposition Blamed for Strike

34190085A Dakar LE SOLEIL in French  
22 Feb 90 pp 1, 2

[Editorial by Alloune Drame: "Time To Act"]

[Text] A second year without classes would mean condemning an entire generation, and the victims, the overwhelming majority of whom are innocent, will have their whole lives to regret this "moral genocide."

The student movement that has recently sprung up, and which we modestly refer to as a strike of Dakar secondary school students, has with its latest developments produced inadmissible acts of violence, the phase of corruption.

This strike—since we resign ourselves to describing it as such—is opening itself to all the evil actions an anarchic situation can generate. A situation that is in any case abnormal inasmuch as [those who have created it] swear by all of the inestimable efforts made last year by both the government and our civil society to improve our students' living conditions. Every Senegalese is aware of this effort that all of us are called on to make.

This is why it is absolutely impossible to understand why, after such solicitude bearing the stamp of ardent patriotism, after the immense teaching effort made by the teachers and their trade unions to restore to the Senegalese school system its letters patent of nobility, and, above all, after a year without classes that was a cruel one for everyone, this is why we say that it is difficult to understand why the political parties, embarrassed by the turn events have taken, thought it wise to once again turn the children loose in the streets.

And, furthermore, it is simply revolting to have to stand by powerless and see this enormous squandering of a majority of the school population, the victims of political manipulation, but who—sad paradox—with their eyes closed appear to be willing to sacrifice their future on the altar of the ambitions of individuals whose fight is elsewhere.

The scandal reaches its peak when we note a certain tendency for them to get used to strikes, to speak of them lightly, as if they were ordinary events of our times.

The first people to call on to react quickly and vigorously in the face of this series of gross distortions of the greatest dangers to our young people are, of course, their parents. They can still preserve the immense sacrifices they made for their children. Every parent possesses a fragment of the solution to the problem in his or her home. In their own interest, in the interest of their children, and in the interest of their country, they should assume their responsibilities at once, at first individually and then collectively in order to ward off the sudden increase in dangers that everyone knows is being orchestrated by "politicians" hiding in the shadows. We would be guilty, not to say cowardly with regard to our children were we not to react when we are all perfectly aware of the ins and outs of the situation and, above all, of what is at stake.

The bitter but belated regrets that accentuated the precedent that the year without classes constituted will no longer be acceptable. Another attitude would mean nameless resignation with respect to the pressing demands of an overwhelming majority of students who are only asking to be protected so that they can go back to school.

I understand these students, led astray as they are by their so-called leaders, who vandalized the classrooms of Seydou Nourou Tall Secondary School, an object of their demands for several years now. Actually, the same leaders, who two days before publicly acknowledged that the government had satisfied virtually all of their demands and that, all things considered, only a few material commodities remained in order to seal the bargain, were at the head of the destructive hooligans at Seydou Nourou Tall yesterday.

We do not need to have a picture drawn for us to see that this was a low-down political maneuver and to reveal in it a deliberate desire to create destabilization.

It was, therefore, also the government that was called on to do something about the parents. It was called on to take firm steps within the framework of its responsibility for the normal functioning of the country's institutions.

The minister of national education promised parents who were concerned about their children's future and students who wanted to escape from the traps of manipulation that he would do this.

It was time to act on behalf of our endangered schools.

#### \* Student Committee Lists Demands

34190085B Dakar SOPI in French 9 Feb 90 pp 4-5

[Statement of demands issued by Senegalese Student Coordinating Committee: "Senegalese Student Coordinating Committee: For a Consistent Struggle Based on Our Platform of Demands"]

[Text] In February 1988 the students of Senegal, under the clear-sighted leadership of the Senegalese Student Coordinating Committee, conducted a heroic struggle to improve the conditions under which they pursue their studies.

Thus, we reached agreement with the Ministry of National Education on 26 of the 31 points on our list of demands. In the face of the legitimate demands made by the students, the government displayed the mediocrity and irresponsibility that are typical of it, which led us straight to the year without classes.

Since then, the sons of our rulers have been fleeing from our schools as though it were the "plague" in search of more clement skies, thus leaving less well-provided-for sons to flounder in the meanders of a dying educational system. We are convinced that an end must be made of this systematic sabotage dictated especially by the necessities of an austerity policy that relegates education to the backburner.

We are also convinced that we must continue to fight for the establishment of a national, democratic, and people's school system in conformity with the recommendations of the States General of Education and Training.

Now, in February 1990—two years have gone by—we note with sadness: The government has not respected the essence of the platform that cost us so many sacrifices.

All of these reasons have led us to propose the platform that follows.

We indeed do not think that the problems of our educational system will be resolved by pulling a rabbit out of a hat.

The only alternative is to fight intelligently to get the government to meet our demands.

For we are convinced that, when the student movement deploys its strength and its majesty, everything will bow before it....

### Senegalese Students' Platform of Demands

#### I. Educational Materials:

- Provision with manuals and books adapted to current programs: books given priority over serial publications.
- Libraries provided with complete works and general circulation of fascicles designed by Senegalese teachers.
- Laboratories and workshops for all secondary schools and CEM's [expansion unknown] with the necessary equipment and satisfactory safety and security conditions to deal with the accidents and frequent thefts that occur in the workshops in particular.
- Sufficient supply of classroom desks.
- Maximum of 50 students per class; in the event of an excess, new classrooms or new schools to be built accordingly and a sufficient number of teachers to be recruited.
- Construction of new CEM's and secondary schools.
- Reconstruction of Seydina Limamou Laye Secondary School.

#### II. Social Issues

1. Operational budgets to be made available to welfare workers.
2. No elimination of scholarships, substantial increase in appropriations, and allocation of funds to all who are in need of them.
3. Active participation of students in the National Scholarship Allocation Commission.

#### III. Legal Issues

1. Police respect for school grounds.
2. Recall of budgets for socioeducational centers of the last 3 years.
3. Drop court actions brought against a comrade.

#### IV. Opportunities Relating to Certain Advancement Channels

Test adapted for holders of Series FF secondary school certificates for admission to ENSULT [expansion unknown] or in ENSUT [expansion unknown] or allocation of scholarships for education abroad.

#### V. French in Senior Year

1. Opportunity for senior year students to take anticipated French exams again.
2. Let French be optional during senior year.

#### VI. Saint-Louis University

1. Allocation of scholarships and housing for all students.
2. Recruitment of a sufficient number of professors.
3. Establishment of a complete documentation center.

#### VII. Technician's Certificate (TC)

1. New rules (elimination of disqualifying grades).
2. Revision of general contract and trainee positions.
3. Scholarships for advanced training abroad.
4. Probationary periods including a course in driving followed by recruitment in order to obtain an automobile mechanic driver's license.
5. Scholarships for TC students.
6. Integration of TC holders.

#### LONG LIVE THE STUDENT MOVEMENT!

#### FOR RALLYING AROUND OUR PLATFORM OF DEMANDS!

The Senegalese Student Coordinating Committee

Monday, 5 February 1990

#### \* University Holds Five Times Optimal Number

34190085C Dakar SOPI in French  
9 Feb 90 p 5

[Article by A.A.S.: "University Is Giving Way at the Seams"]

[Text] Designed for 4,000 students, the University of Dakar today has 19,000. This is a rough figure. That is, five times its original capacity.

#### Sardines

With the arrival of 4,600 new secondary school graduates this year, the university is experiencing disturbing and intolerable overcrowding; which is not without its consequences. Faced with this stream of new arrivals, university authorities have taken the initiative of relieving congestion at the institution by increasing the



number of outgoing students. So, unlike previous years, the deadline for registration has been shortened, fewer exceptions have been granted, and only 76 of the over 300 applications for course changes have been accepted.

As regards the teaching schedule, the authorities plan nonstop operations (0730 to 2200 hours) in certain faculties without providing all the accompanying services (cafeteria, transportation, increase in staff personnel). In the faculties of science and law, in particular, many students are still not in supervised study groups. At the present time one can only find a seat in a faculty through a miracle. "Since the start of the year, I could only sit on three occasions," S. Fall, a first-year student in economic sciences, exclaimed.

"The situation is deplorable everywhere. Whether it is in the university library, the restaurant, or the medical service, the staff suffers from a shortage of personnel. Indeed, eating at a reasonable hour has become a headache! Some leave the restaurant at 1400 hours!"

Furthermore, the demands made during previous strikes are still almost entirely unsatisfied. The government's pledges concerning expansion and rehabilitation of infrastructure (construction of new amphitheatres, equipping of rooms for supervised study groups) have not yet produced any construction starts, despite all the noise made about "Italian credit" amounting to 5 billion CFA [African Financial Community] francs. Moreover, it appears that this item will probably be abandoned.

Combined with the frustration of students still haunted by the specter of a year without classes, this situation may give rise to an explosive situation. And all of the requirements for this are being met because of the attitudes of the government authorities and the university students. For the moment, at least one thing is certain, it will be very hard for them to hold out. And this time, if they start off on the same tack again, it may go very far. It is to be feared that everything is starting all over again.

#### \* University Overcrowding, Conditions Deplored

34190085D Dakar SOPI in French 9 Feb 90 p 4

[Article by Abdou Salam Diop: "Armed Vigil at University"]

[Text] Sheik Anga Diop University has decidedly struck a hard bargain to shake off the torpor into which the periodic strikes of the past few years have plunged it.

And yet as they emerged from the negotiations between the government and the teachers unions and following the promises made to the students, everything led us to believe that the temple of knowledge was going to recover its brilliance of yesteryear. We were given to understand that nothing would be the same as before once again in this great repository of knowledge, which every Senegalese has always and at all times hoped to see

fulfill his true vocation. Today, with regard to the decrepitude that prevails there and the "no future" that it certainly offers those who attend, we are forced to admit that the series of declarations of AG's [expansion unknown], of sit-ins, and other demonstrations given vent to since last 10 January, although they debate such rehashed issues as housing, study conditions, and what all else, they are in keeping with the logic of a new set of problems marked by their serious nature and the urgency of resolving them, which affects the social as well as the pedagogic aspects of the situation. Two troubled areas that have become more critical, particularly this year. [as published] As concerns the social services, first of all, the students denounce the uselessness of a medical service that has become the waiting room of a "dying room," because medicines, even those that meet "basic needs" like nivaquine or aspirin, are in extremely short supply. Constantly. As long as mild illnesses are involved, it is all right....

A visitor who arrives on campus around noon is quickly impressed by the enormously long lines waiting to get into the restaurants. For a student who wants to have lunch, the choice is nevertheless simple: cut the last hour of classes in the morning and get in line before 1130 hours. Then he may well get to eat before 1230 hours, have time for a short breather, to finish off the "three squares," and get back to the faculties easily by 1430 hours.

And just think, students enrolled in PCI do not even have "this privilege" because they have to attend lectures (faculties) from 1200 to 2100 hours. Will most of them, who live outside the student housing complex, make their bus? The bus they jumped off of shortly before 0800 hours? They face the practical problems of obtaining meals and transportation without any sort of solution in sight despite the promises.

A big anthill, that's what the student housing complex has become, swarming with three, four, and even as many as five in the limited space of a small room.

There are today nearly 4,500 students who have been waiting since October for the scholarship allocation commission to decide to meet. Just think for a minute about the situation these new secondary school graduates are in. Another aspect of the overcrowding is the matter of teaching, apart from the fact that schedules are inflexible and incompatible with the usual planning of a weekday (0800 to 1200, 1500 to 1800 hours). The faculties are overcrowded and this leads to monopolization of the premises. If a student does not go to the classroom at least an hour before the lecture begins to get a seat, he even has to be satisfied with sitting on the floor to take notes or simply standing. The question cannot be stated in terms of their ability or inability to study under such conditions, but rather for how long they can do so. Until July?

Meanwhile, the rate of staff recruitment is extremely low, even if the rector does make florid statements to



anyone willing to listen to him, asserting that it is higher than the rate at the Sorbonne.

In any case, in the Faculty of Law they point out that the supervised study groups have not yet been formed and that, even if they are, available teaching assistants are yet to be found. In the face of this catastrophic situation and seeking any solution, Minister of Higher Education Sakhir Thiam has advocated the "theory" of "decreasing the flow of incoming students and increasing the flow of outgoing students" before a parliamentary session of the National Assembly. During the first phase of this relief of overcrowding, we may expect the imminent opening of Saint-Louis University and that all new secondary school graduates will be funneled into it, but we may also expect the possible exclusion of "cartouchards" [repeat students who have failed their first-cycle exams], as is the case at the secondary school and college levels. Moreover, over 100 cartouchards who had applied for a change in course of study had their applications turned

down. Up to now. So, the government is making the student housing complexes unlivable and study conditions difficult for the students in order to force a large number of students to quit or to abandon their studies. Another form of voluntary departure in this sector.

Nevertheless, a solution does exist all the same, and it should be considered: sell Diouf's armored Mercedes. This would resolve all these problems the university is experiencing by assuring instructors better pay, which would reduce their exodus and also make it possible to recruit enough of them and provide students with the means necessary for them to pursue their studies.

But Abdou, the father, (Sunu Baay) seems to prefer the luxury of his car to supporting his "children," who today lack everything.

So, tempers are rising on campus and another strike is looming on the horizon again.

**END OF**

**FICHE**

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